Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Siska de Baerdemaeker
Seminar
Date:Thursday 13 March 2025
Time:13.15 – 15.00
Location:D700
Dark matter realism reconsidered
Abstract
Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg (2024) has convincingly argued in favor of dark matter realism based on Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger.
I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter.
I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter.
I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize: it organizes a structured space of possibilities for fundamental dark matter, and it guide.
