Master’s Course in Theoretical Philosophy
Rollcall and information about the course: August 31 2026, 13-15 in D734.
The Master's course in theoretical philosophy includes such fields as philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science and the history of theoretical philosophy. The course is for students who are well-trained in analytical philosophy and who aim to pursue doctoral studies. It includes a thesis of 30 credits.
Admission
Admission is offered only once a year, for the autumn semester.
Application period
March 16 – April 15, 2026
Requirements
Theoretical Philosophy – Bachelor’s Course, 30 credits, or a Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy. English 6.
Eligibility criteria
If there are more applications than positions, the positions will be allocated based on the grades and the relevance of academic courses, the quality/subject of the bachelor thesis and motivation letter. Please do not forget to upload the motivation letter when you apply!
Information about the motivation letter and the writing sample pdf, 58.7 kB. (58 Kb)
How to apply
Click on the application box in the right hand column.
The first semester: Four modules of 7,5 ECTS credits each.
(To be completed with more information before the application period has ended.)
A. Advanced Course in the History of Philosophy, 7.5 ECTS credits. Final Causes without Divine Design: Plato and Aristotle on why the World is Intelligible
Description of course content: Both Plato and Aristotle subscribe to explanations that have later come to be called ‘final causation’. In Plato’s Phaedo, the character of Socrates criticizes earlier natural philosophy for merely describing material processes or constituents of the universe (Gr. kosmos) without really explaining them. This lack of explanation is often related to the idea that, from Plato’s perspective, earlier natural philosophers could not explain why certain things are for the best. In the Republic, we also find the much-debated claim that the Form of the Good (compared to the Sun) is not only the cause of the intelligibility of the world around us but also its cause of being. This seems to indicate that the Good is central to explain the nature of being in general. The Timaeus, in its turn, provides the truth-like explanation of the universe in terms of the demiurge, a divine artisan organizing the pre-existent, pre-cosmic state of things, the so-called receptacle that plays a role analogous to both matter and space. In the truth-like explanation in the Timaeus, it is specifically the order, implemented by the demiurge on the basis of the model of a living being, that is related to the goodness and intelligibility of the universe. However, notoriously, not even the divine artisan is powerful enough to order the pre-cosmic state of things completely, and the order is only as good as it can be when manifested in space and time.
It is striking that, from Aristotle’s perspective, Plato could not introduce the notion of ‘final causation’ properly despite the criticism of natural philosophy and the reference to the Form of the Good as the ultimate explanatory principle of reality. This is because, for Aristotle, a central way in which we ask why must be understood in terms of ‘for the sake of which’ (later to be called ‘the final cause’). In the later centuries and millennia, Aristotle’s notion of explaining by reference to for-the-sake-of- has often been misunderstood as the claim that there is a general purpose in nature and thus connected to the idea of divine design. However, for Aristotle there is no divine creator, which means that there cannot be divine design either. His abstract notion of god as a divine intelligence (Gr. nous) timelessly grasping itself does not leave room for purposeful creation or any other concern for the cosmos. In Aristotle, god as the prime (unmoved) mover, is not an efficient or formal cause of the universe but a final one. He also identifies the timeless divine self-understanding as the cause or explanation of the intelligibility of the universe (the so-called ‘active’ or ‘productive intellect’). Does this mean that divine self-understanding is the basis of the intelligibility of the cosmos because it is a form of understanding (Gr. noein)? Or, does it mean that in fact the basis of the intelligibility of the world lies in final causation? From this perspective, we can understand the world because we can understand functions (for-the-sake-of-which), and only functions can explain, for instance, why certain material processes are organized in a certain way in living beings. Without such explanation, the world would not be intelligible because the movements of matter would not be governed by such principles and would lapse into chaos.
Instructor: Miira Tuominen.
Examination: Assignments/essay.
B. Advanced Course in Epistemology, 7,5 ECTS credits. Emotions and Moral Knowledge.
Description of course content: A leading view in the epistemology of emotion is that emotions can help us to learn about the evaluative realm. Some think that emotions are necessary for acquiring evaluative concepts, others for accessing evaluative truths, and others for acquiring evaluative understanding. Still others deny that emotions are necessary for any of these aims. In this course, we will explore the question of how emotions are involved in the acquisition of specifically moral knowledge and understanding. We will also discuss whether the lessons learned regarding the moral can be generalized to other kinds of evaluative knowledge and understanding or whether there is something particular about the moral realm that makes knowledge and understanding in that domain relevantly different from other evaluative domains.
Instructor: Tricia Magalotti.
Examination: Essay.
C. Advanced Course in Philosophy of Science, 7.5 ECTS credits. Scientific Realism.
Description of course content: The scientific realism debate is one of the classical debates in philosophy of science. Scientific realists claim that the core tenets of predictively successful and empirically well-confirmed scientific theories should be taken to be approximately true. Often, this view is understood in the sense that the theory’s scientific objects refer to something in the external world. Scientific antirealists, to the contrary, deny those claims. The debate is of crucial importance for understanding the status of scientific reasoning. In the course, we will develop a broad perspective on the debate. We will start by looking at the related but different metaphysical realism debate, which addresses the question as to whether it makes sense to posit a world independent from the human perspective. We will then discuss the historic roots and classical core arguments of the scientific realism debate. The final part of the course will address recent developments and perspectives.
Instructors: Richard Dawid.
Examination: Assignments/essay.
D. Advanced Course in Theoretical Philosophy, 7.5 ECTS credits. Decision and Game theory.
Description of course content: Decision theory is a formal, mathematical framework for analyzing choice, focusing on the relationships between actions, preferences, beliefs, and desires. Closely related, game theory examines strategic interactions among rational agents whose outcomes depend on one another’s choices. The first four lectures introduce the foundations of decision theory, including utility theory, the representation of preferences, expected utility maximization, and the key axioms that underpin it (such as completeness, transitivity, and independence), as well as the distinction between decision-making under risk and under uncertainty. The remaining lectures turn to game theory, beginning with a taxonomy of games—distinguishing, for example, between perfect and imperfect information, simultaneous and sequential moves, and zero-sum and non-zero-sum settings—before developing core analytical tools such as normal-form representations, payoff matrices, dominant strategies, and best responses. The course culminates in a detailed study of Nash equilibrium, in both pure and mixed strategies, and its central role in understanding strategic reasoning.
Instructors: Anders Schoubye and Orri Stefanson
Examination: Assignments/essay
The student must pass the examinations of the first semester in order to proceed to the second semester.
The second semester: Thesis work (30 credits)
Instructor: Anders Schoubye
The second semester consists of a thesis work (30 credits). The topic is elective but must be approved by the convenor and must fit the research profile of the members of the faculty. A supervisor will be allocated to the student, based on her or his project description. The final grade of the entire course is determined by the grade of the thesis. The exam of the thesis part consists in the thesis itself, a defence of it at a seminar, and an opposition on another student’s thesis at a seminar. It is recommended to study the grading criteria and the guidelines for the thesis.
Since an entire semester is devoted to writing the thesis, the demands are higher than for a bachelor’s thesis, with respect to volume (approximately 40 pages), content, and degree of independence in the writing process. This is reflected in the grading criteria.
Assessment
Examination: Assignments/essay
Course convenor: Associate Professor Anders Schoubye anders.schoubye@philosophy.su.se
Director of studies: Mattias Högström mattias.hogstrom@philosophy.su.se





