Profiles

Mathias Herzing

Mathias Herzing

Post Doctor

Visa sidan på svenska
Works at Department of Economics
Telephone 08-16 30 43
Email mathias.herzing@ne.su.se
Visiting address Universitetsvägen 10 A, plan 4 & 7
Room A 712
Postal address Nationalekonomiska institutionen 106 91 Stockholm

About me

I obtained my PhD in 2005 at the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, and have since 2006 been affiliated with the Department of Economics, Stockholm University. I teach microeconomic and game theory courses. My research interests are microeconomics, industrial organization and applied game theory. In recent years my main focus has been on environmental inspections and enforcement.

Publications

A selection from Stockholm University publication database
  • 2016. Jonas Häckner, Mathias Herzing. Journal of Economic Theory 163, 141-166

    This paper discusses how marginal costs of public funds are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Under a quite general tax scheme, these costs turn out to be lower the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, marginal costs of taxation are lower in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. In cases when marginal costs of public funds cannot easily be assessed we ask if pass-through rates can provide useful information for policy makers. The market characteristics that we analyze are shown to have opposite effects on pass-through and marginal costs of public funds. It is also demonstrated that the marginal cost of public funds is generally lower for ad valorem taxes than for unit taxes. The main results are based on a linear demand system, but a number of extensions confirm that our main results are reasonably robust.

  • 2015. Rikard Forslid, Mathias Herzing. Health Economics 24 (6), 726-741

    This paper analyzes the profit maximizing capacity choice of a monopolistic vaccine producer facing the uncertain event of a pandemic in a homogenous population of forward-looking individuals. For any capacity level, the monopolist solves the intertemporal price discrimination problem within the dynamic setting generated by the standard mathematical epidemiological model of infectious diseases. Even though consumers are assumed to be identical, the monopolist will be able to exploit the ex post heterogeneity between infected and susceptible individuals by raising the price of vaccine in response to the increasing hazard rate. The monopolist thus bases its investment decision on the expected profits from the optimal price path given the infection dynamics. It is shown that the monopolist will always choose to invest in a lower production capacity than the social planner. Through numerical simulation, it is demonstrated how the loss to society of having a monopoly producer decreases with the speed of infection transmission. Moreover, it is illustrated how the monopolist's optimal vaccination rate increases as its discount rate rises for cost parameters based on Swedish data. However, the effect of the firm discount rate on its investment decision is sensitive to assumptions regarding the cost of production capacity.

  • 2011. Mathias Herzing. Canadian Journal of Economics 44 (2), 561-579

    P>This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in finite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely.Ce memoire etudie l'impact de l'information cachee sur l'interaction strategique dans le contexte des accords de commerce. Quand il y a asymetrie de l'information, il est possible qu'emerge une relation d'equivalence entre la liberalisation et la viabilite de la cooperation. On montre qu'il peut etre optimal de s'entendre sur un degre de liberalisation associe a une probabilite ex ante strictement positive qu'une deviation va se produire. Dans ce cas, la cooperation va s'effriter dans une periode finie, et le degre optimal de liberalisation ne tient pas indefiniment.

  • 2013. Henrik Artman (et al.).

    Målsättningen har varit att ta fram ny kunskap inom miljötillsynen och därigenom uppnå en effektivare miljötillsyn samt att få in nya vetenskapliga perspektiv på miljötillsyn.

    I rapporten studeras metoder för inspektioner och det kommunikativa samspelet mellan inspektören och företrädare för den verksamhet som inspekteras, hur den institutionella ramen för inspektionsprocessen fungerar samt visar på möjligheter att mäta effekterna av inspektioner och tillsyn.

    Naturvårdsverket kommer att ha resultatet som ett kunskapsunderlag i fortsatt arbete med tillsynsvägledning och utveckling av hur tillsyn och tillsynsvägledning kan följas upp och utvärderas.

  • 2008. Mathias Herzing, Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson. Ekonomisk debatt
Show all publications by Mathias Herzing at Stockholm University

Last updated: June 6, 2018

Bookmark and share Tell a friend