Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Felix Lambrecht (LMU Munich)

Diachronic Group Responsibility

Seminarium

Datum:

onsdag 9 april 2025

Tid:

13.15 – 15.00

Plats:

D700

Abstract

Most people endorse some form of the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis: Group agents can be responsible for actions committed in the past. For instance, contemporary Germany is responsible for the wrongs of the Holocaust. Contemporary Canada is responsible colonial wrongs committed in the 19th century. Contemporary Chiquita Brands International is responsible for brutality on its banana plantations in the 20th century.

However, in many cases, the properties of most of the groups we hold responsible for past wrongs have changed since the time at which the wrongs occurred. For instance, nearly every property of Germany (members, territory, government structure, etc...) has undergone significant change since the time it committed its wrongs during World War Two.

So, to vindicate the Diachronic Group Responsibility Thesis, we need an account that explains why a present group agent can be responsible for an action committed in the past by a past agent that appears not to share any properties with the present group agent. In this paper I provide such an account.

On the account I construct, group G2 at t2 is responsible for an action committed by G1 at t1 if G2 does an action which commits G2 to being bound by G1’s actions. Call this the Commitment Account of Diachronic Group Responsibility. I argue that the Commitment Account is superior to the alternative accounts on offer by demonstrating that it better captures our intuitive judgments about cases and better coheres with accounts of group agency more broadly.