Abstract

Several philosophers have argued that derogatory language can be analyzed by appeal to the linguistic frameworks by Stalnaker and Lewis, according to which utterances aim to update a shared body of information mutually accepted among the interlocutors. The thought is that by making a derogatory claim, the speaker aims to add derogatory or offensive content(s) to this shared body of information. However, a problem about this approach is that these frameworks are primarily designed to model mutual belief. This seems to make them ill-equipped to accommodate the normative dimensions of derogatory speech, which (roughly) has to do with the ways that derogatory speech condones mistreatment of certain groups of people. The challenge is to show how these frameworks can be expanded such that they can do justice to the way that derogatory and offensive language  puts pressure on action or attitudes. I propose that this challenge can be met by appeal to an expanded version of Stalnaker’s pragmatic framework. I argue that this expanded framework offers a way to account for the way that language can enforce both offensive stereotypes and derogatory norms for action and offer a theory of how these contents are represented in the discourse structure.