Abstract

In this talk I present an account of a philosophically underdiscussed speech act: invitation. I propose that, when A invites B to φ, A therein issues B with a permission-giving discretionary directive to engage in an activity that A is to host. As it is a sincerity condition of invitation, I maintain, that A i) desires φ-ing with B and ii) believes it to be (at least) possibly desirable for B to φ with A, A represents herself as possessing these attitudes in inviting B (though A might in fact lack them). My proposal satisfies a key desideratum for an adequate view of invitation, namely its being able to distinguish invitations from offers, on the one hand, and proposals for joint activity, on the other. This feature of my view is reflected in what I propose to be the distinctive value of the power to invite: our having a measure of creative autonomy over the relationships we cultivate.