Högre seminarium i praktisk filosofi: Orri Stefánsson

tisdag 5 oktober 2021 13.15 – 15.00

Zoom

Should I offset or should I instead do more good?

Abstract

Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Is there any moral reason for offsetting rather than giving to some charity that does good more effectively? There would be such a reason if your offsetting compensated the victims of your emission. But it does not. In fact, you have reason to believe that if your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are different people. How else might we justify offsetting rather than giving to more efficient charities? The most promising route might seem to go via contractualism. But, I argue, both ex post and ex ante versions of contractualism have difficulties in justifying offsetting instead of doing more good.

Commentator: Olle Torpman (IF)