Stockholm History of Philosophy Workshop: Jari Kaukua (Jyväskylä)
Seminarium
Datum: fredag 10 mars 2023
Tid: 13.15 – 15.00
Plats: D700
Concepts, conceivability, and metaphysical possibility in Avicenna
Abstract
In his theory of science, Avicenna seems to commit to a very demanding concept of concept (taṣawwur): only the intellect’s adequate conceptions of real essences are concepts in the strict sense. This lands him the task of explaining what it is that we are doing when we think of things that are never realised, such as phoenixes or counterfactual worlds. I suggest that his solution relies on a nuanced distinction, grounded in his psychology, between a descriptive and a normative concept of concept. Unrealised, and consequently impossible, things are not conceivable in the strict sense of the word (they do not have real concepts), but they may be conceived as conjunctions of real concepts that are instantiated in mental images construed by our imagination. Such conjunctions may be epistemically indistinct from real concepts, which raises interesting questions concerning the metaphysical or scientific consequences of conceivability. Thus, I conclude with the suggestion that Avicenna would not have appreciated conceivability as a sign of metaphysical possibility.
Senast uppdaterad: 3 mars 2023
Sidansvarig: Department of Philosophy