Anubhav Jha, Princeton University

Seminar

Date: Tuesday 28 November 2023

Time: 13.00 – 14.30

Location: IIES Seminar Room A822/Hybrid

Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication

Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication

 

Abstract: Political rallies have formed a large part of U.S. electoral campaigns since the 19th century and remain relevant today. This paper models candidates’ rally decisions as an empirical dynamic game of electoral competition and applies it to estimate rally effectiveness for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The model supports three empirical patterns. As the election approaches, candidates rally more, concentrate on tight state-level races, and within those tight races, they hold more rallies in states with more electoral college votes. Model parameter estimates uncover that rallies by presidential candidates were effective in increasing their poll margin lead over their opponent. The estimates also reveal that a rally by a presidential candidate is more persuasive than a television ad. I construct and execute model selection tests that infer whether candidates are strategic and forward-looking to validate model assumptions. Counterfactual exercises show that Trump’s rallies were electorally pivotal, while rallies by other candidates had no effect on their chances of winning. The effects of short-term campaign silences (i.e., forbidding political campaigning) are limited since candidates can gain sufficient support from the electorate before campaign silences begin.

 

Last updated: November 27, 2023

Source: Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)