A General Non-Manipulable Matching Mechanism for Markets with One-sided Preferences

ABSTRACT: For an important class of matching problems, matching markets that doesn’t look very similar share some common properties, e.g., lattice and strategy structures. To identify a non-manipulable matching mechanism on a general matching market, that includes some of the most studied matching markets as special cases, both a preference domain and a rationing mechanism, that includes some of the most studied preference domains and rationing mechanisms as special cases, must be identified. This paper shows how restrictions imposed on the price space and the ownership structure can endogenuously define the preference domain, the rationing mechanism and the matching mechanism. The main result demonstrates that the endogeously generated matching mechanism is non-manipulable for the considered general matching market. Furthermore, the celebrated deferred acceptance and top-trading cycles algorithms turn out to be special cases of our more general matching mechanism.  

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