Sebastian Tebbe's thesis available for download

The thesis "Externalities and Coordination Failures" consists of three chapters.

 

Peer Effects in Electric Car Adoption: Evidence from Sweden

Sebastian looks at how peers (such as coworkers, family, and neighbors) influence the spread of electric cars in Sweden. These so called peer effects cause a permanent change in the demand for electric cars – diesel and gasoline cars are pushed out of the market by new electric cars bought by peers. Peer effects are also linked to spreading information. Through these peer effects, carbon pollution is reduced as people are more likely to buy electric or clean cars, drive less, as well as have fewer cars. In his paper he also shows how the empirical results change how the best environmental policies are made. 

 

Optimal Congestion Zone Pricing, Driving Behavior, and Vehicle Choice

Driving in cities causes traffic jams and pollution, so many places have set up location-based road pricing policies. In this paper, Sebastian investigates what the best way is to charge for traffic congestion, focusing on local pollution and traffic. He looks at how a brief exemption from congestion charge for cars driven by alternative fuels as well as the amount of times people have to pay congestion fees on their way to work affect car ownership and driving behavior in Stockholm. He finds that people who have to pay congestion fees on their way to work are more likely to buy a car that runs on alternative fuels rather than buying a traditional one running on fossil fuels. He also finds that commuters in alternative-fueled cars would increase their driving by 157 kilometers whilst people driving cars on fossil fuels would drive 298 kilometers less which suggests that commuters found alternative ways of getting to work. The empirical figures suggest that the best congestion charge would be, on average, €.38 per entrance, with less driving in the congestion zone accounting for three-quarters of the total charge.

 

Do We All Coordinate in the Long Run?

In laboratory weak-link coordination games*, players often don't work together to find the best balance. In this study, Sebastian and his co-authors look into whether these problems can be fixed by increasing the number of rounds or changing the stakes per period. They find that players are less likely to play more than the minimum choice from the previous period when the horizon is longer or the stakes per period are smaller. They also examine which sociodemographic factors and personality traits have the strongest relationship with the coordination game. The trait that is linked to good coordination is cognitive ability.

*A weak-link coordination game is a coordination game among people. It describes the situation where a player will earn a higher payoff when they select the same course of action as another player. Providing effort is costly, however, so players have an incentive not to exceed the group minimum. Players hence face a trade-off between exerting high effort to increase the group’s payoff and avoiding unnecessarily high costly effort above the group minimum.

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Sebastian will also defend his thesis on 13 June.

Click here for more information about the defense