The standard approach in game theory is to analyze social situations in terms of *solution concepts*.  A solution concept is a  systematic description of the players' choices across a wide class of  game situations.   Each solution concept (the most well-known is the Nash equilibrium) is  thought to be the embodiment of rational behavior.  In this talk, I develop a model of strategic reasoning in games and show how it can be used to analyze game situations in terms of the players' "processes of deliberation" that leads them to make their choices. On this view, the rational outcomes of a game situation are arrived at through a process in which     each decision maker settles on an optimal choice   given her      evolving beliefs about   her own choice and her opponent's choices.  The general conclusion is that the rational outcomes in a game situation depend  not only on the structure of the game (i.e., the feasible actions and preferences for each player), but also on the participants' initial beliefs and inclinations,   which update mechanisms are being used   to update their beliefs and inclinations,  and what exactly is   commonly believed  about the process of deliberation.