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What Determines the Reference of Names? Neither Practice nor Epistemic Fix.

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Abstract:

It is fairly widely accepted that Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, and others showed in the 1960s-1980s that proper names, in particular uses by speakers, can refer to things free of anything like the epistemic requirements posited by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. This paper separates two aspects of the Frege-Russell view of name reference: (i) the metaphysical thesis that names in particular uses refer to things in virtue of speakers thinking of those things and (ii) the epistemic thesis that thinking of things requires a means of determining (in the sense of figuring out or identifying) which thing one is thinking of. My question is whether the Kripke-Donnellan challenge should lead us to reject (i), (ii), or both. Contrary to a popular line of thinking that sees practices or conventions, rather than singular thinking, as determinative of linguistic reference, my answer is that we should reject *only* the epistemic thesis, *not* the metaphysical one.

0. Introduction

Both Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell placed strong epistemic requirements on thinking of a thing. For Frege, in order to think of a thing a thinker needs an individuating mode of presentation singling it out. For Russell, a thinker needs a special sort of immediate acquaintance with the thing thought of. These views are species of what I will call the *Determinative Epistemic Requirements on Singular Thinking Thesis* (DERST): if a thinker is thinking of a thing then she has within her psychology (perhaps implicitly) some means of determining (in the epistemic sense of *identifying*) which thing she is thinking of. She has an epistemic fix on the thing. Frege and Russell also saw language as thoroughly enmeshed with thinking,[1] such that a proper name as used by a speaker on a given occasion refers to a particular thing in virtue of being an expression of the speaker's thinking of that thing. I will call this the *Priority of Singular Thinking to Reference Thesis* (PSTR). Combining these two theses, Frege and Russell also held—or, as I will say in what follows, adopting the simplified synthesis of their views by Saul Kripke (1980), the "Frege-Russell view" held—that to refer to a thing with a name, a speaker needs a means

[1] As Gareth Evans observed about Russell, "He was accustomed to go straight from remarks about 'the thought in the mind of the man who utters a certain sentence' to remarks about the nature of the statement he was making, the proposition he was putting forward, and so on." (Evans 1982, p. 67.) Evans here quotes from Russell's 1912 *The Problems of Philosophy*.

of determining which thing her use of the name refers to. I will call this the *Determinative Epistemic Requirements on Name Reference Thesis* (DERNR). Kripke and Keith Donnellan spearheaded a challenge to DERNR[2] that has been widely endorsed.

In this paper, I am going to take it for granted that the Kripke-Donnellan challenge shows that proper names, as used by speakers, can refer to things free of anything like the epistemic requirements posited by Frege and Russell (that is, DERNR is false). I am interested in which of the two aspects of the Frege-Russell view should be given up, conditional on accepting this. Should one give up the metaphysical thesis that names in particular uses refer to things in virtue of speakers thinking of those things (reject PSTR)? Or should one give up the epistemic thesis that thinking of things requires a means of determining (identifying) which thing one is thinking of (reject DERST)? Or should one reject both PSTR and DERST? My answer will be that we should reject *only* DERST, *not* PSTR.

This runs counter to a popular line of thinking according to which at least part of the problem with the Frege-Russell view is that it fails to recognize the independence of linguistic reference from thought. As Genoveva Martí puts it, language should be seen as a conventional institution with "a life that goes beyond the actions, interactions, mental states, intentions, and goings-on in the minds of [its] members." (2015: 85) Accordingly, words in speakers' mouths have a life of their own, and may refer to particular things independently of what those speakers may be thinking of. This line of thinking faces what Howard Wettstein calls "the Fregean's good question": "What, other than some sort of cognitive contact, could possibly connect a piece of language with what it's about?" (2004: 78)[3]

Wettstein, Martí and others who take up this question place our name-using practices or conventions in the connecting role. But, I will argue, it is not clear how these practices or conventions can fill this role. Their failure to do so lends support to the view that the connection between an utterance and what it refers to *is* "some sort of cognitive contact": in particular, the connection is the speaker's thinking of that thing, where that thinking gives rise to the utterance. The speaker's thinking of the thing does not require her to have a determinative epistemic fix on the thing: both DERST and DERNR are false. But PSTR is true. Appeal to practices should not make us comfortable rejecting PSTR.

The paper is organized in six sections. In section 1, I introduce the Kripke-Donnellan challenge and explain how it seems to make pressing the question of what determines the reference of a name as used. In section 2, I present one version of the 'Practice Approach,' which is the general approach to answering this question that appeals

[2] Most centrally, in Kripke 1980 and Donnellan 1970, 1974.
[3] Martí calls roughly the same issue "the 'magic' objection." (2015: 89)

to linguistic practices. This version of the Practice Approach focuses on the idea that the reference of a present utterance might be inherited directly from previous utterances to which it is causally linked (i.e., not *via* the thinking of the speaker). The challenge for such an idea, I find, is that the usual processes by which name-utterances are produced do not look like reference-preserving kinds of processes. In section 3, I discuss two versions of the Practice Approach that do not rely on causal inheritance of reference. I find that the challenge for these views is in articulating what connection to a practice a use of a name needs in order to be absorbed into that practice. In section 4, I argue that the Practice Approach is not supported by appeal to a distinction between actual or conventional or utterance reference, on the one hand, and merely intended or speaker's reference, on the other. In section 5, I explore further the prospects for an account of reference determination in terms of practices by considering cases of referring with names in total ignorance of the referent and providing support for the idea that the reference of the names is not prior to the thinking of the thing even in such cases. Finally, I conclude in section 6 with a brief mention of my own take on the question of reference determination and the direction in which the Kripke-Donnellan challenge pushes us: toward the rejection of epistemic requirements on singular thinking.

1. The Reference Determination Question

The work of Kripke and Donnellan sharply challenged *DERNR*.[4] They pointed to the fact that people succeed in referring to things with names though they possess very little, and no uniquely identifying, information about the things, and though they certainly lack immediate acquaintance with those things and do not 'know which' things they are, even on an ordinary understanding of 'know which.' Just to rehearse one of Kripke's examples: someone who has heard of Richard Feynman may refer to Feynman by his use of the name 'Feynman' even if the only information he associates with the name is something like 'a physicist.' (1980: 81)

Kripke thought that his challenge to *DERNR* created a new challenge in turn: a problem about reference determination. At the beginning of *Naming and Necessity* he describes the question of what determines the reference of a name as "the basic problem for any view such as Mill's [including Kripke's own view]." (1980, p. 28) The question concerns determination of reference not in the epistemic sense of how the speaker or others might figure out or identify what she refers to, but in the metaphysical sense of in

[4] The focus of this essay is proper names, although the challenge I am calling the 'Kripke-Donnellan' challenge was broader, encompassing—especially together with the work of Putnam 1970, 1975—at least certain common nouns and arguably many other kinds of words. I believe that much of what I say in this essay applies to referring by other kinds of words, but I will not defend that generalization here, where I restrict the discussion to proper names.

virtue of what the speaker refers to what she does. I will call this the 'Reference Determination Question' ('RDQ'). Kripke thinks that the Frege-Russell view has an answer to this question. This answer comes from converting the epistemic thesis DERNR into a metaphysical thesis according to which not only is it necessary for reference that a speaker has a means of identifying her referent, but also this means of identifying the referent is what makes a particular thing be the referent. That is, it is in virtue of the fact that the speaker would in principle identify her referent in a certain way (e.g. as whatever satisfies a certain condition she associates with her use of the name) that the thing that would be so identified is the referent.

If the Kripke-Donnellan challenge is correct, though, DERNR is false and so cannot be appealed to in supplying an answer to RDQ. If names, as used, may refer to particular things in the absence of speakers having any means of singling out those things, then it cannot be in virtue of such identifying conditions that used names in general refer to what they do. Having eliminated associated identifying conditions from being that in virtue of which used names refer to particular things, one's answer to RDQ could still uphold PSTR. Such an answer to RDQ would be that in the Feynman case (for instance) the speaker is able to *think* of Richard Feynman despite having no determinative epistemic fix on him, and it is in virtue of being generated by such thinking of Richard Feynman that the speaker's use of the name 'Richard Feynman' *refers* to Richard Feynman. This is the general form of answer to RDQ that I favor.[5]

For Wettstein, Martí, and others, this kind of answer is off the table, because they reject PSTR in addition to DERNR. They seek to answer RDQ in a way that does not appeal to the speaker's thinking of the referent. They may allow that thinking of things causes referring utterances (which often refer to the very same things thought of), but they deny that referring utterances refer to things *because* (in virtue of the fact that) they are caused by (or otherwise connected with) the speaker's thinking of those things. Instead, they view our referential practices or conventions in using names as key to answering RDQ. I will call this general orientation the 'Practice Approach,' and I will focus my discussion on three recent elaborations of it.

I will discuss two broad strategies within the Practice Approach. One strategy builds on Kripke's idea that a use of a name refers to a particular thing in virtue of being causally linked to earlier uses tracing back to an introduction of the name as a name of that thing. The other strategy views such causal-historical linkages to earlier uses as inessential to reference. To focus the discussion, I will use a recent account of reference by Andrea Bianchi (2015) as a representative of the first strategy, and accounts due to Martí (2015)

[5] It is not an aim of the present paper to develop a positive answer in this direction, but only to make the case that this is the direction we should go in. I will say a little bit more about developing an answer in this direction at the end of section 5 and in the Conclusion.

and Wettstein (2004) as representatives of the second. I believe that the points I make for the most part will generalize to other accounts following similar strategies.

2. First Practice Approach Strategy: Causal inheritance of reference

The first strategy for answering RDQ while rejecting PSTR incorporates Kripke's idea of a chain that stretches from an introduction of a name to the use in question. Kripke describes the idea in the following passage:

> Someone, let's say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can't remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. (1980, p. 91)

It should be noted that this passage is not in conflict with PSTR. It might be that what happens when reference is passed along as if by a chain is as follows. First, a speaker refers by "Feynman" to Feynman in virtue of her use of "Feynman" being generated by her thinking of, or having in mind, Feynman. Second, her referring act causes someone else to think of Feynman, to get him in mind, which eventually (perhaps some time later) causes this new speaker also to refer to Feynman by "Feynman." Like the first use, this second use refers to Feynman in virtue of having been generated by the speaker's thinking of Feynman.[6]

To instead reject PSTR while taking up the picture articulated in this passage, one would fill out the picture by describing a passage from link to link of just the *word* "Feynman," and by viewing the convention or practice associated with the word as that in virtue of which each subsequent use continues to refer to Feynman. Filling out Kripke's

[6] Various accounts might be given of this "transmission of having in mind." Kaplan 2012, Almog 2014, and Pepp 2012 provide a few recent developments. The relevant notion of "having in mind" comes from Donnellan's above-cited work. But all that is needed for present purposes is that the second speaker comes to have Feynman in mind as a result of hearing the first speaker's use of the name and that this having in mind or thinking of Feynman is not itself in virtue of the second speaker's now thinking with the *word* "Feynman." This last condition is needed because if the second speaker's thinking of Feynman were in virtue of her mentally invoking the word "Feynman," then the reference of the word would be prior to her singular thinking of Feynman. I will say more below (see the end of section 5) about why the condition is plausible.

picture in this way requires separating the transmission of the word from the transmission of thinking about the thing referred to. A natural way to do this is to focus on the transmission of surface forms (e.g. orthographic or phonological). What a given use of a name refers to then may be said to be determined by the causal source of the surface form of that use of the name, ultimately going back to an introduction of that surface form as a name for a particular thing.

As Kripke noted, the referent of a name as used is not always determined by the introduction that is the ultimate source of the surface form of the name. Speakers can repurpose surface forms, as when they name one thing after another, and in these cases their uses of the name (the same surface form) may refer to something other than what it was introduced to refer to in the introduction that is the source of their use of that surface form. And as Gareth Evans pointed out concerning the name "Madagascar," such repurposing can happen even when speakers intend to use a given surface form in referring to the same thing as was referred to in source uses.[7]

What these cases of intentional and unintentional repurposing reveal is that copying a surface form from a previous utterance as part of making a new referring utterance does not make the new referring utterance refer to what the previous one did, regardless of the speaker's intentions. Indeed, I think it is not even the case that copying surface forms when referring provides a default preservation of reference that may be overridden by the speaker's intentions (as in a namesake case) or by the speaker's social position combined with subsequent history (as in the "Madagascar" case). Rather, I think that copying surface forms from previous uses is simply not relevant to the referring of names as used. If this is right, then it is not clear how to develop a view of reference that is broadly Kripkean but rejects PSTR.

To bring out why I think that this *is* right, I will focus on a recent attempt by Andrea Bianchi (2015) to set out a broadly Kripkean view of reference that rejects PSTR. I choose Bianchi's account as a target because it highlights the copying of surface forms as a critical part of determining the referents of names in particular uses. An important role for such copying is implicit in most Kripkean views, and by discussing Bianchi's view I aim to bring out why it is not a good basis for answering the RDQ.

On Bianchi's account, an utterance of a proper name (he calls such an utterance a "linguistic particular" or "proper name token") refers to a particular thing in virtue of

[7] Evans (1973) introduced the much-discussed case of the name "Madagascar," quoting Isaac Taylor's 1898 *Names and their History*: "In the case of 'Madagascar' a hearsay report of Malay or Arab sailors misunderstood by Marco Polo … has had the effect of transferring a corrupt form of the name of a portion of the African mainland to the Great African Island." (11) The case was meant to illustrate that a name—a surface form, that is—could change its reference despite each speaker in the chain of communication intending to keep it the same.

being a *repetition*[8] of an utterance that was an *introduction* of that name for a thing. The idea here is that if one repeats an utterance of a name, one's utterance refers to the same thing that was referred to by the utterance one repeated. This preservation of the referent is transitive, so a repetition of the repetition also has the same referent, and so on.[9] Repeating an utterance, for Bianchi, is reasonably understood as copying the surface form of that utterance. Thus, although repeating a linguistic particular may involve thinking of the repeated linguistic particular, it need not involve thinking of the thing referred to by the repeated linguistic particular. By repeating a particular one may thus refer to a thing by name not because one is thinking of the thing (as PSTR would hold) but because one repeats an utterance that introduced a name for it.

There is some initial plausibility to this idea. In certain contexts, copying surface form does seem to preserve reference. If I print out this paper and make several photocopies of it, the printed name 'Bianchi,' for instance, will keep on referring to Bianchi in each of the copies. If I take a photo of Bianchi and make copies or enlargements of it, each of these prints will be of Bianchi. Bianchi's suggestion is that ordinary referring utterances of the name 'Bianchi' are likewise copies of previous utterances. Thus, each one retains the reference of the one it repeats.

Bianchi's picture of reference can be made vivid by imagining someone who speaks by splicing together recordings of previous utterances and playing these back to make new utterances. She might collect such recordings of utterances from various sources, assembling a large stock of them. Suppose that in testing her playback buttons, or perhaps in absent-mindedly pressing them, this person at some point plays back a recording of a previous utterance of the name 'Bianchi' that referred to a bicycle company by that name. Let us allow that the new 'linguistic particular' produced by the playing back of the recorded utterance would also refer to the bicycle company in virtue of the recorded utterance having so referred. This seems similar to how a copy of a printed name would refer to the same thing as was referred to by the printed name of which it is a copy.

But the situation is rather different when the speaker instead uses these played back recordings to refer to things in speaking. Suppose that the speaker plays back a recording of an utterance of 'Bianchi' that referred to the bicycle company as part of referring, for her own part, to the philosopher. She may or may not be aware of what the recorded utterance referred to, but this does not seem to matter. She simply selects a recording with a surface form that serves her purposes. It seems clear that *her* utterance—to use Bianchi's terminology, the linguistic particular she produces—refers to the philosopher, even though it is made by playing back a recording of a linguistic particular

[8] The notion is drawn from Kaplan 1990.
[9] There may be a long lag between an utterance and a repetition of it. The idea is that storage in memory allows this.

that referred to the bicycle company.

If her playing back this recording were like the playing back of the recording in testing the system or absent-mindedly pressing buttons, we would expect there to be at least a default sense in which her utterance refers to the bicycle company, which is perhaps overridden by some other factor (for instance, that she intends to refer to the philosopher.) But I do not think this would be the right way to describe the case. Rather, the recorded utterance's referring to the bicycle company is simply irrelevant to the speaker's present referring. She refers to the philosopher, using a surface form that, whatever its source, suits her purposes. One way to put the point would be that even if any playback of a recording of an utterance refers, in some default sense, to what the recorded utterance referred to, the very use of the playback *in a referring utterance* cancels this default, regardless of the speaker's intentions. Importantly, the speaker cannot make her new use into a mere playback of a previous use by intending that it be so. If the playback is the end result of a process of referring, it is not, by its nature, a mere playback. The speaker can no more change this by her intention than she could make a photograph of one identical twin into a photograph of the other by intending that it be of the other.

If this is correct, then if, instead, the speaker plays back the recording in question in order to refer to the bicycle company, there is still no reason to think that her utterance refers to the bicycle company in virtue of the fact that the playback is of an utterance that did. Rather, her new utterance refers to the bicycle company for the same kinds of reasons (whatever they are) that the new utterance she made in the first case refers to the philosopher. The thing to highlight is that linguistic particulars (utterances) produced by the process of speaking with the recordings are different from those produced by testing or by absent minded playback. They sound the same and use some of the same materials in production, but they are different kinds of products. One is a playback of a previous use; the other is a new use produced using a playback of a previous use as material. In the latter case, any default preservation of reference between the original and the copy or playback is canceled, by the very nature of the linguistic activity.

There may be ways to produce an utterance that really is a playback of a previous utterance. This would be accomplished by suppressing in various ways one's interaction with the speech of others. For instance, in the children's game of 'telephone,' each child in a long line aims to repeat verbatim into the ear of his successor an utterance whispered into his ear by his predecessor. If the children are successful (it is the point of the game for them not to be, but it could happen), it might be right that the utterance of the last child (let's suppose it is just the utterance of a name) refers to the same thing as the utterance of the first child, and does so in virtue of the chain of repetitions between them. But again, these linguistic particulars are not the same kind of thing as the similar-sounding particulars that would come into being if the children were instead gossiping about the

person referred to by the initial utterance. In the 'telephone' case, the children try to act like playback devices, refraining from injecting their thinking of things into their utterances.[10] If they succeed in this, their utterances of names are of a different kind from the ones they might have made in gossiping. The latter are products of their own thinking, not mere reflections of someone else's.

In sum, if referring utterances of names are made by repeating—playing back—previous utterances, this implies nothing about the reference of the present utterances. The previous utterances referred to what they did, and the present utterances are thus repetitions of utterances that referred to those things. But when such repetitions are generated by the process of speaking and referring, they are not generated in the right way, and so are not the right sort of linguistic particular, to inherit the reference of the repeated utterance. The point is not that such utterances inherit reference unless this is overridden by specific features of the referring situation, as in name introduction or reference change. It is that such utterances lack any such inheritance by virtue of their very nature as referring utterances.

3. The Second Practice Approach Strategy: Non-causal inheritance of reference

It might be thought that the problem with Bianchi's account is its emphasis on the causal source of the surface form in a referring use of a name, rather than on other sorts of connections between the surface form and the referent. In the views of Wettstein (2004) and Martí (2015)[11], a use of a name may refer to a particular thing without the surface form of the use having a causal source in an introduction of a name for that thing.

For his part, Wettstein says that Kripke's notion of a chain of communication, causal or not, plays no role in his account. He models our practices of using names on a hypothetical practice of assigning numbers to people at birth and thereafter using these numbers to refer to the people to whom they have been assigned. In the hypothetical practice, a number refers to the person to whom it was assigned. Users of the numbers will typically be thinking of the people to whom they refer, will know or believe various things about them, will have various intentions, and so on. But when they utter the number, they refer to the individual to whom the number was assigned, *simply because it is his number*. Analogously, a "public name" in our actual practice refers to the individual or thing to which it was given. When one uses a public name, one refers to the individual that bears the name one uses. One's use of the name refers to that individual simply in virtue of the fact that she bears that name and independently of the speaker's being part of any sort of

[10] They might not succeed. It's not hard to imagine one of the children hearing 'Peter,' thinking of Paul because Paul is Peter's brother, and whispering 'Paul' to the next child.
[11] Martí has advanced similar ideas for many years; see for instance Martí 1995.

chain.

This model suggests that the existence of a practice can make utterances be part of it. A practice can, so to speak, draw activities into its orbit. For example, since there is a practice in the United Kingdom of aggressively expressing disdain for someone by holding up an index and middle finger in a V-shape, palm in, then a foreigner who does this absent-mindedly in the UK participates in this practice and aggressively expresses disdain for the person in front of her, though of course she does not mean to. Similarly, consider a case in which I am curious about whether there is anybody named 'Peter Jacobsen' in the large lecture hall I am about to address. I call out from the podium, "There's a phone call for Peter Jacobsen," just to see if anyone comes forward. Suppose that in fact there is one man in the hall by that name, and he comes forward. If practices can make it the case that those who could reasonably be taken to be participating in them are in fact participating in them, then perhaps I have participated in the practice of referring to this man by this name.

To me, this idea of the power of practices is mysterious. Surely the foreigner in the UK will be taken to participate in the practice, will suffer the harms of being so taken, should learn about local practices so such mishaps are avoided, and so on. But the fact that there is a practice in existence and she is in a position to be taken as participating in it does not transform her absent-minded hand movement into something else. Nor, I believe, does the existence of a practice of calling a certain man 'Peter Jacobsen' transform my making up a name into a participation in a referential practice. The existence of the practice may *cause* me to be exposed to the practice as a result of my look-alike utterance and to subsequently participate in the practice. But it is unclear why my initial utterance should also be taken to be such a participation.

Indeed, Wettstein appears not to embrace fully this idea of the magnetic power of practices, despite his use of the numbers analogy. He requires that a speaker joining a name-using practice "acquires the name in some usual way," noting that "making up a name with no special bearer in mind" (as in the 'Peter Jacobsen' case) does not enable one to refer to a thing that just happens to bear the name. (90 n25) A usual way of acquiring a name is to encounter a use of it, typically when someone tells you about its referent.[12] But this usual way involves being part of a chain of communication. So it seems that Wettstein would not want to treat it as essential to the account of how names refer.

Martí's version of the Practice Approach offers a positive suggestion about how a use of a name might inherit its reference to a particular thing non-causally. The suggestion

[12] This is emphasized by Kaplan 2012, p. 148. Acquiring a name by encountering a use of it need not involve being told in direct conversation about the thing named, of course. One might overhear a use of the name in a conversation one is not part of or see it written down in various contexts.

takes some effort to extract as Martí does not make it explicit, so I will bring it out a bit slowly. Martí gives the hypothetical example of a speaker who knows that in a certain part of Ireland, it is ensured through some sort of social control that at all times there is exactly one man in each town named 'Patrick O'Grady.'[13] This speaker, she claims, may enter a pub in such a town, declare, "I am looking for Patrick O'Grady," and refer, by her use of 'Patrick O'Grady,' to the man in the town who bears that name. Martí's claim is not merely that the speaker's doing this would cause her audience to *take* her to be referring to that man and to go on to tell her about him, but that the speaker's *very first use* of the name refers to the man. Martí takes this to count against views embracing PSTR because the speaker's use refers to the man not because the speaker has been told about him in particular (she has not) and as a result is thinking of him in particular (she is not), but because there is a practice of using that name to refer to him in this town and she has joined that practice. It could also be taken to count against views on which reference is inherited in virtue of the copying of the surface form of a previous use.[14]

It is perhaps more compelling that the very first use of 'Patrick O'Grady' in this case (I will call it the 'POG case' for short) is part of the local practice and refers to the local man by that name than it is that the corresponding claim holds about the 'Peter Jacobsen' case. But we should distinguish the intuition that the initial use of 'Patrick O'Grady' refers to the local man so-called from the intuition that the speaker's initial use is part of the local practice. The former intuition may be explained by what I will call here 'denotational reference,' and will now briefly elucidate.[15]

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke allowed a bit grudgingly[16] that one might stipulate that one's use of a name would pick out whatever it is that uniquely fits a certain description, if anything does. Put another way, he allowed that one might in some sense refer to a thing without being at the end of any chain of communication originating in that thing, by invoking a condition that the thing happens to satisfy uniquely. This is

[13] Martí attributes the example to Soames 2005, in which it is attributed to Jonathan McKeown-Green.
[14] Martí does not develop this latter point.
[15] It might more perspicuously be called 'denotation' *as opposed to* 'reference.' (See next note.) But that is a topic that has been addressed elsewhere. It can be left to one side in the present discussion.
[16] He writes: "One is isolated in a room; the entire community of other speakers, everything else, could disappear; and one determines the reference for himself by saying—'By "Gödel" I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Now you can do this if you want to. There's nothing really preventing it." I believe that Kripke's ambivalence here is well placed. While of course nothing prevents one from making such a stipulation, what one does in stipulating that one's use of a name picks out whatever fits a certain description is a very different thing from what one does in using a name in the ordinary way. Though it is common to call both resulting relations between a use of a word and a thing 'reference,' I favor reserving the label of 'reference' for the relation put in place by the non-stipulative act and calling the relation put in place by the stipulative one 'denotation.' This terminology follows that of Donnellan 1966 and its substantive merits are discussed in Almog, Nichols, and Pepp 2015. Further development of the difference between these relations is found in Almog 2014 as well as Pepp 2012 and Capuano 2012.

denotational reference.

"But that's not what most of us do," Kripke added to his acknowledgement of denotational reference. As noted above, the problem posed by RDQ for Kripke concerns how reference is determined when this is *not* what we are doing (i.e., in paradigm cases of reference like the Feynman case). So if the speaker's initial use in the POG case refers denotationally to a particular man simply because that man uniquely satisfies a condition she associates with the name (along the lines of: *being a resident of this town who bears the name 'Patrick O'Grady'*), then this is not the kind of paradigm case for which Kripke thought RDQ was pressing. Proponents of the Practice Approach accept Kripke's arguments and also do not think that reference is paradigmatically denotational reference. So if the POG case is a case of denotational reference, they would not want to appeal to it as the basis for an account of how practices help to answer RDQ in *paradigm* (non-denotational) cases of reference.[17]

Indeed, it seems that there can be denotational reference where practices figure in the denotational condition even when no practice is joined. Consider again the 'Peter Jacobsen' case (I will call it the 'PJ case' for short). The speaker might associate with her use of the name 'Peter Jacobsen' a condition along the lines of *being in this audience and bearing the name 'Peter Jacobsen.'* This association could be seen as an explicit or implicit mental stipulation that her use of the name picks out whoever is the unique person bearing that name in the lecture hall, if there is one. While we may, with Kripke, allow that if there is a unique such person then she succeeds in (denotationally) referring to him, Wettstein's judgment that this initial making up of a name would not constitute her joining the existing practice of referring to that man by 'Peter Jacobsen' stands. The speaker's referring *denotationally* to this man would be in virtue of his satisfying the denotational condition, not in virtue of her having joined the practice that makes him satisfy that condition.

So if the POG case is to help with the articulation of a non-causal view of inheriting non-denotational reference from other uses,[18] the intuition elicited from it must be that the speaker's initial use refers non-denotationally and is part of the local practice, unlike the speaker's initial use in the PJ case. A way to elicit this intuition is as follows. We can suppose that the speaker learns of the POG custom, but misunderstands it as a custom in which each town has an imaginary patron fictional character named "Patrick O'Grady". So when she goes into the pub and says, "I am looking for Patrick O'Grady," she does not associate with the name any denotational condition satisfied by the resident

[17] Likewise, if it is a case of denotational reference then it does not support Martí's opposition to PSTR, assuming that PSTR is a claim about the paradigm kind of reference that Kripke's and Donnellan's counterexamples concerned.
[18] And if it is to serve Martí's own purposes of telling against PSTR (see previous note).

of the town who in fact bears the name 'Patrick O'Grady'. Yet, despite her error about the practice, it may still seem that she manages to join the practice, which is in fact a practice of referring to an actual man by the name, and that in so doing she herself refers to that really existing man.

If this still seems compelling, the next thing to consider is how this case differs from the PJ case such that here the speaker joins the practice and refers to a particular man, whereas in the PJ case she does not. It seems that the difference in the POG case is that the speaker *knows* that there is a unique local name-using practice involving the 'Patrick O'Grady' surface form (even if she incorrectly believes it is a practice of only fictional reference). She is not just making up a surface form and testing whether there is any local practice involving it as in the PJ case. If this identifying knowledge of the practice is what is doing the work in making the speaker's use of the name refer, then we have a new spin on the Frege-Russell view. On this new view, a name, as used on a given occasion, refers to a particular thing in virtue of the speaker associating with the name a condition that picks out a practice of using the name to refer to that thing. Picking up on the "DERNR" label introduced at the beginning of the paper, we can call this view "DERNR Redux."

If DERNR Redux is to serve as an answer to RDQ, it should apply not only to relatively unusual cases like POG, but also to paradigm cases of reference. This is in the same way that the Frege-Russell view would need to hold not only for relatively unusual cases of denotational reference, but also for paradigm cases of non-denotational reference. The latter is what the Kripke-Donnellan challenge shows the Frege-Russell view not to do, as illustrated, for instance, by the Feynman case. Whether DERNR Redux holds for such paradigm cases can also be questioned. There are many practices of referring to different people using the surface form "Feynman," and it is not clear that ordinary speakers referring by "Feynman" to Richard Feynman associate conditions with their uses of the name that distinguish the practice in which they participate from these other practices. Even a condition along the lines of *the practice of referring with the surface form "Feynman" that I have been exposed to* may not work, since a given speaker may have been exposed to, and even regularly participate in, different practices of using the same surface form to refer to different people. Thus, even if we allow that in some cases like the POG case a speaker may be able to use a condition to stipulate which practice she joins, this is not how reference usually works.

These considerations suggest that it is difficult to spell out how uses of names inherit reference from practices if one does not treat causal links among the surface forms of uses as doing the work of securing that inheritance. For if one wants to exclude from such inheritance cases where speakers make up surface forms (as in the PJ case), then it seems that one must require that speakers have something like identifying conditions for

the practices they join. This is Frege-Russell redux, and the requirement is not plausible for paradigm cases of reference.

4. Two kinds of reference?

The foregoing discussion suggests that appeal to linguistic practice will not answer RDQ once PSTR is rejected. It is not at all clear that the existence of linguistic practices and the causal connections of utterances to them constitutively make these utterances refer to particular things. But adherents of the Practice Approach may reply by citing what they take to be either a key advantage of the approach or, perhaps, a more specific statement of RDQ. They may point out that the Practice Approach can distinguish between "reference" and "intended reference" (Wettstein), "conventional" reference and intended reference (Martí), or the referring of linguistic particulars versus "what speakers *do* when they are referring to something" (Bianchi).[19] Each writer emphasizes that it is the first member of the pair, the unqualified, not merely intended, not action-oriented *reference* that is their interest. They are interested in the referring product itself, not what the speaker was doing or thinking in producing it. To illustrate, Martí gives the following example:

> Suppose that someone enters a room and overhears a conversation in which the name N is used, becoming convinced that the conversation was about person A, someone she saw leaving the room she was about to enter. She may then join the conversation, start to use N, and continue to use N thinking that she is saying something about A. Yet, if the conversation relies on an established practice by which N refers to B… (2015, p. 80)[20]

The continuation of the thought is that in Martí's assessment it is clear that the speaker's real, unqualified, not-merely-intended *reference* is to B, although she "speaker-refers" to A.[21] Martí is willing to go along with the idea that the speaker does come to think of B through overhearing the conversation, and that this thinking of B is involved in producing the speaker's utterances. She suggests that if this is right, then it is only the fact that the speaker participates in an established practice of referring with N to B, and in no such practice with respect to A, that can ground the fact of her (real, not just intended) reference to B, versus her mere speaker-reference to A.

But in cases like this one, it is difficult to apply distinctions between actual and merely intended reference, or between the reference of an utterance and the reference a speaker makes with an utterance. As far as I can tell, it is not clear what the speaker

[19] Each writer assimilates his/her distinction to Kripke's (1977) distinction between "semantic reference" and "speaker's reference."
[20] I have cut the quote prior to Martí's assessment of the case, just to get the case itself on the table.
[21] In Martí's discussion "speaker-refers" is used as a distinct verb, such that in the example the speaker refers to B and the speaker speaker-refers to A.

intends to refer to (both A and B seem like candidates) nor is it clear what she actually refers to. It is not clear whether by her utterance *she* is referring to A or B, but neither is it clear that the *utterance* refers to A or B. (There may be facts of the matter—I certainly do not rule that out. But they are not facts that we can discern from the case as described.[22])

If the aim is to distinguish the "conventional" referent of the utterance from other referents it may have, and if by "conventional referent" is meant, roughly, the thing referred to by utterances within the name-using referential practice to which the present utterance is appropriately linked, and if the appropriate linkage is one that the speaker's utterance has to the practice of using N to refer to B, then, to be sure, the fact of this linkage to the practice grounds the fact that the "conventional referent" is B. But this grounding is merely definitional.

Perhaps the question the Practice Approach addresses would be more clearly put as follows: why/in virtue of what is a particular utterance by a speaker part of a particular name-using convention or referential practice (e.g. a practice by which N refers to B)? (The Practice Approach might take this to be equivalent to the question of why/in virtue of what the utterance refers to what it does, but this formulation emphasizes the focus on practices. If for some reason utterances can refer to things contrary to the practices they are part of, the Practice theorist can ignore utterance-reference in favor of practice-membership of utterances.)

But here there seem to me to be no clearer desiderata for predictions in cases like the A-B case than there are with respect to utterance reference. Is the speaker's use of N part of the established practice by which N refers to B? I think it is not clear. In one way, she is picking up the practice by repeating (to use Bianchi's term) the utterances of the conversationalists. But in another way, in using those repetitions to express a bit of thinking that is (at least in part) about A, she seems to be outside the practice. It is true, as Martí observes, that she will probably be corrected as the conversation continues, and that she will probably accept the correction and cease to refer to A by N. This suggests that she desires or intends to follow the practice of the other speakers. But it is not clear that this implies that she does follow it initially, or that her initial utterances are part of it.

We do not have to appeal to practices to deliver desired predictions about utterance

[22] Here is a slightly silly analogy, but it might be helpful. Suppose some group of people are mostly ignorant of how reproduction works, but are aware that if a man and a woman have sex and a child is born to the woman nine months later and it looks a bit like the man, the one event probably caused the other. They call men in such a situation 'the father of' that child. Now consider a case where two such men stand in this loosely specified relation to the child. Which one is the father of the child? It seems to me that from the perspective of the people described, it simply isn't clear. Does this mean there isn't a fact of the matter? As it turns out, no, it doesn't mean that. But they do not know this, either. We may be in a situation something like this with respect to tough cases of reference such as Martí describes.

reference in cases of speaker confusion (or intentional conflation[23]). Nor does shifting the emphasis of our question to inclusion of utterances in a practice reveal desired predictions in such cases. Rather, what the desired predictions are in these cases is not clear, either with respect to what the utterances refer to or with respect to their inclusion in certain practices.

5. The role of referential practices

I will take stock of what I have advanced so far. First, appealing to name-using practices does not answer RDQ. The existence of name-using referential practices in a speaker's community or audience does not make it the case that a particular utterance of hers refers to a particular thing. Nor do various kinds of connections her utterance has to such a practice. Even the fact that producing the utterance involved qualitatively repeating previous utterances in the practice does not constitute the utterance's referring to what those earlier utterances referred to. Ordinary utterances are not generated in such a way as to make this plausible. The view that practice determines reference is not supported, either, by restricting the notion of reference to actual, conventional, or utterance (versus merely intended or speaker's) reference.

None of this suggests that our practices of using names are irrelevant to the referring of our utterances of names. I produce utterances of 'Aristotle' nowadays in part because some 2400 years ago a baby was born and named (the Greek version of) 'Aristoteles' and people were told about him via utterances of this name and then when they heard other utterances sounding similarly they identified what they were hearing about as Aristotle, leading them into further thinking about Aristotle and further uttering of 'Aristoteles,' which at some point led to Anglicized utterances of 'Aristotle' by English speakers, leading to people being told about Aristotle by that name, and identifying what they heard about in similar sounding utterances as Aristotle, and so on up through my own first encounter and subsequent many later uses of the name for the man. The fact that there is a practice of referring to Aristotle by 'Aristotle' and that I know and follow this practice causes me to utter 'Aristotle' to refer to Aristotle, which lets others identify what I refer to, and think their own thoughts about Aristotle, and refer to him by 'Aristotle' as a result, and so on. The practice is of utmost utility in keeping people thinking about and referring to Aristotle for thousands of years. But this does not mean that it is in virtue of being participations in the practice that particular uses of 'Aristotle' refer to Aristotle.

Nonetheless, in some cases, noted by proponents of the Practice Approach, it can

[23] Suppose the speaker realizes the others are not talking about A but for one reason or another finds it useful to carry on as if she thinks they are. It is no clearer in this case what her utterances refer to or whether they are part of the practice by which N refers to B than it was in the original case.

seem that the only connection between a referring use of a name and the thing referred to is a referential practice. Just by hearing a name uttered one may be able to utter the name in turn and refer by it to what it referred to in the utterance one heard. As Wettstein notes, "…one can then ask, 'Who was Cicero?' not having the foggiest idea who he was." (78) And as Martí's A-B example suggests, one may refer by name to someone when one has merely overheard an utterance of their name in a conversation. Proponents of the Practice Approach may view such cases of referring in ignorance as among the best illustrations of the efficacy of practices to determine reference. The speakers in these cases know next to nothing about the referents of their utterances. They may only have understood that an utterance they heard was a name of something. Now, just by acquiring and using—Bianchi might say, repeating—that name, their utterance refers to the same thing as the utterance they heard. They do not identify what the speaker is referring to and start thinking their own thoughts about that thing that lead to their own utterances. They just use the name, letting it refer to whatever it refers to, via the practice they have now joined.

That is one way to tell the story. Another way to tell it is that when the ignorant person hears the utterance of the name—suppose it is 'Cicero'—this makes her think of Cicero. Her thinking might just be to the effect that she has never heard of Cicero, does not know whether Cicero is a person or a place, and so on. But it is Cicero she is thinking about. Her asking, "Who was Cicero?" is the result of that thinking and the utterance of 'Cicero' refers to Cicero because her thinking is of Cicero.

Some support for the second way of telling the story can be found by considering a case that is similar except that the speaker forgets the name, or doesn't hear it properly, so she is unable to participate in the practice of using 'Cicero' to refer to Cicero. Still, she can now refer to Cicero, for instance by asking "Who (or what) was that?" or "What were they famous for?" That her use of 'that' or 'they' refers to Cicero is not in virtue of her participating in the name-using practice she just encountered. Plausibly, it is in virtue of the use having been generated by her thinking of Cicero.[24] If that is correct, then it is not clear why her use of 'Cicero' to refer to Cicero would not also be in virtue of the use having been generated by her thinking of Cicero, in the case where she does also acquire and recall the name 'Cicero.'

It might be thought that the speaker's use of 'that' or 'they' in this case is denotational in that its reference is determined by the fact that the speaker associates it with a condition like *being the thing just referred to using a name I forgot/didn't catch.* But while the speaker might associate such a condition, she also might not and yet refer to Cicero anyhow. For consider that instead of inquiring immediately, it may be that some time after initially hearing the name 'Cicero' she has an irksome feeling of remembering hearing about something she meant to ask about but not remembering what or in what

[24] Kaplan 2012 emphasizes that names may be forgotten while thinking-of persists.

conversation. I submit that in trying to sort out her thoughts she can say, "That is something I wanted to ask about," and refer by 'that' to Cicero, although she associates with it no condition that is satisfied uniquely by Cicero. She refers to Cicero because she is thinking of Cicero, even though she has no means of determining (in the epistemic sense) to whom she refers.

6. Conclusion

The Kripke-Donnellan counterexamples are neutral with respect to the truth of PSTR. The counterexamples challenge DERNR, but do not directly challenge either PSTR or DERST. Rejection of PSTR is a further step motivated by the idea that language has a separate existence—a life of its own—distinct from actual language use and the thinking that produces it. When we accordingly abstract an utterance from its generation by a certain episode of thinking, it is hard to see what makes the utterance refer to a thing. Proponents of the Practice Approach think that appreciating the utterance's place in a referential practice answers this question. The investigations in this paper cast doubt on this.[25]

My own high-level answer to RDQ takes the following shape: a proper name utterance that is the kind of thing generated by a certain kind of process (i.e., the kind of process that makes ordinary utterances, as opposed to the kind that makes copycat utterances as in the 'telephone' game) refers to a particular thing in virtue of the thinking episode at a late stage of that generation process having been of that thing.[26]

There is immediately a further question about what makes the relevant thinking episode be of a particular thing. To answer this question while respecting the rejection of DERST, one must not introduce determinative epistemic requirements on thinking of a thing. Obviously, I have not shown that this can be done, nor have I addressed arguments supporting DERST.[27] Nor have I assessed the marketplace of views about singular thinking or charted the extent to which strong epistemic requirements on thinking of a thing are upheld in different views. This all needs doing. What I have been concerned to show in this paper is that this, and not the separation of linguistic reference from thought, is the alternative frontier to which the Kripke-Donnellan arguments point us. Name-using

[25] Wettstein writes: "Abstract the name from its environment in our practice. Then stare at a name, and then at its referent, and keeping [sic] looking back and forth. The connection between these two pieces of nature, that one is *about* the other, can seem dazzling." (111) I have just the same feeling about abstracting the name from its environment in our *thinking*. I have been arguing that putting it back in its environment in our practice without putting it back in its environment in our thinking doesn't help much.

[26] I could add that another kind of thing, utterances or linguistic particulars generated in the 'telephone' way, refer to what they do in virtue of the particular of which they are copies/repeats having referred to that thing.

[27] Such as Evans's (1982) defense of Russell's Principle.

referential practices are not suited to determine the reference of our utterances once we abstract them from their cognitive environment. Thus they do not dissolve the mystery that arises from denying the priority of thinking to referring. We should not deny that priority. We should accept it and see that in light of it, our inheritance from the Kripke-Donnellan challenge is to assess the prospects for divorcing our account of singular thinking from epistemic requirements of various strengths.

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