



Stanford

ARCHAEOLOGY CENTER



POLARIZED PASTS

HERITAGE AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN EUROPE AND THE US

This workshop seeks to confront the pasts unfolding right now. Over the last decade, political movements on the alt-, hard- and far right have come to characterize their mission as a 'cultural struggle', claiming that the majority is threatened by and cannot co-exist with other social categories. In doing so, many have seized on the potential of heritage as a vehicle to display dissatisfaction with the present. Meanwhile, conflicting voices draw on heritage as evidence for diversity and a means to achieve social justice. And so, in the wake of European crises and growing polarization in US politics, we find heritage used as leverage for calls to both halt and embrace immigration, to both resist and further globalization. To better understand the role of the past in this polarized present, and to identify relevant questions and ways forward, the workshop draws on the unique insights of archaeologists, anthropologists and classicists from Europe and the US.

WHEN: 1-2 MARCH 2019

WHERE: STANFORD ARCHAEOLOGY CENTER

BLDG 500, ESCONDIDO MALL

MAIN ORGANIZER: ELISABETH NIKLASSON, ENIK@STANFORD.EDU

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Ethics in Society

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PROGRAM

FRIDAY MARCH 1

9:00-9:30 Morning reception

9:30-9:45 Elisabeth Niklasson
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HERITAGE AND THE RE-NATIONALIZATION OF EUROPE

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11:05-11:20 Coffee break

**11:20-12:00 Elisabeth Niklasson &
Herdis Hølleland**
Heritage in the Service of
Scandinavian Welfare
Chauvinism (p.8)

12:00-1:00 Lunch at SAC

TOXIC NATIONALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR GENETIC ORIGINS (PANEL)

1:00-1:30 Michael Herzfeld
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Essentializing Otherness
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1:30-2:00 Chip Colwell
Is DNA a Dangerous Heritage? (p.11)

2:00-2:30 Anna Källén
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2:30-3:00 Discussion

SATURDAY MARCH 2

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ARCHAEOLOGIES OF INTOLERANCE - LEGACIES OF POLARIZATION

10:00-10:40 Reinhard Bernbeck
Stratigraphies of Memory: Germany
Between Jihad and Neo-Nazis (p.14)

10:40-11:20 Alfredo González-Ruibal
A Hundred Years' Civil War (p.16)

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CLASSICAL SCHOLARS AND THE WEAPONIZATION OF ANTIQUITY

**11:35-12:40 Johanna Hanink &
Donna Zuckerberg**
How has Public Scholarship
Polarized the (Classical) Past? (p. 18)

12:40-1:40 Lunch at SAC

Reinhard Bernbeck teaches Western Asian archaeology at the Freie Universität Berlin. He previously taught at Bryn Mawr College and Binghamton University before returning to Germany. He is co-editor of *Ideologies in Archaeology* (with Randall H. McGuire) and *Subjects and Narratives in Archaeology* (with Ruth van Dyke). Past excavations include prehistoric sites in Iran, Turkmenistan, Turkey, and Jordan. He has carried out fieldwork at Nazi camps and World War I sites in Berlin and surroundings. He co-edits the online journal *Forum Kritische Archäologie*. His interests include past political economies and the political-ideological dimensions of archaeology today. Apart from academic positions he has also worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross in humanitarian missions in the context of the Afghanistan conflict.

Chiara De Cesari is senior lecturer in European Studies and Cultural Studies at the University of Amsterdam. She is the author of *Heritage and the Cultural Struggle for Palestine* (forthcoming 2019 with Stanford University Press), and co-editor of *Transnational Memories* (de Gruyter, 2014, with Ann Rigney) and *Memory, Heritage, and Populism in Europe and Beyond* (Routledge, forthcoming 2019, with Ayhan Kaya). She has published widely in journals such as *American Anthropologist*, *Memory Studies*, *Museum Anthropology*, and the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Her research focuses on memory, heritage, and cultural politics, and how they intersect with current transformation of the nation-state form; memories of colonialism and cultural racism in Europe; the transnational museum; Palestine/Israel. Her most recent project explores the globalization of contemporary art and forms of creative institutionalism and statecraft. Among several EU-funded projects, De Cesari is Amsterdam team leader in the Horizon 2020 CoHERE project exploring whether and how people feel ‘European’.

Chip Colwell is Senior Curator of Anthropology at the Denver Museum of Nature & Science. He has published 11 books, most recently *Plundered Skulls and Stolen Spirits: Inside the Fight to Reclaim Native America's Culture* (University of Chicago Press), which received a 2018 Colorado Book Award. His work has been highlighted in such venues as the *New York Times*, *The Guardian*, *Salon*, and *Slate*. He is the founding Editor-in-Chief of *Sapiens.org*, an online magazine about anthropological thinking and discoveries.

Alfredo González-Ruibal is a researcher with the Institute of Heritage Studies at the Spanish National Research Council. His research focuses on the archaeology of the recent past and African archaeology. He is particularly interested in the negative side of modernity—dictatorship, war, colonialism, capitalism—and has been excavating battlefields, concentration camps and war ruins for many years. He is also interested in issues of resistance and equality in non-modern societies. He is the author of *An archaeology of Resistance, Time and materiality in an African borderland* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) and *An Archaeology of the Contemporary Era* (Routledge, 2018) and is working on an English version of his book on the Spanish Civil War (*Volver a las Trincheas*, Alianza, 2016), which will also be published by Routledge. He is the managing editor of the *Journal of Contemporary Archaeology*.

Johanna Hanink is a classicist at Brown University. Much of her work centers on the legacy of ‘classical Athens’ and the notion of the ‘Greek miracle’, and her books include *The Classical Debt: Greek Antiquity in an Era of Austerity* (Harvard University Press, 2017). She is also Art and Humanities editor of the *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* and a translator of both ancient and modern Greek.

Michael Herzfeld is the Ernest E. Monrad Research Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University, where he also served as the first Director of the Asia Center’s Thai Studies Program (2014-18). He is also the International Institute for Asian Studies Extraordinary Professor of Critical Heritage Studies at Leiden University. Author of eleven books (most recently *Evicted from Eternity: The Restructuring of Modern Rome*, 2009, and *Siege of the Spirits: Community and Polity in Bangkok*, 2016) and producer of two ethnographic films, he has served as editor of *American Ethnologist* (1995-98). He has conducted field research in Greece, Italy, and Thailand. His current research interests include artisanal knowledge and its transmission; gentrification, heritage politics, and the disruption of social life; the local and global effects of nationalism; and theoretical and comparative approaches to cultural intimacy, crypto-colonialism, and the concept of polity.

Herdis Hølleland works as a researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU). She holds a PhD from the University of Oslo which explored the implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Australia and New Zealand. Her current research interests include national and international heritage politics, bureaucracies and expertise. In addition to heritage research, Hølleland has worked extensively with research policy having established the Young Academy of Norway as well as served as an expert to Norwegian Ministry of Education.

Anna Källén, PhD, is Associate Professor in Archaeology and works as a researcher and lecturer in Heritage Studies at Stockholm University, Department of Culture and Aesthetics. After her doctoral degree in 2004, her research has taken the form of critical enquiry into the making, use and maintenance of archaeological heritage in contemporary, colonial, and cold-war society. After many years in Southeast Asia her research is now mostly focused on Europe, and there in particular Sweden and France. Her latest books are *Stones Standing: Archaeology, Colonialism and Ecotourism in Northern Laos* (Left Coast Press & Routledge 2015), and the forthcoming *The Archaeologist In-Between: Olov R.T. Janse 1892–1985* (Makadam 2019). She is currently Lead Investigator of the multidisciplinary research project *Code, Narrative, History: Making Sense of Ancient DNA in Contemporary Culture* (2018–2021), which investigates the crafting of historical and political narratives around aDNA research in Sweden, France and the UK.

Elisabeth Niklasson is a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford University. She holds a PhD in archaeology from Stockholm University (2016). Her research explores the fabric of heritage politics using ethnography and discourse analysis: how paper shuffling and power struggles in political institutions influence what we come to know as ‘our common heritage’. Specifically she studies the identity politics of the EU and the role of heritage within far-right political movements in Europe. She is the author of *Funding Matters: The Political Economy of Archaeology in the EU* (2016).

Cathrine Thorleifsson is a researcher at the Centre for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo. She holds a PhD in Anthropology from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2012). Cathrine’s chief theoretical interests lie in the study of nationalism, migration, belonging and intersecting forms of racialization. Her latest research project examines the rise and character of neo-nationalism in contemporary Europe. Based upon multi-sited fieldwork in Norway, England, and Hungary amongst the supporters of populist radical right parties the project explores how various material conditions, socio-cultural contexts, and historical events inform the reconfiguration of nationalisms. Cathrine is the author of *Nationalism and the Politics of Fear in Israel: race and identity on the border with Lebanon* (I.B Tauris 2015) and *Nationalist responses to the crises in Europe: old and new hatreds* (Routledge 2018).

Donna Zuckerberg is the author of *Not All Dead White Men: Classics and Misogyny in the Digital Age* (Harvard University Press, 2018). She received her Ph.D. from Princeton University in 2014 and is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Eidolon, an online publication for informal Classics scholarship. Her writing has appeared in the Washington Post, the TLS, and Jezebel. She lives in California with her partner, two sons, and bulldog.

European Heritage and Cultural Racism

Chiara de Cesari, University of Amsterdam

In this talk, I explore a paradox at the hearth of what is commonly called European memory or heritage, as this discourse is both embraced and simultaneously denied by the most diverse actors in Europe today. I argue that in spite of heightened political fragmentation, and the resurgence of deeply parochial nationalisms, Europe is increasingly imagined across multiple sites as a bounded memory community, however fuzzy and fundamentally contested the content of this memory may be. Yet, if the EU and other actors have ostensibly promoted this shared European heritage to foster more inclusive, post-national identities and a more inclusive European political community, in fact the same heritage is widely used not to include and connect Europeans but to exclude some of them. In this talk, I investigate the entanglement of what scholars call cultural racism and dominant ideas of 'European heritage' as they are mobilized and circulated in the public sphere by EU institutions as well as other political forces.

More specifically, I first explore how Eurosceptic, right-wing populists mobilize ideas of European values, heritage and civilization. My argument is based on the analysis of a set of interviews with around 80 populist parties' supporters who have been interviewed as part of a research project on populism conducted by Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen's Horizon2020 CoHERE team in 2017 in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. What do these people hold of the idea of a 'European culture' and a 'European heritage' and how do such understandings relate to their pronounced belief in national culture? Supporters' answers illuminate the different ways in which a discourse of civilizational European heritage does coexist in varying degrees of tension with right-wing populism's emphasis on the centrality of the nation. If for many of them Europe is made up of diverse cultural nations and regions, these unite in an 'ethic communion of shared values' (Thran and Boehnke 2015, 192) grounded in a shared civilizational heritage. Such brand of Europeanism coexist with a strong sense of national identity and even a militant nationalism without much trouble for those holding these beliefs. Also nationalist populist forces may legitimize themselves by donning the mantle of European values. The best example is Pegida ('Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West'), a German nationalist, anti-Islam and anti-migrant right-wing movement which has informed right-wing populist parties and their supporters' attitudes across Europe and has now chapters in several European countries like the Netherlands and the UK.

Although European right-wing populist parties have been vocal in their opposition to the European Union, they have also often invoked the notion of a common ‘European heritage’ to justify their anti-immigrant politics and to discriminate against migrants and minorities based on alleged irreconcilable civilizational differences between European values and Islam. Across the COHERE sample, there are frequent references to a Christian, and sometimes a Judeo-Christian civilization as the shared heritage of Europe: at times this heritage is qualified as European, at times as broadly Western, including the US. Our findings show that while some general agreement exists on the foundations of European heritage as based on Greek, Roman and (Judeo-)Christian traditions, this acknowledgement does not translate into the belief in a common European culture. Ultimately, it is the cultural construction of an existential threat coming from multiculturalism and a perceived ‘Islamization’ of Europe that feeds into narratives of a common European heritage.

Finally, I explore the ‘perverse confluences’ (cf. Clarke et al. 2014, 15) of such populist ideas with allegedly inclusive notions of European heritage promoted by EU institutions.

Innocence Reinvented: The Hungarian Far Right and the Politics of Eternity

Cathrine Thorleifsson, C-REX, University of Oslo

This paper explores the ways in which far right actors in Hungary appropriate history to present themselves as defenders of a nation and civilization in danger. Based upon ethnographic fieldwork amongst supporters and politicians from Jobbik- Movement for a Better Hungary in 2015, it demonstrates how particular historical time periods are used to re-invent the nation as good and innocent. Drawing upon Snyder's recent work (2018) I suggest that Hungarian far right leaders can be analysed as "eternity politicians" that leap from one moment to another, over decades or centuries, to build the dual myth of innocence and danger. They imagine cycles of threat in the past, creating an imagined pattern that they realize in the present by producing artificial crises and daily drama (2018:8).

In the Hungarian case far right leaders place the nation at the center of a cyclical story of victimhood where their foremost task is to guard the hetero-normative nation against perceived threats such as liberalism and multiculturalism. The myth of the innocent nation is spun with the help of the appropriation of the past. Presenting Hungary as a defenseless martyr of history, Jobbik fuses symbols that nurture affective attachment to chosen insiders and ascribe innocence to past state atrocities. The following ethnographic observations at a Jobbik meeting in Budapest, demonstrates how the party appropriates symbols, myths, religion, historical events and time periods in the iconic representation of the nation.

It a rainy and windy October evening. Jobbik is arranging a forum on migration in Hallor Street. The door is covered in frosted glass, with the map of Greater Hungary imprinted. A soft light filters through the logo. The white-painted room of around 40 square metres is heavily decorated with nationalist symbols. A flag in red-white-green tricolour and a hole in the middle, commemorating the 1956 uprising against communism, is placed next to the entrance door. Jobbik's flags are attached to the other wall. The Jobbik logo is an adaptation of the Hungarian flag that has been warped from the centre to form a circle onto which a white Christian cross taken from the Hungarian coat of arms has been superimposed. Earlier adopters of the Arpad stripes were Hungary's Arrow Cross, Hitler's most reliable partner. In addition to old symbols used by the interwar fascists, Jobbik uses symbols like the Turul bird, a mythological bird of the Hungarian sagas.

At a Jobbik rally later that month, I observe how the memory of the interwar admiral Miklós Horthy, who ruled Hungary from 1920 to 1944 is appropriated. Horthy signed numerous anti-Jewish laws in 1938, 1939 and 1940, and was one of Hitler's closest allies. Empire after World War I. In Jobbik's view, Horthy was 'the greatest statesman of the twentieth century', a 'regent' that put Hungary on the path of prosperity following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Since the party gained it has erected numerous statues in his memory. The most controversial is placed in the heart of Budapest at Szabadság Tér (Freedom Place) outside the entrance of the church of the Calvinist minister Lóránt Hegedüs Jr, a notable antisemite and admirer of the British historian and Holocaust denier David Irving (Schiff 2013). Jobbik appropriates Horthy's memory to boost heroic masculinity when faced with a new perceived crisis: the mass movement of migrants from Muslim lands across Hungarian territory. The dual practice of nurturing innocence and forgetting violence is symptomatic for how the far right appropriates history in particular self-serving ways, moving radical nationalism from the margins to the mainstream.

Heritage in the Service of Scandinavian Welfare Chauvinism

Elisabeth Niklasson, Stanford University

Herdís Holleland, Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research

When it comes to idealized golden ages and dreams of homogeneity, we know that far-right populist parties talk the talk. From the Spartan fancies of Golden Dawn to the Kalevala-politics of the True Finns, from the classical-confederate fusion of the US alt-right to the Italian Lega's nostalgia for Mussolini – near and far, chosen pasts are being put to work in attempts to narrow the borders of national belonging. In this contribution we ask: do these parties also walk the walk? Using Scandinavia as a case study, we take a closer look at how heritage figures into the politics of three Scandinavian populist (far-)right parties with seats in national parliaments: The Sweden Democrats, a party with neo-Nazi roots which have adopted heritage as a core element in their cultural politics, the Danish People's Party, an anti-tax party turned anti-immigrant which draws on heritage as a justification for 'Danishness', and the Norwegian Progress Party, an anti-immigrant party with a combined nationalist and market liberal stance on heritage. What unites them is a unique form of welfare chauvinism. As the self-proclaimed guardians of the world-renowned Scandinavian welfare system, they seek to restrict it to serve only 'natives'.

Beginning with the manifestoes and parliamentary proposals, we first outline the cultural policies of the three parties and examine if they differ from the establishment parties. Drawing on an analysis of state budgets and the initial results of a survey among civil servants in the heritage sector, we then discuss the effects and reception of their policies. While these analyses are important in and of themselves, they act as a foundation for the question we are really interested in: what political, bureaucratic and societal conditions need to exist for far-right parties to influence the way heritage is done in liberal democracies? We propose three such conditions:

A repositioning of the 'Overton window', i.e. the window that encompasses the range of ideas tolerated in public discourse at a given time. When the boundaries for what a party or politician can do or propose without being considered too extreme are pushed, and establishment parties respond by mimicking populist rhetoric or tacitly accept false dichotomies, heritage is often activated as an argument for exclusionary ideas. In Scandinavia, the relocation of this window has resulted in nativist assumptions becoming increasingly normalized in debates on immigration and social welfare.

A destabilization of traditional block-politics in multiparty systems. As new populist right parties have claimed space in national parliaments around Europe, old political alliances have become unable to form stable governing blocks. The weaker minority coalitions that are formed instead, and which have now become the new normal in Scandinavia, need support from the populist right to make political changes. Under these circumstances, cultural policy – which is generally considered a softer and less important field – can become a gateway for populist right influence.

Gaps left by changes in governance. In the wake of New Public Management and neo-liberal agendas, heritage governance has changed. In Scandinavia this has created two potential avenues of populist right influence; one is conceptual, the other is structural. The former concerns the term heritage or ‘kulturarv’. Since the early 2000s, when first adopted into the government vocabulary, kulturarv has had a mainstreaming effect on public policy, linking monuments and traditions to their use-value, whether it be for tourism and creative industries or for democratization and integration. Here the populist right can tap into an already established discourse, making enthusiastic calls to bring heritage closer to “the people” while simultaneously circumscribing who the people are in other policy areas. The second gap concerns changes in bureaucratic governance. The long-term effects of the last decades of agencification and decentralisation of the heritage sector are largely unknown, but since many populist right parties seek to further reduce bureaucracy (in line with their anti-establishment rhetoric), we may experience faster changes and strengthened political influence over national heritage goals in the future.

Finally, in discussing the influence and weight of these proposed conditions, we bring the historical legacies of the archaeological discipline and ourselves into the equation, asking what role civil servants and heritage scholars ought to take in this polarized present.

Racism and Heritage, Racism as Heritage: Essentializing Otherness Cuts Both Ways

Michael Herzfeld, Harvard University

From casual comments about “national DNA” to genome projects orchestrated by national governments, there is today a worrisome tendency to return to 19th-century biogenetic models of cultural “inheritance.” By seeking the evidence for this turn in both everyday expressions (e.g., of surprise that a non-Greek could speak Greek well without any Greek ancestry “in the blood”) and increasingly explicit policies enunciated by political parties and national governments, I propose to unpack the meaning of the term “heritage” in such a way as to show that even apparently benevolent liberals may, in their critiques of working-class mores (e.g., Hillary Clinton’s “basket of deplorables”), risk lapsing into the same essentialist assumptions as those with which they charge the followers of populist leaders. As the reactions of movements such as Golden Dawn in Greece and Cinque Stelle in Italy and of Trump supporters in the U.S. demonstrate, such accusations play into the emergence of a new and toxic nationalism, one that now begins to invoke scholarly analyses of heritage as the basis for its radically anti-intellectual and anti-social claims. Such claims, as happened in the run-up to World War II, extend to arguing that racist doctrines are markers of high civilizational achievement. Anthropologists have a moral responsibility to counter such arguments, not with the antipathy that usually and paradoxically infects the liberal response, but with a serious attempt to engage and refute them.

Is DNA a Dangerous Heritage?

Chip Colwell, Denver Museum of Nature & Science

By now, everyone knows Elizabeth Warren’s attempt to use her genetic ancestry to prove her claimed Native American identity. But in the United States, she is hardly alone in her desire to use her DNA to connect to a biological past to shape her present sense of self—from Neo-Nazis aiming to prove their whiteness to Louis Gates Jr. hoping to recover roots lost because of slavery. Well more than 12 million people have sent in a swab with a pile of cheek cells to direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies. This contribution to the workshop aims to unpack DNA as a heritage (a past constructed for present-day goals), to understand how it functions as a device for identity and belonging. I argue that DNA is a “dangerous heritage” because of its potential power for creating polarized pasts.

The popularization of DNA is rife with confusions over the technology and its interpretations. The technology can currently lead to only tepid conclusions about ancestry, yet the results are often accepted as certainty. Home DNA tests are a parlor game that’s been turned into heritage as serious as Stonehenge. Few seem to dwell on its limitations, while most embrace its potential. DNA purports to look backward within an individual, transforming ACG and T into an individualized history, a person’s irrefutable heritage. Like all heritage, DNA does not speak for itself, but must be constructed, crafted in a way that does not seem constructed but natural. They must fit into broader social contexts; they must build on the logics of identity and belonging; they must speak not so much to real pasts as the reality of the political present.

A central goal of this workshop is to consider the “political polarization Europe and the US,” in order “to better understand if and how particular pasts are activated (or omitted) in contemporary far-right populist rhetoric, and the counter claims this has given rise to.” It is helpful, then, to pause here to ask ourselves why DNA has emerged as such a powerful medium for identity right now in this moment. I propose at least three reasons and consider the range of narratives that are constructed from home DNA tests. I then consider how these narratives inform other kinds of stories that emerge from DNA research, namely paleogenomics, and the explicit use of ancient DNA to write history and heritage. In conclusion, I consider how far right claims through DNA are being situated within the larger context of why and how narratives of DNA are being constructed and deployed. And I argue that DNA is a “dangerous heritage” that demands great care and careful transdisciplinary analysis of its context, particularly its potential to polarize pasts.

Ancient DNA: A Complicated History

Anna Källén, Stockholm University

In the politics of the past, genetics is the new black. Ancient DNA (aDNA) appears to offer intimate details on prehistoric people's identities, and is now used in many parts of the world as a potent source of facts about human origin and belonging. This paper will zoom in on Scandinavia, where there is currently a vibrant academic and public media interest in archaeogenetics. With focus on one case – a result of aDNA analyses that was featured in Swedish public media in August 2018 with the headline “Half the population of Viking Age Sigtuna were immigrants” – it will point to the complexity and political potency of meaning-making around aDNA. It will demonstrate that many actors and stakes are involved, and that the political consequences of communicating research results are not necessarily the anticipated.

The breakthrough of techniques to extract and analyse aDNA has been described as a scientific revolution in archaeology, and results have been featured in public media with authoritative and compelling claims to present facts about human identity and answer politically inflammable questions of origin and belonging. With its allusion to neutral scientific objectivity, aDNA analyses can appear to offer hard facts about human identity in a media climate otherwise characterized by scepticism towards critical academic expertise. However, investigations have shown that aDNA research is often framed as a political enterprise, and that its stories are formed just as much in media as in the lab. High-profile researchers in this field typically express an ambition to rewrite history, and provide better stories of the past, based on diversity and multiculturalism. The idea that DNA studies will provide proof of diversity is also key to the foundational myth of DNA research more broadly, and can be seen at the core of the Human Genome Project as well as in advertisements for direct-to-consumer DNA tests. A paradoxical problem occurs, however, when it comes to labelling. In order to illustrate multiculturalism, aDNA research borrows from population genetics, where genes are labelled in terms of “culture”, which in Europe often represent current nation states.

The consequences of this paradox were played out in a recent case of aDNA research relating to the Swedish town Sigtuna. The paper was published a week before the national elections in 2018 by members of the prolific Atlas project at Stockholm University, and was based on genomic and isotope analysis of bones from a Christian cemetery in the Viking Age town of Sigtuna (Krzewinska et. al. 2018). The analyses demonstrated genomic

strontium isotope variation between some of the individuals, which was illustrated by labels representing current nations or regions. That was spun via the University press release to public media into a story where half the population of Viking Age Sigtuna had been immigrants, and Sigtuna (known as “the first town of Sweden”) was depicted as a cosmopolitan metropole, like a Shanghai or London of its time. Noteworthy is the active media involvement by one researcher, who complemented the original research paper with interviews where he expressed pro-immigration political ideals and spun those aspects of the analysis results. However, the ambition to provide the election debate with facts of diversity at the foundation of the Swedish nation ultimately failed. The story backfired, and fuelled alt-right commentators’ claims of a science and media conspiracy fabricating “fake news” about the origin of the Swedish nation.

The Sigtuna case raises two main concerns in relation to history-telling and heritage claims based on aDNA. One is that the polarizing logic of public media has a considerable effect on science that attract much media interest, such as aDNA research. Wide and frequent featuring of research results in public media is encouraged and rewarded by universities, academic journals and funding agencies, gathering momentum for media-oriented sciences. In this case, it appears that the positive glow around public communication has eclipsed the complexities and ethical pitfalls of communicating aDNA research concerning ethnicity and migration in the public domain. Another is that the labelling of bodies by population genetics paves the way for political uses of aDNA “facts” to support claims of identity and belonging by actors at both extremes of the ideological spectrum, regardless of the political ambition of the researchers.

Stratigraphies of Memory: Germany between Jihad and Neo-Nazis

Reinhard Bernbeck, Freie Universität Berlin

"We Germans, our people, are the only people in the world who have planted a monument of shame in the heart of its capital." This quote from Björn Höcke, prominent member of the right-wing party "Alternative for Germany" (AfD), from January 2017 referred to the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. The statement reflects the current dynamics in a growing segment of the German population. Originating from a deep-rooted racism that has never disappeared, such sentiments can once again be articulated publicly. The timing coincides with the passing of the last eyewitnesses of Nazi camps.

In my contribution, I will discuss three issues related to this turning point of cultural heritage and collective memory: the development of Germany's mnemonic landscape, the consequences of an attendant amnesia concerning Germany's colonialism, and an archaeological engagement with a World War I PoW camp designed as active political interference in current racist conflicts.

Traditional perspectives on heritage are driven by an imagined collective past with a positive envaluation. The situation in Germany is more complex, as East and West Germany took radically different stances. East Germany's state-run propaganda depicted the country as a collective of victims, while the West remained silent for the first 25 years after the war. The Frankfurt "Auschwitz trials" in the 1960s, pressure by foreign countries, and a younger, post-1968 generation successfully pushed for change. But the history of memory took a new turn with the 1989 reunification, when a pan-German heritage was supposed to merge from formerly antagonistic mnemonic cultures. Conveniently, a second "dictatorship" - the GDR - was added to the Nazi one.

Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was mobilized to bolster this claim. Right-wing heritage discourse in Germany is not just about a clumsy rhetoric that glorifies Nazism and swastikas; it incorporates a more subtle narrative that waters down the crushing verdict on the Nazi era and the Holocaust as a uniquely brutal historical era. In this discourse, reference to Arendt's totalitarianism concept means a decided partisanship in favor of a relativization of Nazi crimes.

This complex fixation on the Nazi period and its aftermath has an important side-effect. The First World War and above all the brutality of German colonialism are virtually erased from collective memory. The Holocaust obscures everything that preceded it. A naive imagination of the Kaiserreich romanticizes the Kaiser and turns colonialism into the import of exotica.

Only this mnemonic constellation can explain why the parliamentary building of the GDR was demolished in order to rebuild on the same spot the Baroque city castle: an ugly socialist building is replaced by a fake royal palace, to be called "Humboldt Forum". How to fill it? With the ethnological collections that were amassed in the colonies, despite an outcry of the initiative "Berlin Postkolonial".

The denial of this colonial past can be actively countered. I will present as a case an excavation in a World War I prisoner-of-war camp that was specifically designed for Islamic soldiers from French and British colonies. The German government hatched a plan for "jihad made in Germany", bestowed the camp with the oldest mosque on German soil, and tried to radicalize the prisoners by importing imams from the Ottoman Empire. The released prisoners were supposed to fight a jihad behind the enemies' fronts. My contribution will provide more context for this excavation, including institutional plans for a refugee camp that was established on top of the old PoW camp, but also an arson attack by Neonazis on a nearby building from Nazi times.

The camp is directly connected to the Humboldt Forum. In World War I, ethnologists boasted that they no longer had to travel to exotic countries, since the exotics were at their doorstep. Linguistic research was carried out, recording spoken words of PoWs on wax cylinders. These cylinders will be housed in the Humboldt Forum.

Remembering is forgetting. The Nazi era has obscured the colonial crimes of the German state. The prisoner camp with its mosque south of Berlin was a typical "non-place" of 20th century modernity. It never turned into an attraction of "dark tourism." To the contrary, what sets it apart from "World Cultural Heritage" such as Auschwitz are its complex transformations and their potential for violence and conflict that continue right to this day.

A Hundred Years' Civil War

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A brutal civil war and a long dictatorship during the twentieth century led to a highly polarized society in contemporary Spain. The dictatorial regime of Francisco Franco (1936-1975) insisted in creating a simple narrative of good versus evil that punished and humiliated the vanquished in the war and empowered the victors. This discourse was transmitted through indoctrination in schools, propaganda in the media and materiality (monuments, memorials, social housing, etc.). The material and verbal discourse of the dictatorship in relation to the civil war, national identity and the country's past penetrated deeply into the collective mentality of Spaniards. The transition to democracy forced the Francoist ideology underground, but is now resurfacing in different ways and seen by many as a legitimate political perspective.

The polarization provoked by the regime has become more visible during the last few years due to different phenomena: the exhumation campaign seeking to recover the bodies of the killed by right-wing violence (around 150,000 victims); the rise of the far-right, as part of the global reactionary backlash, and the upsurge of Spanish nationalism (itself a reaction largely triggered by Catalan nationalism). Some of the advances toward the production of a shared narrative during the democratic period have been shattered by increasing political polarization. Thus, Spanish society is now fractured along different lines (ideological, national, religious).

In this context, working on the archaeology of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime means entering a minefield where myths (on different sides) often replace historical narratives and civilized dialogue becomes extremely difficult. Certain material elements of the past have risen to prominence in political debates—particularly the Valley of the Fallen, the mausoleum where Franco is buried—and have elicited much verbal and symbolic violence.

Archaeological remains, particularly mass graves, also take part in the disputes. Besides, the situation is no longer limited to the recent past. The history of Spain as a country is becoming more and more a contested terrain where academic nuance is rarely welcomed and emotion tends to replace reasoned arguments. In such a politically

charged and fragmented scenario, who the “People” whom archaeologists should serve is no longer obvious, as many of those who have often been regarded as subalterns (rural communities, the unemployed, workers) are now backing reactionary politics. The dualism that has become very popular in heritage studies between elites and masses is not useful in a context where the frontlines are not clearly defined. The situation is true for Spain, but also for many other countries—Brazil, the United States or Poland—where extremists have risen to power with wide popular support.

In this paper I intend to do several things: first, I will rethink critically the concept of the People through the work of Hannah Arendt and other political philosophers, who encountered similar problems 80 years ago. Secondly, I will explore the role of knowledge and epistemic authority in current debates within and outside academia. Then I will suggest some ways in which archaeologists and heritage students can contribute to uphold democratic values and be useful to society, while avoiding the traps of multivocality and localism. Finally, I would also like to reflect on the impact that a polarized environment has in the subjectivity of the researcher. For that, I will resort to my personal experience since 2006 conducting archaeological research on the remains of war and dictatorship in Spain. I will describe some of the attitudes that I have encountered (both positive and negative) and will share what I have learnt from working in a politically tense—and often aggressive—environment.

How has Public Scholarship Polarized the (Classical) Past?

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This contribution will address the intersections of public scholarship in the field of Classics and recent ideological appeals to classical antiquity made by members of the far right.

Instances of the far-right's invocation of ancient Greece and Rome, especially in online fora, are now well documented (e.g. Pharos; Zuckerberg 2018), and we begin by discussing a few examples. We then will discuss some of the ways in which classicists have responded to the phenomenon, largely through public scholarship and conferences (such as the "Claiming the Classical" workshop held last November at London's Institute for Classical Studies).

One question we wish to pose is that of how professional classicists have perhaps been complicit, over the past few decades, in antiquity's ideological 'weaponization'.

We are particularly interested in how some public scholars have now suggested that historians' reticence to engage the public effectively, created a void that came to be filled by less informed commentators with particular political agendas. Lepore, for example, has observed that, when American historians "mocked the Bicentennial [of U.S. independence] as schlock," ... "That left plenty of room for a lot of other people to get into the history business" (2013: 69). More specifically to the field of Classics, McCoskey (2018) has recently argued that the nature of classicists' response to the Black Athena controversy of the 1980s and 1990s ("most classicists did not want to take up the difficult and often messy questions that were being posed") effectively set the stage for white nationalism's interest in and view of the Classics today.

On the other hand, with budget cuts and the advent of rubrics of "access and outreach" (one thinks of Britain's REF) classicists have been forced to defend the 'relevance' of their discipline—to colleagues, funding bodies, and taxpayers. In doing so, they have often reinforced old tropes about the field as a privileged site for the study of privileged material: the foundations of Western civilization.

We therefore would like to posit, and discuss, the thesis that professional classicists have been far too unselfconscious about their own role in the public discourse around classically themed topics: for too long we have tended to intervene only by way of reaction, in attempts to ‘correct’ incorrect ‘misappropriations’ and ‘misreadings’ of classical antiquity and thereby ‘save’ the field—and even the ancient Greeks and Romans themselves—from modern misconceptions.

One example we would like to raise here is that of an open letter dated May 18, 2009 and addressed to then-president Obama. This letter condemned the prior Bush administration for recognizing a “Republic of Macedonia” and demanded that the Obama administration correct this error by refusing to recognize a non-Greek Macedonia and thus end its complicity in the “misappropriation by the government in Skopje of the most famous of Macedonians, Alexander the Great.” The letter has been signed by 376 individuals, many of whom are prominent classicists and historians (the latest added his name in February 2018). Today, it continues to be cited by Greek nationalists (such as those involved in recent clashes in Greece over the ‘Macedonia issue’) as evidence that esteemed philologists deny an independent Macedonian identity. This is a case in which classicists’ awkward, and perhaps uninformed, interventions have fanned the flames of classically-inflected nationalism.

We will conclude by positing that classical public scholarship has in some cases created a negative ‘feedback loop’: it has effectively opened doors for extremist appropriations of classical material, then sought to ‘solve’ the problems that this has created through attempts to issue correctives. What, then, are the responsibilities of public scholarship today, and how can we address these challenges?

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