Elite attitudes toward global governance

A report of summary findings from the LegGov Elite Survey

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Legitimacy in Global Governance Program
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This report presents overview findings of a survey of elite attitudes toward global governance conducted in 2017-19 across six countries (Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, USA, plus a global group) and six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research). The core motivation for the study is to discover how far leaders in politics and society are ready and willing to support regulatory arrangements at a global level, in order to tackle the pressing policy challenges of today’s more global world: climate change, cybersecurity, health, migration, peacebuilding, etc.

The survey of 860 political and societal leaders suggests that contemporary elites are quite globally oriented. Albeit with some geographical and sectoral variations, overall the surveyed elites: (a) have high interest in global politics; (b) hold moderate-to-high levels of global identification; (c) show solid basic knowledge of global governance; and (d) express a preference to see governance occur at a global level for some policy areas, including trade, environment, and human rights. That said, this interviewed cross-section of political and societal elites generally have little direct contact with global governance institutions.

In spite of their substantially positive inclinations toward global engagement in principle, the surveyed broad sample of elites generally hold mainly moderate evaluations of currently existing global institutions. Respondents were asked to evaluate 14 global governance bodies across the policy fields of economy, security, and sustainable development.¹ Certainly the evidence does not show a ‘crisis’ of elite confidence in global governance: no country or sector holds strikingly negative assessments of current arrangements. However, the surveyed leaders give an unambiguous ‘quite a lot of confidence’ to only one of the fourteen global organizations. Thus general confidence levels for global governance are neither so high that we would expect elites to push for a significant expansion of global regulation, nor so low that we would expect elites to obstruct and dismantle the institutions. Current elite attitudes suggest a future of muddling through on global governance.

To explore what might generate greater elite confidence in actual global governance, the survey examined what institutional qualities these leaders most value. Here the data suggest that elites prioritize democracy in the procedures of global governance and effectiveness in the outcomes of global governance. This finding suggests that, to obtain increased elite support for global governance, the institutions need to become more transparent, participatory and publicly accountable in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outputs.

¹ International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Group of Twenty (G20), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), International Criminal Court (ICC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kimberley Process (KP), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (UN), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO).
Acknowledgements

We begin by thanking the 860 participants in this survey. Without their generous contributions, the data and analysis presented here would not have been possible.

We extend special thanks to our colleague Lisa Dellmuth at Stockholm University, who fully co-designed the elite survey questionnaire with us before taking parental leave during the data processing and early analysis phase. We also thank all colleagues from the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) program for their valuable input and feedback on the questionnaire.

Execution of the elite survey has also depended substantially on fruitful collaborations with in-country partners who advised on the national samples and/or conducted the interviews. In Brazil we partnered with a team at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), comprised of José Mauricio Domingues, Gabriela Caruso, Magno Klein, and Fabricio Mello. To identify and reach elites in the Philippines we benefited greatly from the advice of Bonn Juego. In Russia we collaborated with researchers at the Institute of International Relations and World Economy (IMEMO) in Moscow, including Alexey Kuznetsov, Pavel Timofeev, Eduard Ipatov, Marina Ipatova, and Maria Khorolskaya. In South Africa we cooperated with the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) at the University of Pretoria, in particular Siphamandla Zondi, Gabila Nubong, Marlie Holtzhausen, Erica Cerejo, Sumien Deetlefs, Sylvia Graham, Edwin Hlase, Nomzamo Malindisa, Mellissa Mlambo, and Ashleigh Shangare. The survey platform CivicPulse, under the coordination of Nathan Lee, helped to collect responses from state-level political representatives in the United States. We are grateful to all of our partners, while also underlining that they have had no influence over survey responses and bear no responsibility for the data analysis that we present here.

Research assistants at Stockholm University completed the interviews for Germany, the Philippines, most of the USA sample, and the global elite sample. For this major work we are thankful to Dennis Besseling, Melika Bouhlel, Benjamin Darrah-Morgan, Monique Dugarte, Maria Hornung, Riti Joshi, Charlotte Lidström, Ricarda Richter, Waris Sabah, Georgios Sideras, Ana Sofia Valderas, Paulina Cruz Velasquez, and Dionys Zink.

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For more about LegGov, see https://www.statsvet.su.se/leggov/. For any questions and comments regarding this report, please contact the LegGov Elite Survey coordinator, Soetkin.Verhaegen(at)statsvet.su.se.
Introduction

What do today’s elites think about global governance? How far do leaders in contemporary politics and society think globally and look to global institutions to tackle global problems? How much confidence do elites have in existing global governance arrangements, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations (UN)? What criteria do elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance institutions?

These issues – the subject of the following report – are important. Today’s world has become increasingly global. Society faces major planet-spanning challenges, for example, around digital networks, ecological changes, finance capital, migration, peacebuilding, transborder diseases, and much more. Yet are society’s leaders ready and willing to tackle global problems with global governance? Moreover, what kind of global governance do they have in mind?

Whether global governance happens – to what extents, on what terms, and with what impacts – depends substantially on the attitudes of elites. Both for politics in general and for global politics in particular, society’s elites take the lead in setting agendas, constructing institutions, taking and implementing decisions, and assessing policy outcomes. Hence knowing what elites think about global governance can suggest what kinds of global futures are in prospect – as well as what might need to change in order to shift course.

To explore elite attitudes toward global governance, the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) research program at the Universities of Stockholm, Lund, and Gothenburg has conducted a major survey of leaders in government, political parties, business, civil society, media, and research. Between October 2017 and August 2019, we interviewed 860 leaders spread across six diverse countries (Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and USA) and a transnational elite group working in global organizations. (For more detail about the design and execution of the survey, see the appendix to this report.)

The four sections of this report present some overview findings from the study. The first section clarifies core concepts in the analysis (‘global governance’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘elites’). Then three further sections of the report summarize some key statistical results of the survey. Partly we present aggregate data for the full sample of 860 elites. In addition, we assess degrees of geographical variation: i.e. differences in elite views between Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, USA, and the global sample. We also examine extents of sectoral variation: i.e. differences in elite attitudes between government bureaucracy, political parties, business, civil society, media, and research institutes.
The first of the three sets of results considers ‘how global are today’s elites?’ (p. 13). In this section of the report we examine how far the surveyed elites are globally aware; how much they identify globally; how far they prefer governance to happen at a global level; and how much direct contact they have with global governance institutions. With regard to the surveyed sample, key findings concerning these points are:

- Across all of the countries and sectors surveyed – albeit with some moderate variation in degree – elites express decidedly high levels of interest in global politics.
- With some notable variation by country and by sector, elites hold moderate-to-high global identification, in terms of ‘feeling close to the world’.
- With regard to three general knowledge questions, elites across countries and across sectors show high awareness of global governance.
- Large variations exist in the degree to which elites prefer that governance occurs at a global level (as compared with regional, national or subnational levels): it very much depends on the issue-area in question, and to some extent also on the country and the elite sector.
- With the exception of the UN, elites across countries and across sectors generally have little direct contact with global governance institutions.
- In sum, from these findings we may conclude that today’s elites are substantially primed for global engagement, although we should not exaggerate the extent either.

The second section of survey results examines ‘elite confidence in global governance’ (p. 23). Here we report on elite attitudes toward 14 global governance institutions, spread across the issue-areas of economy, security, and sustainable development. We also compare elite confidence in global bodies with their confidence in national and regional governance institutions. Principal findings under this heading are:

- Elites hold moderate levels of confidence toward most of the 14 specified global governance institutions: neither strikingly high nor strikingly low.
- Elite confidence in global governance institutions varies somewhat by country, with levels in Russia and (even more) South Africa being notably lower than the other subsamples.
- Elites express broadly similar levels of confidence toward global, regional and national regulatory institutions; however, the relative order of confidence in these three scales of governance varies substantially by country.
- The global elite group does not hold decidedly higher confidence in global governance institutions than the national elite groups.
- Elite confidence toward existing global governance institutions shows relatively little variation by sector, with bureaucratic leaders holding slightly higher levels and civil society leaders slightly lower levels.
• In sum, we may conclude that elite confidence in current global governance institutions is neither so high that we would expect elites to push for a significant expansion of global regulation, nor so low that we would expect elites to obstruct and dismantle the institutions. Current elite attitudes suggest a future of muddling through on global governance.

The third section of survey findings covers ‘elite assessments of institutional features’ (p. 31). Here we investigate what qualities elites emphasize when they measure their confidence in global governance institutions. The data cover both organizational procedure (‘inputs’) and organizational performance (‘outputs’). In respect of both procedure and performance, we assess the relative importance that elites attach to the criteria of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness. The main findings on these points are:

• With respect to the procedures of global governance institutions, the surveyed elites in aggregate find democracy by some considerable measure more important than effectiveness, which in turn attracts somewhat higher priority than fairness.

• This rank order of democracy-effectiveness-fairness regarding global governance procedure holds for all countries except Brazil and (especially) Russia, and for all elite sectors except political parties.

• With respect to the performances of global governance institutions, the surveyed elites rate effective outcomes as by far the most important, well ahead of democratic and (even more) fair outcomes.

• While all of the geographical and sectoral subsamples prioritize effectiveness in respect of global governance performance, fair outcomes are ranked ahead of democratic outcomes by the global and (especially) Brazilian geographical subsamples and by the bureaucratic and research sector subsamples.

• In sum, keeping in mind some geographical and sectoral variation, we can in general expect elites to respond most positively to increased democracy in the operation of global governance institutions and to increased effectiveness in the results of global governance policies.

Drawing together findings from the three data sections, we may conclude that, overall, today’s elites are quite interested in and knowledgeable about global governance, and support global policy making in certain areas to meet today’s global challenges. However, these political and societal leaders generally only have moderate confidence in existing global governance institutions. In order to boost elite confidence in global governance – and thereby to increase elite readiness to support or even enlarge global regulation – it would be most important to make the institutions more democratic in their procedures and more effective in their performance.
**Key concepts**

Before proceeding to elaborate on the findings of this elite survey, the following preliminary section provides conceptual clarification with respect to the key ideas of ‘global governance’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘elites’. Each of these core notions underpinning the survey is prone to much ambiguity and varying interpretation. Hence it is important to specify how this report understands these concepts.

**GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: processes of regulation on a global scale**

Both sides of this term want clarification. ‘Governance’ refers here to processes of regulation: that is, to ways of making, implementing, and evaluating rules. Governance thereby brings order, predictability, and directed change to a situation.

Governance can happen at the level of the individual (e.g. with self-discipline) or inside an organization (e.g. with corporate governance). However, macro analysis, such as this study, examines governance of wider society. In this case governance applies to a city, a province, a country, a region, or the world.

The LegGov program has deliberately chosen the word ‘governance’ over that of ‘government’. The term government tends to be associated with the modern territorial state: i.e. with national and subnational government. Occasionally people also speak of ‘world government’, but they then usually imagine a state-like apparatus that might in future rule over the whole planet: with global-scale ministries, a popularly elected global parliament, and so on.

In contrast, ‘governance’ is a wider concept that sees the regulation of society occurring not only through the state, but also through other types of organizations. For example, regional and global governance institutions can have their own regulatory impact, beyond their member states. In addition, other societal regulation can occur through nongovernmental channels, for instance, when market actors make rules for the banking industry or when civil society associations make rules for environmental conservation. ‘Governance’ covers this wider range of societal regulation through state, interstate, transstate, and nonstate channels.

‘Global’ governance refers to these various kinds of regulatory arrangements as they play out on a planetary scale. A global governance institution makes, implements, and evaluates rules that in principle apply to people and circumstances spread across several continents or even the earth as a whole. For instance, the UN includes nearly all states around the world as
members. As an example of private global governance, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) develops protocols for digital network communications on a planetary scale.

The first global governance institutions date back to the middle of the nineteenth century, *inter alia* making rules for meteorology, postal services, and telecommunications. However, the main growth of global governance – and indeed the appearance of the term ‘global governance’ itself – has come since the late twentieth century. This recent expansion is hardly surprising, given the rapid globalization of society in contemporary history. More global connectedness has elicited more global governance.

Global governance institutions come in various forms. The generally better-known agencies are intergovernmental organizations: that is, formal treaty-based bodies with state members. Examples include the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, many global governance arrangements now take the shape of transgovernmental networks: that is, informal collaborations among civil servants from multiple states. Examples include the G20 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Other global governance institutions reside in nonstate sectors such as business and civil society. Examples include the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). Still other global governance arrangements have a hybrid or so-called ‘multistakeholder’ design that assembles various types of actors (academic, business, civil society, government and/or technical). Examples include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).

Nowadays every global policy issue (economy, security, sustainable development, etc.) tends to attract regulation from a mix of all of these kinds of global governance institutions: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, private, and hybrid. In addition, much further regulation of global problems occurs through local, national, and regional institutions. The academic literature variously describes this situation of multi-level and multi-sectoral governance as a ‘regime complex’ or ‘polycentrism’.

While the LegGov program in no way denies the importance of local, national, and regional institutions for the governance of planetary challenges, the present study and report focus on global regulatory organizations. On the one hand, we adopt the global emphasis because planetary problems want significant degrees of worldwide deliberation and coordination: local, national, and regional mechanisms are not enough. On the other hand, we stress global governance since it has generally proved more difficult to create and expand regulatory apparatuses on a planetary scale, as compared with local, national, and regional governance setups.
**LEGITIMACY: the perception that a regulatory arrangement exercises its authority in an appropriate and rightful manner**

Among the various forces that can encourage or obstruct a growth of global governance institutions, the LegGov research program focuses on questions of legitimacy. Governance arrangements that have legitimacy usually can more easily obtain resources, decision-taking capacity, policy compliance, and progress on problem solving. Conversely, governance setups that lack legitimacy usually struggle harder to reach results – or depend on coercion and trickery to make their impact. Legitimacy can therefore be one of a governance system’s greatest assets. Indeed, a governance organization’s efforts to gain greater legitimacy can in themselves already encourage improvements in procedures and performance, including more democracy, more effectiveness, and more fairness.

Thus it is very important to understand whether, why, how, and with what consequences global governance institutions gain, sustain, and lose legitimacy. LegGov is a six-year research program (2016-21) which undertakes the first systematic, comprehensive, comparative academic investigation of these issues. The elite survey reported on here is part of a larger endeavor that also examines general public opinion toward global governance as well as case studies of legitimacy in respect of particular global governance institutions.

LegGov understands legitimacy as the belief and perception that a regulatory arrangement exercises its authority (i.e. its power to rule) in an appropriate and rightful manner. When people regard a governance arrangement to be legitimate, it enjoys their confidence, trust, and approval. Legitimacy goes deeper than mere support for a particular ruler or a particular policy. Legitimacy involves foundational endorsement of the regime itself. With legitimacy, subjects willingly obey an authority, even when they dislike the leader of the day or when a given policy disadvantages them. Thus, for example, people pay taxes or even go to war for a state that they regard to be legitimate, even when they might oppose the government of the day.

Traditionally, studies of legitimacy have focused on the state. This was not surprising at an earlier time when the regulation of society transpired almost exclusively through national and local governments. However, as seen above, in today’s world significant governance also occurs beyond the state through regional and global institutions. Thus it has become important, through research like LegGov, to explore how legitimacy operates in these newer arenas of regulation.

Our elite survey assesses the legitimacy of global governance institutions mainly in terms of ‘confidence’. Contemporary survey research in political science commonly uses ‘confidence’ (along with ‘trust’) as an indicator of the legitimacy of a governance institution. Hence, when this elite survey measures confidence in global governance institutions, the question aims to measure the levels of legitimacy that these authorities attract (or lack).
It should be underlined that this elite survey is concerned with sociological rather than normative legitimacy. In other words, our research seeks to establish the actual legitimacy beliefs of actual subjects of global governance. The project is not developing philosophical arguments about whether those subjects are right or wrong to hold the legitimacy beliefs that they do. Here we examine, through empirical research, whether global governance arrangements are sociologically legitimate. It would be a different exercise to explore, through political theory, whether global governance setups are normatively legitimate.

**ELITES: people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential**

As already underlined, the present study concerns the legitimacy beliefs toward global governance of elites. Other LegGov projects examine the legitimacy perceptions of citizens at large. Future LegGov work will moreover compare the attitudes of elites and the general public in order to measure and explain possible gaps in legitimacy assessments between leaders and society at large. However, the present report restricts its scope to elites, on the argument that elite perspectives also merit detailed investigation in their own right.

Elites are understood in this study as people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential. Elites generally hold the most power in governance. They usually have much greater impact than citizens at large on policy agendas, institutions, decisions, and outcomes. It is therefore important to understand what elites think.

Elites also exercise particular influence in global governance. These leaders generally have the greatest access and inputs to global regulatory institutions. Indeed, elites do most of the actual global governing. They shape opinions, provide relevant research, lobby for influence, and make policies. In a word, without elite engagement, no global governance takes place. Thus it is vital to understand what elites, in their positions of power and influence, think about global governance institutions.

Our study examines both ‘political’ elites and ‘societal’ elites. ‘Political’ elites occupy the formal decision-taking positions in governance. ‘Political’ leaders include both the senior officials who operate the institutions of governance and the politicians who decide upon the policies that the bureaucratic machine elaborates and implements. Meanwhile ‘societal’ elites hold positions of influence outside of the governance apparatus itself. ‘Societal’ leaders include senior academics, civil society organizers, business executives, and media commentators. These circles feed prominently into policy deliberations – and sometimes also participate more directly in governance processes.
In addition, our survey considers both ‘national’ and ‘global’ elites. Sociologists have long highlighted the importance of elites in the national sphere: officials, politicians, academics, activists, entrepreneurs, and journalists who operate primarily within a given country. Our project has therefore interviewed nationally based elites in six countries: Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and USA. We selected these countries for their diversity of cultural values, economic conditions, geographical locations, political regime-types, and positions in the current international order. Besides national elites, recent scholarship has also underlined the growth and impact of elites in the global sphere. These leaders exert their influence not so much from a single country, but from positions in transnational networks. Global elites include managers in global business corporations, conveners of global civil society activities, researchers attached to global think tanks, journalists with global media networks, and officials working for global governance institutions.

The preceding remarks hopefully provide adequate clarification and specification of this report’s concern with ‘elite attitudes toward global governance’. In a word, the study seeks to understand how leading and more powerful circles in society regard regulation on a planetary scale. In particular, the survey measures the degree to which elites have confidence in (i.e. accord legitimacy to) global governance institutions and examines what qualities of global governance organizations are most likely to inspire those legitimacy beliefs.
How global are today’s elites?

As a first step in assessing elite attitudes toward global governance, we analyze survey data about the degree to which today’s societal leaders have a global orientation. The motivating idea here is that, to the extent that elites hold a more global orientation, they would be more prone to support the construction and expansion of global governance. Conversely, to the extent that elites lack global engagement and focus more locally and nationally, they would be less inclined to promote global governance.

To determine the ‘global-ness’ of elites today, our survey has examined five indicators. A first relates to degree of interest in global politics. A second concerns extent of global identification. A third involves knowledge of global governance. A fourth considers preference for global-level regulation. A fifth measures extent of experience with global governance institutions.

As detailed below, the survey results indicate that, across a diverse sample (i.e. six countries plus a global group, as well as six elite sectors), today’s political and societal leaders have considerable global orientation. While there is some geographical and sectoral variation, overall the surveyed elites have:

- high interest in global politics
- moderate-to-high global identification
- solid basic knowledge of global governance
- strong preference for global-level governance in some areas (human rights, environment, and trade)
- but little direct experience of global governance institutions

This evidence suggests that present-day elite attitudes are generally quite well primed for global governance. To be sure, the data in no way justify globalist hyperbole around claims that contemporary elites are ignoring local concerns, losing national identities, and abandoning the state. However, the interviewed political and societal leaders do view the world through substantially global lenses, too.

Note in this regard that the survey did not specifically target internationally active elites in major metropolitan centers, but also covered national and subnational elites with a more domestic profile of activity. So the respondents included officials in domestically oriented government departments, politicians in provincial assemblies, local journalists, etc. The survey results thus hold for elites as a whole and not just leaders with international vocations.
A) Interest in global politics

On average, the interviewed elites are quite interested in global politics. On a scale from 0 to 3, where 0 stands for no interest at all, and 3 for a lot of interest, our sample shows a mean of 2.7 interest in global politics. In comparison, respondents declare less interest in local and regional politics (means are respectively 2.4 and 2.5), but slightly more interest in national politics (mean is 2.8) than in global politics.

The table below breaks down interest in global politics by country sample and by elite sector. While each subgroup shows a rather high average level of interest, there are several points of significant variation. For example, the mean for the Philippines is substantially lower than for the other country and global groups. In addition (and not surprisingly) elites who regularly work with international issues in their function consistently (across all countries and sectors) show higher interest in global politics than elites whose function focuses them on national and sub-national issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elites show high interest in global politics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean interest in global politics, sorted lowest to highest (scale range 0-3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>By country</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>By elite sector</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-political</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B) Global identification

With some notable variation by country and by sector, elites hold moderate-to-high global identification, in terms of (in the words of the survey question) ‘feeling close to the world’. The overall mean is 1.9 on a scale of 0 to 3.

Respondents in Germany report the strongest global identification, above even the global sample. Global identification is weakest among respondents from the Philippines, Russia, and South Africa. The order of countries by strength of global identification matches the order for level of interest in global politics.

However, with regard to elite sector, interest and identification do not always go hand in hand. Whereas party-political, media, and research elites express strong interest in global politics, they identify weakest with a global community. Civil society elites are at the high end for both indicators.

Again, not surprisingly, global identification is in most cases higher among elites in internationally oriented functions relative to those in (sub)nationally oriented positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elites hold moderate-to-high global identification</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean global identification, sorted lowest to highest (scale range 0-3)</td>
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**By country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>(sub)national</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>/</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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</table>

**By elite sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>(sub)national</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party-political</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
C) Knowledge of global governance

Interviewed elites across countries and across sectors show a high level of basic awareness of global governance. The survey reveals no major pockets of elite ignorance.

To get a broad measure of elites’ knowledge about global governance, we asked interviewees three general knowledge questions. The first enquired about membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): ‘Which country does not have a permanent seat? France, China or India?’ The second question asked about the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF): ‘Are they located in Washington DC, London or Geneva?’ The third question related to the core concern of Amnesty International: was it climate change, human rights or the destruction of historic monuments?

On average, the 860 interviewees score 2.6, so between 2 and 3 correct answers. Indeed, well more than half of the respondents correctly answered all three questions.

By country, elites in the global and German samples have the highest number of correct answers. Scores for the other five countries are broadly similar at a somewhat lower level, although still high overall. One might also consider that different knowledge questions – e.g. an item concerning BRICS – could possibly generate different patterns of correct answers across countries.

![Solid basic knowledge of global governance](image-url)
The variation in elite knowledge of global governance is less between sectors than between countries. That said, party-political elites had somewhat greater difficulty with the questions, while bureaucratic, business and research elites show the highest scores.
D) Preference for global-level governance

Large variations exist in the degree to which elites prefer governance to occur at a global level (as compared with regional, national, or subnational levels). It very much depends on the issue-area in question, and there is notable variation as well by country and by elite sector.

One key reason to engage in global governance is the assessment that certain issues are better handled beyond the national and regional level. We asked our 860 elite respondents what level of decision-making they regard as the most appropriate for dealing with ten policy areas.

As the above chart indicates, a majority of respondents expresses a preference for global-level governance on matters of human rights, environment, and trade. Note as well that respondents also favor the global level over the national level in respect of migration and development. That said, very few respondents prefer global decision-making on issues of employment, education and taxation, where the national level is overwhelmingly favored.
The largest degrees of elite support for decision-making at the regional level (i.e. by a group of adjoining countries) appear regarding defense, migration and trade. However, the regional level is never preferred for any policy field by more than 31 percent of respondents, and the global level is favored decidedly more than the regional level in 6 of the 10 issue areas.

As for subnational governance, nearly one in five respondents prefer this level as regards education issues. Some 8-12 percent prefer the subnational level in respect of employment, health, environment, taxation, and development. Overall, however, preference for the subnational level of governance comes a distant fourth after national, global, and regional levels.

Some variation in these relative preferences emerges when we disaggregate the data by country and global sample. On average, interviewed elites in Germany find the global level most appropriate for decision-making (4.4 issue areas). Elites in Germany also stand out with the highest preference for regional governance (2.9 issue areas), which corresponds with Germany’s experience of high levels of regionalism in the European Union. Taking the global and regional scores together, elites in Germany give the greatest preference to governance beyond the state (7.3 issue areas).

The score for Germany is even higher than that for the global elite sample, which gives lower preferences to both the global level (3.8 issue areas) and the regional level (2.0 issue areas). In
fact, the global elite group declares as much preference for the national level as for the global level (3.8 issues each). Interestingly, then, our survey suggests that affiliation with a global organization is not necessarily associated with a decisively higher preference for global-scale governance.

Among the other countries, the USA elite sample expresses nearly as much preference for global-level governance (3.7 policy fields) as the global elite sample. The USA is followed closely by Brazil (3.5 policy fields). However, these two national elite groups also express the lowest preference among the surveyed countries for regional-level governance (1.3 policy fields). Hence overall preference for governance beyond the state comes out considerably lower for the USA and Brazil than for Germany and the global sample. The lowest preferences for global-level governance emerge for elites in the Philippines (3.1 policy fields), South Africa (2.8 policy fields) and – especially – Russia (2.3 policy fields). Elites from these three countries also express, by some measure, the highest preference for the national level of decision-taking.

In contrast to the substantial fluctuations by country, elite sectors show rather less variation in their degree of preference for global-level governance. In this case the highest preferences come from civil society and media (respectively at 3.9 and 4 issue areas), while the lowest come from bureaucracy (3.1 issue areas) and business (3.0 issue areas). Preference for the regional level is highest among business elites (2.1 issue areas) and lowest among civil society elites (1.4 issue areas). All six elite sectors express a similar level of preference for the national level.

**Little variation between sectors in preference for global-level governance**

Average number of policy areas preferred to be handled at each level of decision-making

![Chart showing variation in preference for global-level governance across sectors.](chart.png)
E) Experience with global governance institutions

Respondents’ levels of interest in global politics, global identification, knowledge of global governance, and preference for global-level policymaking all indicate relatively strong average levels of global orientation. Yet, when it comes to direct experience of global governance institutions, the sampled elites report few actual contacts.

We asked interviewees to indicate their level of experience of interacting with 14 global governance institutions: FIFA, FSC, G20, ICANN, ICC, IMF, KP, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank, and WTO. This selection includes examples of all of the previously described institutional designs of global regulation: i.e. intergovernmental, transgovernmental, private, and hybrid organizations. The 14 bodies also range broadly across policy areas of economy, security, and sustainable development. Respondents were asked about their experience with these institutions on a scale of 0 (‘no experience at all’), 1 (‘little experience’), 2 (‘quite some experience’), and 3 (‘a lot of experience’). On average, the 860 interviewees have 0.6 experience with the 14 institutions, so around midway between ‘no experience at all’ and ‘little experience’.

The figures above show that there is some (but mostly minor) geographical and sectoral variation in experience of interacting with global governance institutions. As might be expected, the largest gap arises between the global sample and the six country samples. After all, respondents in the global sample are working in global organizations, including the studied global governance institutions themselves. Yet even the global elite sample averages only ‘little experience’ of contacts with global governance agencies. Meanwhile the country elite samples
and the sectoral elite samples show little variation. Russia and the Philippines score slightly lower, and media scores a bit higher, but overall the averages both for countries and for sectors are within 0.2 of each other.

Greater variation occurs in respect of degree of experience with the 14 specified global governance institutions (see below). Here the UN scores decidedly higher than the rest, with an average of 1.5, midway between ‘little’ and ‘quite some’ experience. Relatively higher scores also arise for two other UN agencies (WHO and UNFCCC) as well as for global economic institutions (World Bank, WTO, G20, and IMF). Lower scores figure for global security institutions (UNSC, NATO, and ICC).

Extremely low levels of interaction prevail in respect of several global multistakeholder institutions (i.e. FSC, ICANN, and KP), along with FIFA as a case of private global governance. Indeed, only half of the respondents reported to know of the existence of the three multistakeholder initiatives. To this extent the surveyed elites still associate global governance with intergovernmental organizations and are not much attuned to newer alternative institutional designs.
Elite confidence in global governance

The foregoing examination of global orientation among today’s elites has found that the surveyed political and societal leaders are generally quite interested in and knowledgeable about global governance, and support global policy making in a substantial range of areas. Yet what about specific organizations? How do elites evaluate the global governance institutions that are currently in operation?

To answer this question, our survey asked elites to indicate their level of confidence in 14 named global governance institutions. For purpose of comparison, we also asked respondents about their levels of confidence in their national and regional governance arrangements.

As noted in the earlier discussion of key concepts, political science research often uses ‘confidence’ as a proxy measure for legitimacy. As also indicated before, legitimacy involves a foundational trust and approval of a regime – thus more than contingent support based on certain personalities or policies at an institution. Hence, if elites express high confidence in a global governance institution, we may infer that they are ready to give it substantial competences and resources, as well as to participate in its proceedings and to comply with its decisions.

The data presented below show that:

- Overall the surveyed elites hold moderate levels of confidence in existing global governance institutions. They are neither particularly negative nor particularly enthusiastic.
- Average elite confidence toward specific global governance institutions shows some notable variation, ranging between ‘not very much confidence’ and ‘quite a lot of confidence’.
- In general, conventional intergovernmental organizations attract somewhat higher levels of average elite confidence than newer institutional designs of global governance that include nonstate actors.
- Elites have higher confidence in global governance institutions covering the area of sustainable development than those in the areas of economy and security.
- Surveyed elites in South Africa and Russia show lower average levels of confidence in global governance institutions than in the other studied countries.
- Whether elites have more or less confidence in global governance institutions relative to regional and national institutions varies substantially between countries.
- In terms of elite sector, civil society respondents report the lowest levels of confidence in global governance institutions, while bureaucrats show the highest levels of confidence, although overall differences between sectors are relatively small.
**A) Comparing global governance institutions**

As per the figure below, our survey finds that elites overall have moderate confidence in existing global governance arrangements. The average views are neither starkly negative nor starkly positive. Elite legitimacy perceptions therefore suggest neither a crisis nor a boon for global governance. Elites seem by no means ready to downgrade or abandon these institutions, but they are not poised to upgrade and expand them either.

In only one case, the WHO, do elites with an average score of 2.1 clearly express ‘quite a lot of confidence’ in an existing global governance institution. In four other cases (UN, UNFCCC, ICC and ICANN), the average assessment at 1.7-1.8 leans toward ‘quite a lot of confidence’. In eight other cases (World Bank, FSC, WTO, IMF, UNSC, NATO, G20, KP), the average confidence level of 1.4-1.6 lands around the middle between ‘not very much confidence’ and ‘quite a lot of confidence’. At the lower extreme, FIFA with a mean score at 0.8 is alone among the 14 global organizations in falling below ‘not very much confidence’.

For further comparison, we also asked the surveyed elites about their levels of confidence in national and regional governance institutions. Average scores for these other scales of regulation (at 1.6 and 1.7, respectively) show that elites’ overall legitimacy beliefs do not differ that much between national, regional, and global institutions. Thus, it is not that elites are especially positive or negative toward global governance arrangements and therefore might be inclined to embrace or abandon them relative to national and regional bodies. Rather, the surveyed elites show themselves to be generally moderately supportive toward governance on all three levels.

In general, the old-style intergovernmental organizations attract higher elite confidence than the new forms of global governance, such as transgovernmental networks (G20), private mechanisms (FIFA), and one of the multistakeholder initiatives (KP). The top-five ranked institutions include only one non-traditional body, while the new agencies occupy three of the bottom five positions in the ranking. That said, with the exception of scandal-ridden FIFA, confidence in the other four cases of newer institutional designs averages broadly alongside that for most of the conventional multilateral institutions.

However, around half of the respondents used the ‘don’t know’ option when answering the question of confidence in the three multistakeholder initiatives. We therefore focus exclusively on the ten state-based global governance institutions in the remainder of this report.
Some important variation in average levels of elite confidence in global governance appears between issue-areas. In particular, the three examined intergovernmental institutions in the realm of sustainable development have a combined average score close to ‘quite a lot of confidence’ (UNFCCC, WHO, and World Bank). In contrast, global governance institutions in the areas of security (ICC, NATO, and UNSC) and economy (G20, IMF, and WTO) land around the middle of the scale, attracting neither notable legitimacy nor notable illegitimacy.
B) Comparing geographical subsamples

Certain other variations in elite confidence toward current global governance institutions appear on geographical lines. On the high end, surveyed elites in Brazil, Germany and the global group come relatively close, with an average score of 1.8, to the pole of ‘quite a lot of confidence’. Elites in the United States and the Philippines are not far behind with a mean of 1.7. That said, none of these average legitimacy perceptions point to a country whose elites would decisively and proactively champion the cause of global governance. Interestingly, the surveyed global elites also do not show markedly higher average confidence in global governance institutions than most of the country-based elites. Hence, transnational elites do not seem particularly ready to spearhead ardent backing for global governance either.

Toward the low end, interviewed elites in Russia fall solidly in the moderate range with a mean confidence score for existing global governance institutions of 1.5. Elites in South Africa come markedly closer to the ‘not very much confidence’ pole with a mean of 1.3. Yet neither of these lower figures point to a hotbed of elite discontent with current global governance either.

In the next figure, we compare for each geographical subsample the average confidence level in global governance institutions with the confidence levels in regional and national regulatory
bodies. The results show considerable variation. Elites in Brazil give their highest confidence to the global institutions. Elites in Russia accord significantly more confidence to the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization than to the global and national institutions. Elites in the other two countries (Germany and South Africa) place their highest confidence in national institutions. (Differences at the top end for the Philippines, USA and the global group are not statistically significant.)

Further variation arises inasmuch as three of the geographical subsamples (Brazil, Philippines, USA) rate global governance bodies ahead of national governance agencies, while the reverse order holds for Germany, Russia, and South Africa. Indeed, all possible confidence rank-orders between global, regional, and national governance are observed across the seven geographical subsamples. Thus, while the first table in this section, with aggregate findings for all 860 surveyed elites, put average confidence for regional and national institutions in the middle amongst the global institutions, a disaggregation by country reveals substantial variations in patterns of legitimacy beliefs toward different levels of governance.

### Comparing elite confidence in global, regional and national governance institutions: it varies substantially by country

Mean confidence (scale 0-3)

![Graph showing confidence levels](image)

Notes: The global institutions included are: G20, ICC, IMF, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank, and WTO. Regional governance institutions are: Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil, European Union (EU) for Germany, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia, African Union (AU) for South Africa, and North American Free Trade Agreement/United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the USA. Respondents in the global sample were asked about their confidence in the six regional organizations. National institutions included are the government and parliament.
C) Comparing elite sectors

We now turn to variation in confidence by elite sector. Do average opinions about global governance differ between leaders in business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research? Does any elite group hold strikingly stronger or strikingly weaker legitimacy beliefs toward the global institutions?

Overall the sectoral variations are smaller than the geographical variations. With an average score of 1.8, the bureaucratic group by a small margin holds the highest confidence in current global governance institutions (but the difference with business elites is not statistically significant). With the somewhat lower average confidence rating of 1.5, civil society elites express overall the most modest confidence.

**Elite confidence in global governance institutions varies relatively little by sector**

Mean confidence (scale 0-3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mean Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-political</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The institutions included are: G20, ICC, IMF, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank, and WTO.*

Also when we compare confidence in global governance institutions with confidence in regional and national governance institutions, less variation is observed between sectors than between countries. Bureaucratic and civil society elites rate governance bodies on these three levels more or less equally. A small but statistically significant difference is observed among business and party-political elites between global governance institutions on the one hand, and both regional and national governance institutions on the other. Researchers and media elites have significantly more confidence in global than in national governance institutions.
Notes: The global institutions included are: G20, ICC, IMF, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank, and WTO. Regional governance institutions are: Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil, European Union (EU) for Germany, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia, African Union (AU) for South Africa, and North American Free Trade Agreement/United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the USA. National institutions included are the government and parliament.

Hence none of the elite groups stands out for having particularly high or particularly low confidence in existing global governance institutions. These overall attitudes do not suggest that any elite sector – business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, or research – is in the near future likely to mount a major resistance against or a major promotion for global governance.

D) Summary

In sum, we may conclude that elites’ global orientations (as documented in our first section of data discussion) are not matched by solidly positive elite evaluations of current global governance institutions. Across institutions, across countries, and across sectors, observed elite confidence in existing global governance arrangements is mostly moderate, sometimes moderately high, but rarely resolutely high.
These ‘middle of the road’ opinions seem unlikely to drive much change in contemporary global governance. On the one hand, elite legitimacy beliefs for actual global governance institutions are not so firm as to energize a major expansion of global regulation. On the other hand, average prevailing legitimacy levels among interviewed elites are also not so weak as to encourage obstruction and dismantlement of existing global governance arrangements.

Rather, the overall picture of moderate confidence suggests an immediate future where elites muddle through on global governance. At the same time, overall moderate elite confidence may offer some reasonably secure ground on which to construct greater global governance as and when future substantive global crises might demand it.
Elite assessments of institutional features

So far this report has established that contemporary elites are quite globally oriented, but generally are only moderately supportive of today’s global governance institutions. The question then arises whether certain changes in global governance practices might raise elite evaluations, thereby helping to safeguard global governance institutions against efforts to undermine them, or perhaps even encouraging an expansion of global regulation. What features of global governance institutions do elites find most important?

To explore this question our survey examined elite attitudes toward the procedures and the performances of global governance institutions. Procedure (sometimes also referred to as ‘inputs’) relates to the ways that a regulatory organization makes and implements its policies. Performance (sometimes also referred to as ‘outputs’) relates to the impacts and outcomes of a governance institution’s policies. Established academic research has shown that both institutional procedure and institutional performance are important in shaping people’s confidence toward global governance.

The further issue is then what specific qualities of procedure and performance matter in order to obtain legitimacy for global governance institutions. Here our survey examined the qualities of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness, in relation to both inputs and outputs. We are particularly interested to establish priorities: i.e. how elites rank the relative importance of democracy, effectiveness, or fairness in respect of institutional procedure and performance.

To elaborate briefly, democratic procedures are policy processes in which affected people have due participation and control (e.g. through transparency, consultation and accountability). Democratic performance occurs when policy outcomes enhance popular participation and control in society. Effective procedures are policy processes that are timely, efficient, and use the best available expertise. Effective performance occurs when policy outcomes enhance problem-solving. Fair procedures are policy processes that are impartial (i.e. without favoritism or double standards). Fair performance occurs when policy outcomes involve an equitable distribution of benefits and costs.

In summary, our elite survey has found the following points in relation to institutional qualities as grounds for confidence in global governance:

- With respect to the procedures of global governance institutions, the surveyed elites in aggregate find democracy by some considerable measure more important than effectiveness, which in turn attracts somewhat higher priority than fairness.
• This rank order of democracy-effectiveness-fairness regarding global governance procedure holds for all countries except Brazil and (especially) Russia, and for all elite sectors except political parties.

• With respect to the performances of global governance institutions, the surveyed elites rate effective outcomes as by far the most important, well ahead of democratic and (even more) fair outcomes.

• While all of the geographical and sectoral subsamples prioritize effectiveness in respect of global governance performance, fair outcomes are ranked ahead of democratic outcomes by the global and (especially) Brazilian geographical subsamples and by the bureaucratic and research sector subsamples.

• In sum, keeping in mind some geographical and sectoral variation, we can in general expect elites to respond most positively to increased democracy in the operation of global governance institutions and to increased effectiveness in the results of global governance policies.

A) How elites rank the importance of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness

Our elite survey asked respondents how much importance they attach to qualities of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in respect of global governance institutions. More specifically, we asked the interviewed elites to indicate what they regarded as more important in global governance procedure: transparency (as a core aspect of democracy); expertise (as a core aspect of effectiveness); or impartiality (as a core aspect of fairness). In addition, we asked respondents to indicate their relative priority in global governance performance between: improving democracy in affected countries; delivering solutions (as a core aspect of effectiveness); and achieving fair distribution of costs and benefits.

With regard to procedure, respondents overall gave highest importance to transparency (42.6%), followed by expertise (30.8%) and impartiality (26.6%). On these measures, then, democracy ranks well ahead of effectiveness and fairness as the principal criterion for elite judgements of the ways that global governance institutions should operate.

With regard to performance, respondents overall gave by far the highest importance to delivering effective solutions (63.4%), with a distant second for democracy promotion (20.6%) and third for equitable distribution (16.0%). On these measures, then, effectiveness greatly outstrips democracy and fairness as the primary basis for elite assessments of desirable outcomes of global governance institutions.
B) Variations in priorities by country

These overall patterns of relative priorities hold across most of the geographical subsamples in our study. Regarding global governance procedure, the order of democracy-effectiveness-fairness applies in respect of Germany, Philippines, South Africa, and the global group. The elites surveyed in the USA rate democratic and effective procedure equally, while fair procedure comes a distant third. The German and global samples also give by far the lowest priority to fair procedure. Departing from the overall rank-order, respondents in Brazil place fair procedure in second position after democratic procedure and put effective procedure a distant third.
However, the greatest deviation from the overall pattern regarding procedural criteria appears in the Russia sample, where respondents give fairness by some measure the highest priority and put democracy in third place, with a much lower rating in comparison with the other countries.

Regarding global governance performance, all but one of the seven geographical subsamples follow the overall pattern where a large majority of respondents gives highest importance to effectiveness relative to democracy and fairness. An exception is South Africa, where less than half of the respondents (45.4%) prioritizes effectiveness and 35.3% prioritizes democracy, far more than in the other six cases. Another notable exception arises in respect of Brazil, where the surveyed elites give many more second rankings to fair outcomes than in other countries and the global group. Fair outcomes obtained a particularly low third place among respondents in Germany and the USA.

### Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(% that gives highest priority to...)</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures</td>
<td>The international organization takes decisions based on expertise</td>
<td>The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(% that gives highest priority to...)</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The international organization improves democracy in affected countries</td>
<td>The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems</td>
<td>The benefits and costs of the international organization’s policies are fairly distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C) Variations in priorities by elite sector

Disaggregating the responses by elite sector, we see that the rank-order democracy-effectiveness-fairness in respect of global governance procedure holds for all six groups except political parties, where a slightly larger percentage prioritizes fairness before effectiveness. That said, the degree to which democracy prevails over effectiveness differs considerably by sector: the margin is large in respect of the research, civil society, and media groups and smaller in the cases of bureaucracy, business, and political parties. In general, variations in relative priorities regarding global governance procedure are smaller between sectors than between countries (also if one would disregard Russia as an outlier).

Turning to criteria for global governance performance, a substantial majority of respondents in all six elite sectors gives highest priority to effectiveness. Four of the six sectors then further follow the overall pattern of placing democracy before fairness in the second position. However, that order is reversed in the case of the bureaucratic sector. Business elites give by some measure the least priority to fair outcomes.

### Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Sector</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>49.0</td>
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<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Party-political</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Sector</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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<td>Party-political</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>56.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concluding remarks

This report has summarized findings of a unique large-scale survey of elite attitudes toward global governance. As indicated at the start, our motivation has been to assess how far elites – leaders in politics and society – are ready and willing to support regulatory arrangements at a global level to meet the substantial planetary challenges of the contemporary world.

With this concern in mind, we have interviewed 860 elites across diverse geographical and sectoral locations about their overall global orientation, their confidence in a broad range of global governance institutions, and their criteria for assessing those institutions. The interviews took place between October 2017 and August 2019 among leaders in academia, government bureaucracy, business, civil society, media, and political parties in Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, USA, and a global group.

In a nutshell, the survey finds that, overall:

- today’s elites have a substantial global orientation which can make them in principle quite positively disposed toward global governance
- elite views of currently existing global governance are more qualified, showing neither solidly high confidence nor critically low confidence
- when elites assess the qualities of global governance, they tend to give highest priority to democracy in respect of institutional procedure and highest priority to effectiveness in respect of institutional performance
- given that elites have significant political impact, the future of global governance institutions may substantially hinge on the ability of these organizations to enhance democracy in their operations and to raise effective problem-solving in their results

To be sure, these headline conclusions present a simplified picture. As this report has detailed, evidence around these overall findings can vary – in some cases quite considerably – depending on which global governance institution, which country, and which elite sector is in focus. For example, elite assessments of the WHO are very different than elite evaluations of FIFA. Elites in Russia prioritize institutional qualities very differently than elites in Germany. Media elites are more likely to prefer global-level governing than business elites. In many cases the variations are relatively small, but it is nevertheless important to treat the overall findings carefully, with due regard to the highly diverse contexts that the survey encompasses.

Likewise, we must remember some limitations of the data. Yes, we can certainly affirm that this survey provides unique evidence about elite attitudes toward global governance. No other study of this subject has probed the issues so deeply and systematically. Nor has any previous investigation interviewed so many individuals across so many diverse countries and sectors.
Still, the survey has covered only 860 persons (in a carefully targeted, yet not representative sample) in only seven geographical settings at only one particular time. It is possible that a different sample at a different future moment could generate different results.

We must also underline the descriptive character of this report. We have here presented patterns in the data without explaining the observed variations between institutions, between countries, and between elite sectors. Our further analysis – to be released in future publications – will explore possible causal connections between the conditions described in the three sections of this report: i.e. elites’ global orientation, elites’ confidence in global governance institutions, and elites’ assessments of institutional qualities in global governance. That future research will be available at https://www.statsvet.su.se/leggov/.

For now, descriptively, this report provides unprecedented detail regarding elite attitudes toward global governance. It tells us significantly more than we knew before. The evidence contradicts notions, popular in some of today’s media, that elites have turned against globalization. Nor does our evidence about elite confidence in global governance suggest a likely decline in regulation beyond the state. On the contrary, overall elite attitudes could actually be positive toward an expansion of global governance if certain of its practices would be altered and improved.
Appendix: research design

To provide methodological context for this report of research findings, this appendix clarifies how our study demarcated the population of ‘elites’; how we selected organizations and individuals to take the survey interview; how the interviews were conducted; and what kind of questions the survey asked.

Defining elites

The study defines elites as ‘people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential’. Hence the survey includes not only ‘political elites’ (i.e. in government bureaucracies and political parties), but also ‘societal elites’ (i.e. in business, civil society, media and research). Moreover, we cover not only specialists in global governance, but also political and societal leaders more generally. The study assumes that attitudes in these elite circles can have significant implications for the place of global governance institutions in today’s world.

Selecting the interviewees

As a first step, we selected seven geographical sites from which to invite our elite survey participants. Our six focal countries (Brazil, Germany, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and USA) cover a range of different positions in world affairs: culturally, economically, geographically, and politically. We added a further ‘global sample’ of elites who are attached to global civil society organizations, global corporations, global media outlets, global research institutes, and global governance institutions themselves. The inclusion of a global sample allows us to enquire how far more globally oriented and more nationally oriented elites have different views about global governance.

As a second step, we identified key organizations in society for each of the six countries of the survey as well as the global arena. These lists of organizations covered the six sectors of interest: business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, party politics, and research. Across these sectors we aimed to include organizations that address diverse issue-areas and that have varying degrees of national and international orientation. In selecting specific organizations, we drew inter alia upon in-house LegGov expertise, generous assistance from scholars specialized in the various countries, participation and accreditation lists for the global governance institutions that are central to our study, and statistics on audience size for media organizations.
As a third step, we identified people within the selected organizations who hold a coordinating or strategic function in respect of substantive issues (so excluding pure administrative management). For example, in the party-political category we interviewed elected politicians or their senior advisors. In government bureaucracies, we invited senior figures in the civil service, the diplomatic corps, the judiciary, and the military. In business circles, we interviewed company managers, international relations officers, and senior communication staff. For civil society organizations, we addressed directors, strategic advisors and leading activists. In the media arena, we approached editors and senior journalists. In the research category, we included professional knowledge producers at universities and think tanks. At the global governance institutions themselves, we interviewed leading international civil servants as well as state representatives and their senior advisors.

As a fourth and final step of selection, we used quota sampling to reach the desired target group of interviewees, as summarized in Figure 1. We interviewed at least 100 elites from each of the seven sites. Half of this number came from political elites (25 each for bureaucracy and party-politics) and the other half came from societal elites (12-13 each for business, civil society, media, and research). The reasoning behind this weighting was our expectation that, in general, political elites would have more direct and substantial influence on global governance institutions than societal elites.

Our choice for quota sampling is based first on the advantages this strategy offers in guaranteeing that the respondents cover a good variety of types of functions and organizations, issue areas they most often engage with and international or (sub)national orientation. Second, it is the best sampling method available for this situation where an exhaustive database of politically relevant elite individuals and organizations is not available. Therefore, it was not possible to draw a random sample, as is commonly done in public opinion research. This sampling method implies that our sample is not strictly representative for elites in the countries (and global circles) we study, so that the results of our analyses cannot be extrapolated beyond our sample.
Conducting the interviews

Researchers at Stockholm University and the partner institutes undertook extensive searches for the contact details of prospective interviewees. Where such information was not available online, we approached the organizations themselves to obtain it. Invitations to interview were initially made via email, including information about the study and the way that data would be handled (anonymity and confidentiality). When invitees did not respond to the email, we followed up with telephone calls. While the response rate is less central to the quality of a targeted quota sample as compared to a random probability sample, we may note that this elite survey reached a respectable overall response rate of 31.8 percent. The breakdown by geographical subsample is: Brazil 37.8%, Germany 35.0%, global sample 40.5%, Philippines 56.2%, Russia 22.0%, South Africa 39.7%, USA 25.6%.

Interviews mainly took place over the telephone (82%). Upon request, when it was not possible to schedule a telephone interview, or for the 19 respondents interviewed with the help of CivicPulse, an online survey option was offered (18% of interviews). The first interview took place in October 2017, and the last was conducted in August 2019. Figure 2 shows that the timing of the interviews varied between countries, as a result of varying difficulties to contact respondents for the different samples.
Constructing the survey questionnaire

We opted to run the interviews around closed-ended survey questions rather than open-ended qualitative questions. The reasons for this choice are fourfold. First, our study aims to investigate systematic relationships between different attitudes and experiences. Qualitative research can provide valuable insights into specific situations, but studies of relatively small numbers of actors cannot reveal broader patterns of relationships between elite attitudes and global governance. Second, our study aims to compare elite attitudes and wider public opinion. To this end, we introduced questions about legitimacy of global governance institutions into the World Values Survey (Wave 7) that was fielded concurrently with our elite survey. Using identically worded questions in the two surveys allows us to compare legitimacy perceptions of elites on the one hand and general publics on the other. Third, our study specifically investigates the views both of elites who are experts in global governance and of elites who are not. The latter group would be less prepared to engage in a detailed qualitative interview. Fourth, closed-
ended questions are generally more comfortable for elites who are concerned to preserve their anonymity. That said, we realize that closed-ended questions can easily miss rich detail and nuance regarding respondent attitudes.