Attitudes, Redistribution, and Policy

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Attitudes to inequality and redistribution

Privilege to participate in this session

Important research theme in different subfields

- motivations and approaches differ
- many hypotheses and suggested drivers

Motivations and approaches

Microeconomics/experimental economics

- explain private actions, yielding or limiting unequal outcomes
- evaluate individual, often strategic, behavior, against model predictions often with experiments

Macroeconomics/political economics

- explain inequality and redistributive public policies across societies or time
- evaluate aggregate outcomes against model predictions, and patterns in observational data

Public economics (not optimal taxation)

- explain drivers of individual attitudes
- more inductive, based on survey questions and experiments

Each (invited) speaker key contributor to one approach



Suggested drivers of attitudes to redistribution

Some version of perceived costs and benefits

- general e.g., benefits based on position in income distribution and deadweight costs of revenue
- group-specific benefits based e.g., on traits (demography, sector, geography) or identity (working class, nationalist)
- benefits based on social preferences e.g., altruism or inequality aversion
- costs (or benefits) based on beliefs in how the world works (ideology) – e.g., how much earnings reflect effort vs. luck

My brief comments

- offer some remarks on each of Fehr and Bénabou
- sneak in hint or two on Stancheva's work
- suggest some intellectual arbitrage



A few comments on Fehr

Links to human history and small scale societies?

Role of that part of argument a bit unclear

- perhaps tries to say initial conditions matter, and cultural-biological evolution help determine values and propensity to sanction norm-breakers?
- if so, should perhaps focus also on understanding differences, not just commonalities, across societies in Henrich et al (of course, N = 15 makes this hard)

Multiple social-preferences (value) types

Experimental representative surveys in DEN and SWI

- suggest two types of social preferences "altruism" and "inequality aversion" – coexist with "selfish" preferences in roughly equal proportions
- nice approach to identifying heterogenous values
- consistent with experimental results on varying propensity to sanction – can we test values/sanctions link more directly?
- ▶ if believes in cultural evolution (as Fehr), results on multiple values suggest interior equilibrium of evolutionary dynamics

Social preferences predict Swiss referenda votes

Interesting findings – smell of macro approach

nice attempt to link micro measurement of social preferences to actual policy choices

Model-consistent and quantitatively significant results

- ▶ in line with modified Meltzer-Richards model
- effect of social preferences comparable to income

Different drivers of redistributive attitudes interact

► inequality aversion and altruism matter chiefly for people with above-median income — interesting allow for such interactions

Another interesting interaction

Belief in importance of effort vs. luck

- expected negative effect on desire to redistribute only for people with social preferences
- Fehr interpretation: social preferences a precondition for beliefs to matter

Why not correlated, rather than causally ordered?

- if cultural evolution purposeful, young will pick up both beliefs about how world works and values
- similarly, theory may yield sharper hypotheses on who hold which values and who follow norms to support actions consistent with those values

A few comments on Bénabou

Key insights on beliefs about how world works

Especially about social mobility and drivers of income

- beliefs in particular, motivated (collective) beliefs may not just drive individual decisions
- beliefs in high (low) importance of effort vs. luck may be complementary with low (high) redistributive tax outcomes, leading to two-way feedbacks
- multiple steady states: interesting perspective on redistribution in US vs. Europe

How do such beliefs come about?

- informal arguments point to purposeful cultural evolution: "invest in such beliefs"; "stubbornly ... pass them on to children"
- prospective gains from explicitly modeling this process



Conceptual: beliefs vary across both groups and societies

How would cultural-evolution (belief-formation) models work?

- predictions consistent with Stantcheva's stark results on "polarized realities" in same society?
- advantaged, disadvantaged groups rich vs. poor, white vs. black, native vs. immigrant, Republican vs. Democrat hold very different beliefs about how the world works (QJE 2021 Understanding Tax Policy; papers with Alesina and others)
- cultural evolution would have to be group-specific and run in different directions (or from very different initial points)
- evaluate these predictions for beliefs with micro data such as rich data used by Stantcheva

Methodological: steady states vs. explicit dynamics

Bénabou's key papers focus on former

- latter would not just produce same qualitative predictions
- may also yield auxiliary predictions about belief patterns
- suppose US and Europe have indeed settled on different (average) steady-state beliefs
- if beliefs and redistributive policy complementary and motivated beliefs sticky – we should see opposite-sloping time gradients for policy, and for cross-cohort belief profiles
- again, this suggests going to micro data own surveys, or those from WVS and similar sources

Short summary

Scope for two-directional arbitrage on attitudes to redistribution

- extend predictions from microeconomic approach to questions of macroeconomic relevance
- derive predictions about heterogeneity from macroeconomic approach and test with micro data

Some approaches can be common tools in such arbitrage

▶ I have suggested looking at dynamics of values or beliefs through the lens of cultural-evolution models