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**Paradoxes of Europeanization  
Swedish Cases**

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Abstract:

Europeanization has pervasive consequences for the state and for government organizations. The article analyses consequences of Europeanization in three different fields: occupational safety, medical product surveillance and competition policy. It is suggested that there is a variety in patterns of adaptation towards the European Union. The cases also show that state agencies were all deeply embedded in transnational and horizontal networks, that included not only agencies from other countries and EU organizations but also firms and interest organizations. Although the image of the state as an autonomous actor was not supported, there were ambitious efforts to create national interests, strategies and positions. Paradoxically, transnationalization was accompanied by strong attempts to shape states as actors.

# **Paradoxes of Europeanization**

## **Swedish Cases**

### **1. Introduction**

Being part of the European Community has pervasive consequences for the general role of the Swedish state, for the relationship between state and society and for the organisation of government. It is sometimes claimed that nothing of importance in the Swedish government tradition – whether it be the model with autonomous agencies, the obsession with management by results or the principle of transparency (public access to official records) - will fundamentally be altered. We claim that this is to underestimate the transformation in governance that is taking place. Changes due to europeanization will certainly be more marked in some fields, but few fields will remain the same.

The europeanization of domestic policy is evident in many ways. Being part of the internal market as well as membership in the European Union contributes significantly to a dissolution of domestic and foreign policy. The national political agendas tend to merge into a common European agenda and hardly any single policy field can be kept outside the European integration process (Mény et al 1996). This has

consequences for theorizing about the integration process. Europeanization should not mainly be seen as processes where (national) actors and interests meet and are played out against each other, but it should be seen as processes where both actors and interests are formed. Europeanization create both actors and interests. It changes what government officials think and say as well as what they do.

Even if europeanization should not be seen as something separate from the organizing activities taking place on a more global level, we have here chosen to focus on the implications for the Swedish state government of being part of the European Union. In the second section of the article, we will analyse the Swedish discourse on europeanization, that is how two governmental so called think-tanks have discussed its consequences for Swedish government. The third section presents transformations in governance in three different fields: occupational safety, medical product surveillance and competition policy. Section four presents some observations about the EU as a multi-level system and about the evolving transnational forms of governance. It also illustrates the emerging transnational co-operation by using EUREKA as an example.

Section five deals briefly with the issue of the consequences of transnationalization on regulatory capability and legitimation in Sweden. And finally, in section six, we will conclude the discussion by pointing to three paradoxes inherent in the processes of europeanization. Firstly, we have noticed that an increased embeddedness in the European network eradicates certain boundaries but strengthens others. Secondly,

we have noticed how the connection to a European regulatory framework reduces what politicians and civil servants can do, but also allows scope for local manoevrability. Thirdly, we have seen how membership in the EU reduces national sovereignty but also strengthens the nation as an actor.

## 2. Europeanization and government: the discourse

This section will summarize the discussion in Sweden regarding the organizational consequences of membership. We will primarily look at two think tanks with a certain level of authority: *Statskontoret* (The Swedish Agency for Administrative Development), which is the responsible central agency for investigating the consequences inherent in europeanization, and a relatively independent unit that was created in the central government for a period of some years, the so-called *EU work group*. For a more in-depth discussion see Jacobsson (1997).

In the analysis made by *Statskontoret* the state was considered a unified organisation. In order to increase the impact of Sweden's position in the Commission and in the drafting stage for decisions taken in the Council of Ministers it was considered important for Sweden to have a coherent policy and that the Government could speak with one voice. This required effective methods of co-operation, both in the government and between the government and different

agencies. The EU was considered to be on the "outside", as something that the state organizations had to approach as united as possible.

Secondly, the state was also considered a hierarchy, with all the characteristics of a hierarchy. Government leaders should supply the strategy and have a clear, political position. The state agencies should then "provide the Government, i.e. its leaders with an analysis of the national consequences of EU-related issues, staff to function as experts or representatives for Sweden in different EU bodies and under auspices of the government actively participate in EU co-operation" (*Statskontoret* 1996:13-14). The government agencies should provide a basis for decisions and act in accordance with the will of the Government i.e. the leaders. The bureaucracy should be active but obedient.

Thirdly, the clear division between policy and administration or, as it was expressed, between technical expertise and political competence was upheld. According to *Statskontoret*, experience had shown that the Swedish government model (with autonomous agencies) was "well adapted to achieve a natural division between the political and policy related issues, and the technical aspects in EU-related work" (*Statskontoret* 1996:19). The participation of the civil servants in EU-related work could to a large extent "be compared to the traditional Swedish drafting process which precedes a government decision" (*ibid.*).

The problems were defined along the lines that the state as an organisation did not function as it should. There were weaknesses both in the leader's strategic abilities and in the co-operation within the Government organization. There were weaknesses in control and in the issuing of top-down directives. There were weaknesses in the decisions taken, partly due to insufficient information and decision support. Changes were suggested to create better drafting procedures, better co-operation and better control. The ambition of the changes was that the state would function as a stronger and more unified unit: as a more effective bureaucracy.

The analysis of *Statskontoret* focused mainly on the formal and the intergovernmental EU, i.e. the work that is related to the decision-making process in the Council of Ministers. The other "think-tank" – *The EU work group* – focused on the Commission as the engine of the EU. The work group was of the opinion that a provision for Swedish priorities should be aimed at increasing efficiency as much as possible in the initial stages of the work done in the EU. The informal lobbying aimed at the Commission was considered as important as the formal work directed at the Council of Ministers.

The EU work group was less prone than *Statskontoret* to put Swedish interests on parity with the interests of the Swedish state. The group specifically meant that the actual influence Sweden would have was determined by innovativeness and technical expertise in the proposition and drafting phase on individual issues. Therefore it was important to co-ordinate Swedish action and build on a tradition of

compromise between different interests. Smooth, continuous and informal contacts between the public sector, interest organizations and the business community would also be necessary in order to, for example, know when it was appropriate to take the initiatives.

The *EU work group* did not place emphasis on the state as a unified organization. Co-ordination within the state apparatus was not the objective, but co-ordination between all those who could promote and form Swedish interests. A joint vision and ability to form alliances was necessary. The *EU work group* saw the state as part of and embedded in the society more than as an autonomous body. The *EU work group* referred Swedish interests/priorities to those of society; *Statskontoret* referred them to the state apparatus.

The two analyses did agree on a few issues. The *EU work group* emphasised the importance of long-term, strategic thinking in the top level of government as a basis for work done on lower levels. *Statskontoret* also emphasised the leading role of the top level of government, but varied as to how the goal should be reached.

*Statskontoret* preferred formal instruments of control and co-ordination, while the *EU work group* leaned more towards creating an authoritative organizational unit in the government and in maintaining an active debate in different arenas.

*Statskontoret* emphasised the advantages of the Swedish government model, with a clear division between ministries and relatively autonomous state agencies. There



were procedures that ensured co-ordination in the government (as opposed to the conditions in many other countries) and it was possible to retain the independence of different agencies and still govern their work in an appropriate manner. The *EU work group* saw confidence in the co-ordination inside government but the usual emphasis on the possible division between ministries and agencies was seen as an expression of deficient understanding of the conditions for EU-related tasks.

The basic picture of the EU and of Sweden differed in the two analyses. *Statskontoret* focused on the intergovernmental EU, and consequently on how the Swedish government should act to best promote its interests. The *EU work group* focused more on the supranational EU, and consequently on how the state and other Swedish organizations could jointly work to promote Swedish interests. The *EU work group* saw the state as embedded in society; *Statskontoret* saw the state as an autonomous unit.

Both these so called think tanks strengthened the concept of the nation as an actor. Europeanization promotes thoughts of how one can construct and promote Swedish interests better than before. What could be observed is definitely not the crumbling or dismantling of the nation state. More than before, it is seen as important to create Swedish actors and interests. The issue is however, how or if this discussion is reflected in the operations, which it is intended to modify. Therefore, let's leave the discourse of europeanization behind and shift our attention to what is actually happening in some specific fields.

### 3. In practise... or the art of being a good European and at the same time getting things done

Europeanization has influenced the three different fields studied - occupational safety, medical products surveillance and competition policies - in very concrete and down-to-earth ways. The justification of these operations has changed, if by varying degrees. The organization and control has undergone marked changes. The activities of the state agencies were connected partially to different ideas than before. Rules, decision-making procedures and the networks between organizations had changed. The Swedish government agencies showed a clear shift in preferences, strategies, resources and activities.

The basis for legitimation of occupational safety had been partially modified in connection with the European Economic Space Agreement (that is, with the internal market). At the same time the European regulatory framework had significantly been adopted. As far as the central agency was concerned – the Swedish Board for Occupational Safety and Health (*Arbetskyddsstyrelsen*) – we could notice a reluctant adaptation. The ambition was primarily to protect what had been achieved earlier and was esteemed as valuable. The agency tended to emphasise continuity, i.e. that “much was still the same“. And officials in the agency attempted to protect their turf, partially through emphasizing the space for manoeuvrability still

available. Through buffering, the essential occupational safety work would still be achieved (cf Scott 1992).

In medical product surveillance the common expression was rather that “nothing is what it used to be”. The connection to the European system had brought to the fore partially new bases for legitimation. The legal system had been altered, the organization in the field and the existing routines for decision-making. Whereas the Board for Occupational Safety and Health reluctantly adapted to its new position, the Swedish Medical Products Agency (*Läkemedelsverket*) willingly set about creating a place for itself in the new organizational landscape. Bridging rather than buffering. It strove to build bridges to the world around them rather than protecting the status quo. It worked hard to enhance its own position in the new field of medical product surveillance, which was being set up. One of the things that didn’t change was thus the Swedish Medical Products Agency’s striving to be actively involved internationally. The framework and modes of this involvement had changed however.

Competition policies were also influenced by the internationalization process. The concept of free trade in goods and services must be maintained through a regulatory framework, with organizations and diverse procedures. The complete legal framework of the EU had already been adopted in the early 1990s. Swedish legislation and the new Swedish organization copied Europe’s. EU regulations became applicable as Swedish law along side the Swedish Unfair Competition Act.

“We will be the same” as the EU, but in our own area. The Swedish Competition Agency’s (*Konkurrensverket*) actions were directed towards attempting to apply the same rules as the EU.

The agencies in these fields also tried to protect “their turf” in order to have operations run smoothly. The Swedish Competition Agency worked with exceptions. If the positive effects of co-operation (between companies) weighed more than the negative, the agency could allow exemptions to the Unfair Competition Act. The exceptions were time restricted. The market situation in Sweden – especially the smallness of the Swedish market and the fact that there are only a few competing firms – was also such that the agency did not always follow the practises established by the EU Court.

In occupational safety the whole issue of the workplace environment was regulated not by product directives, but by the so-called minimum directives. The monitoring was carried out by the Labour Inspectorate (*Yrkesinspektionen*), whose work had only been regulated minimally by the EU. Thus there were several buffers in place, so that it was possible to say what the two executives from the occupational health agency did when they stated that one must differentiate between:

“the formal framework which influences the Board’s work and organization through decrees made by the government and the ministries, from the actual work

done on work environments, which is done within the Board by knowledgeable experts”.

The Swedish Medical Products Agency was part of an open system as far as the registration of medical products was concerned. Time was invested in information dispersion to mitigate rules that were disadvantageous from a Swedish standpoint. This made it possible to limit the negative consequences of that which was considered unfavourable. The Swedish Medical Products Agency’s newsletter for licensing issues noted that one effect of mutual recognition was that:

“indications and other information regarding a medical product will sometimes not be applicable to Swedish therapeutic practises. To the extent that this may influence the use of a product in Sweden, the Swedish Medical Products Agency will fill in the information gap”.

In other words, information dispersion was an attempt to hold on to what was considered advantageous in the old system.

We can now roughly summarize the consequences of Europeanization within the three fields in the following way:

Occupational SafetyMedical Product SurveillanceUnfair Competition Policy

reluctant adaptation

willing adaptation

absolute adaptation

protect field

expand field

mirror field

buffering

bridging

copying

protect through  
inspectionprotect through  
informationprotect through  
exceptions

The structures of governance that had evolved in the different fields varied. Neither the significance nor the consequences of Europeanization were the same. The fact that the new was added to the old could be seen in the rhetoric surrounding EU adaptation. Within occupational safety different forms of co-operation with lobby organizations had existed for a long time. They emphasized continuity and connections back in time. A new orientation and the break with the old was emphasized in the field of unfair competition policy. In the rhetoric, medical product surveillance was somewhere in between. In practise it was as impossible to completely break away from the old as it was to completely ignore the new.

Despite the variations it was clear that managerial standards – in the form of management by results and other modern models – were pervasive in all three

fields. The standards that were actually launched were much less varied than those, which were actually put into practise. This was not a problem of course, if the existing practise was only regarded as something that had not, as yet, seen and implemented "the light." If we instead believe that the organization that actually took place was, to a large extent, based on common sense, it becomes reasonable to ask if there aren't lessons to be learned there for incorporating the new into the old. Perhaps the real organizational process that actually exists can contribute to the development of new and more varied general models.

Management operations evolve in the boundaries between the offered and the existing practises. In, for example, occupational safety, there existed a mode of thinking, an organization, procedures, etc. which did not allow for immediate transferral of the European model. What already existed created a certain inertia and what gradually evolved neither reflected a complete makeover nor a complete retention of the old.

Occupational safety was, on the other hand, a good example of the fact that nothing was really the same. There was a Swedish tradition, long-standing structures and policy ambitions. But even in this field the changes in operations were drastic and sometimes unavoidable. Despite this however, it was obvious that a lot of the thinking, organizing and new procedures were based on the old rather than being completely new. This meeting of what already exists and what Europeanization offers, varies in expression from field to field.

A key issue is what is striven for. Is there an ambition to apply the letter of the EU directives? Or is the ambition to protect the existing framework? The question probably needs to be reworked. It is not possible to completely prevent new ideas and structures from exerting influence, nor is it necessary or desirable to naively implement the new. The implementation of new regulations has always been a process where results and intentions do not necessarily coincide, and what is implemented is usually altered in the process of implementation.

Even if a broader empirical basis would be useful, there are a few more interesting observations that can be made from the studies of what actually happened in practise. First, some agencies experienced an opportunity to expand their field of interest in the European organizational landscape. The Swedish Medical Products Agency was competing vis-à-vis other pharmaceutical agencies in other countries and was working to become one of the “chosen” agencies. Europeanization created attempts in this field to expand the boundaries of their jurisdiction. Europeanization thus created a need to redefine the boundaries.

A second observation is that in connection with the EU it may be deemed important for agencies to present activities that are decoupled. A common argument is otherwise that organizations present a facade of being regulated and co-ordinated in order to appear efficient, rational and modern (Meyer and Rowan 1977). We have also seen attempts to gain legitimacy as a good agency through asserting that one



doesn't always follow the letter of the law. Perhaps europeanization is creating greater receptivity for a strategic discussion on decoupling.

A third observation revolves around the concept of europeanization. The empirical studies showed that the European driving forces were important. We also noticed, however, that it was sometimes difficult to separate europeanization from globalization. Aside from the EU, the WTO, for example, was very influential for the Swedish Competition Authority. For the Swedish Medical Products Agency there exists a plethora of standardisers with regional identities that are not necessarily European. This was also true for occupational safety. Europeanization may be a fruitful concept, but it is important to take note of the fact that there are other important international organizations.

In summary, government places importance on merging the new with the old, i.e. finding ways to be a good European and at the same time getting the operations to work. The empirical studies suggest that there is a need for much greater variety in organizational solutions and standards than those offered today. The repertoire should focus less on agencies as limited organizational units, and more along the lines of horizontal networks between government agencies and other organizations.

It has been argued that EU-related work should be incorporated into the ordinary regulatory framework of the different agencies as far as possible. The empirical studies showed that this was problematic. The agency executives participated in

networking vis-à-vis other countries' governments and vis-à-vis the European organizations. These efforts at networking were not easily incorporated into a more formal vertical management system. The executives had difficulty perceiving their own organization as a discreet unit. Their practical experience was one of co-operation and exchange with other organizations: companies, branch organizations, other national agencies, European organizations, etc.

The whole description of the surveillance of medical products field showed how embedded the agencies were with the Swedish companies and the companies' respective branch organizations. This agency should control the companies, but other relationships between the agency and companies had also evolved. This agrees with the description of the occupational safety field, where a classical problem has been that the monitoring agency, the Labour Inspectorate, has at times functioned more in the nature of a consultant and advisor to companies than as an enforcer of the law.

In all of the fields studied the government agencies were deeply embedded in the surrounding society. They acted with and in opposition to other organizations, both within and outside the country. The agencies participated on several levels in networks with other countries' government organizations and with companies and branch organizations. The image of the state as an autonomous unit was not supported. On the contrary, the problems of a vertical and unified picture of agencies, when their operations are organized transnationally, were evident.

#### 4. Images of the EU

The paradox is that there is an increased awareness of national specificity, when what is referred to as "Swedish" is incorporated into what is European. The creation of a national identity is strengthened; what is "Swedish" is strengthened (Ehn 1993). It is continually emphasized in different analyses, for example the one presented above in section two, that europeanization entails an obligation and an opportunity to ensure that Swedish interests are considered and utilized to best advantage. European exchanges make it possible to "exchange" formal sovereignty with real influence. This requires, however, that the objective is clear and that one can efficiently promote one's interests. There is a presupposition that actors and interests do exist.

This type of analysis is based on the conception of the EU as basically an international co-operative organization. Governments negotiate – they pool their national interests. The negotiation process has been compared to a game on two levels, where the government functions as a gate-keeper between the domestic and the international level. National interests are formed between the state and society and the government's task is to promote national interests at international negotiations (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1995; see also Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1992).

The transferral of national power to the EU is seen as conditional in this analysis. This is the core of the verdict in the German Constitutional Court in 1993 (Gustavsson 1997). In an intergovernmental analysis international co-operation fulfils a function for the states (Keohane 1984). The EU becomes an arena for competing national interests. Instead of being allotted an independent political role, the EU Commission functions as a mediator between member governments and their different interests.

The opposing view of the EU emphasizes supranational co-operation. The Court and the Commission have been analysed as independent political actors and important promoters of the integration process. The European business community and lobbying have been identified as an important part of the decision-making process in the EU (Andersen & Eliassen 1991; Mazey & Richardson 1995). The idea is that co-operation leads to co-operation. EU organisations and their co-operative efforts create the driving force which leads to a demand for continued co-operation. Co-operation spills over from one operation to the next (Haas 1958, for an overview see Cornett and Caporaso 1992). In this neo-functionalistic perspective, domestic interests are seen as something that must be continually redefined in dynamic processes where for example the EU Commission plays an important part (Matlary 1997).

The difference between an international and a supranational perspective is basically about which actors are seen as significant in the formation of European politics.

Both perspectives focus on actors and interests more than on ideas and institutions (Jachtenfuchs et al 1997). There are those, however, that are of the opinion that the changes that have recently been implemented – the Single European Act, Maastricht and the European Union Treaty – should be viewed as the result of a long, historical process and not just as single negotiations between national governments (Wallace & Wallace 1996). The common focus on individual political events runs the risk of skewing the perspective on the European integration process towards actors and interests (Mörth 1996). Pierson (1996) has argued for a historical institutional analysis of the European integration process:

“... actors may be in a strong initial position, seek to maximize their interests and nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or desired” (1996:126).

Recent analyses of the EU and the outgrowth of a “Euro-Polity” has also emphasized the conception of the EU as a multi-level system (Marks et al 1996). According to this perspective the intergovernmental and supranational analysis present a picture of the EU that is too static. The conception of the EU as a multi-level system has especially been launched by American and German researchers. Their analyses are based on experiences from federal political systems. Initially the American metaphor had a self-evident status and the German metaphor was relegated to the shadows. This despite the origin of the conception of the EU as a multi-level system stemming

from Fritz Scharpf presenting the problems related to “politikverflechtung” or “interlocking politics” at the end of the 80s (Scharpf 1988, Risse-Kappen 1996).

Scharpf claimed that the European political level and the national political level are linked to each other in a joint decision trap. This observation is based on a comparison between the EU and the German federal political system and not on the more common comparison between the EU and the U.S. German federalism entails that political power is exercised jointly between the different political levels as opposed to the American system with divisions of power. This is the main idea behind the EU as a multilevel system. The national, subnational and European political levels are seen as deeply embedded in each other.

Discussions regarding the EU have primarily dealt with to what extent traditional theories can account for work done in the EU. The unique characteristics of the EU, e.g. that legislation is decided at the European level while implementation of the legislation is done on the national level, seems to demand new concepts and analyses. Caporaso suggests that the EU can be compared to a post-modern state with a weak political centre, spatial locations and overlapping authorities (1996). The increasingly apparent regulatory operation has made Majone discuss EU in terms of a European night watchman state (1996). Other researchers have said that we must leave traditional concepts of the nation state behind when the functions and territories no longer coincide (Schmitter 1996).

Similar to the picture that has evolved in the empirical studies presented above the EU has been analysed as a decentralized, horizontal negotiation system where regulation is done to a large extent in sector networks (Marks 1993, Marks et al 1996, Kohler-Koch & Jachtenfuchs 1995, Kohler-Koch 1996). The significance of informal and horizontal networks has been pointed out by many EU researchers (Heritier 1997), for example in studies of EU policy and decision-making processes. Such studies emphasize informal mechanisms as directing the decision-making process in the EU. This can be described as a kind of transnational everyday integration.

EUREKA is an example of this type of integration. The European Research Coordinating Agency in EUREKA is a transnationally organized form of co-operation, and which clearly shows how the Swedish political process is part of the European political process (for a further analysis see Mörth 1996). The creation of Swedish preferences is of particular interest: was the Swedish public program in the technological-industrial R&D sector in the 1980s a result of a primarily Swedish policy process in which the Swedish government reacted to different events in the near-abroad, or was government policy formed in the European policy process?

Two parallel political processes could be discerned in EUREKA – one Swedish and one European. In the Swedish political process the national technological program during the early 80s was discussed, and the government's decision to join EUREKA in 1985. National efforts towards increasing competence in high technology and the decision to join EUREKA could be seen as a Swedish political process and a Swedish

Europe strategy. The work to create a Swedish information technology program, which was realized in the mid 80s (1986/87), had been evolving since the 1970s. The political breakthrough in the beginning of the 1980s was a result of the Social Democratic government coming into power in 1982 and needing a new commercial policy, combined with the government's problems with the increased control of American technical exports.

The analysis of the Swedish external environment showed, however, that most of the West European governments made similar decision with regard to technological-industrial R&D operations, especially in the form of national technological programs. EUREKA was obviously a part of the European technological community. The similarity between the Swedish information technology program and the German, French and British programs was both a matter of timing and substance. The national technological programs of the 80s were aimed at intensifying government involvement in the IT sector, and at creating an internal market in Europe. The national political processes were linked to each other – it was a European political process (Mörth 1998). The OECD became for example an important meeting place and point of dissemination, and this despite the fact that the organization lacks both a supranational component and formal authority.

Within EUREKA co-operation, it became apparent how connected the national political process was with the European process. EUREKA is, formally speaking, an international form of co-operation but in practise there is interaction between the



national and the European level. It is transnational co-operation, which consists of informal and non-hierarchical relations across national borders. The transnational organization and interaction between different political levels means that the operations are formed into a complex interplay between the regional level and the national political level. Politics is not confined to the territorially given boundaries. Interaction between the EUs political processes and the national political processes occurs on several levels simultaneously, and it is therefore impossible to isolate the processes from each other.

We have interpreted the EU as an organization, which, to a large extent, is structured around sectorial and often informal networks on several levels, with a mixture of public and private participants. This type of interpretation has far-reaching consequences, for example in how we view the creation of Swedish preferences and strategies. Co-operation within the EU creates, on the one hand, a demand for Swedish opinions and strategies and, in this way, serves to strengthen the creation of a Swedish identity. On the other hand, it presents the opportunity to discover what is wanted from that European co-operation. EUREKA is an example of this. Transnationalization means that the issues one pushes for and debates are, to a large extent, imported from "outside".

## 5. Transnationalization and democratic legitimacy

Though the above outline of the EU ties in to other researchers' on-going efforts to make sense of the Union, it should also be seen as an attempt to make the empirical studies presented comprehensible. In this section we would like to direct attention towards a problem, which ties in to the on-going transnationalization process as a whole and not just as this process is connected to the EU. European and global market integration has only marginally been followed by political integration. This means that national politicians can be made responsible for changes, which extend beyond the borders of the nation. Transnationalization can thus create substantial legitimacy problems for national politics.

In a world where the changes emerge across borders it is hard to draw a sharp dividing line between what is Swedish and what is European. That what happens grows out of processes which, sometimes, are neither regulated by national nor by a European political centre. Both desires and resources are, to an extent, created in networks, which cut across the boundaries of national organizations. What is wanted in fields like occupational safety, medical products surveillance, competition policy, agricultural policy, technological policy, public management, monetary co-operation and in other areas, is discovered through participation in transborder networks. The mechanisms can be fairly simple. People with similar interests meet

regularly to discuss issues, and, in all likelihood, what can be termed consensual knowledge gradually emerges.

Transnational organization usually has a clear technocratic slant. The perception of European co-operation as being both technocratic and efficient has a long history. It is evident that Jean Monnet and other EU fathers wanted a functional, efficient and supranational form of co-operation, which should not become unnecessarily burdened by political conflicts. The EC, and later the EUs democratic legitimacy rested on its ability to efficiently solve common problems in Europe. The construction of the high authority, the predecessor to the Commission, can only be understood from the perspective of such a technocratic ideal. Furthermore, when the foundations of the internal market were laid, great confidence was placed in the private standardization organizations' experts and in the experts from the independent European agencies.

Market integration in Europe has led to increased importance for regulations that view conflicts and politics as things to be limited. This is illustrated by the discussion surrounding the monetary union. That politicians reduce their own options to act is, of course, not a new phenomenon; what is new is that they are legally committing themselves not to involve themselves. The changes reach much further than just monetary policy. We can expect more and more initiatives, problems, discussions and proposals to emerge in different ways than before. Agendas are created less and less on the national level only. Discussions regarding the Swedish postal system,

alcohol policies and environmental regulation are being shaped by forces outside the domestic arena.

This does not have to be viewed as a problem, but it leads to a situation where responsibility and power are separated more than before. The governance of modern societies is largely about organization, influencing agendas and debates and this is, at least partially, what is being removed from the political arena. The responsibility remains but the ability to control has been reduced. Politicians are made responsible for things which they, in effect, have no way of controlling. As shown above, in the section about organization in occupational safety, there are, of course, ways of exerting influence in how the implementation process is organized, but this requires conscious strategies in order to create buffers and decoupling.

There are different ways of approaching the complexity, which accompanies transnationalization. The Swedish government has, for a long time, built its strategy on reducing complexity through pushing the issues down to administration, external agencies and to municipalities (Jacobsson, 1984). This has been supported by the Swedish government model. At the same time it has been possible to appropriate issues when this has been deemed expedient. The political mechanisms that have developed have thus become reactive, i.e. until something happens, agencies, municipalities and external organizations have been allowed to operate independently. Democratic legitimacy has been maintained through retaining the

prerogative to re-appropriate issues and outwardly giving the impression of taking action.

The main effect of europeanization and transnationalization has not been reduced control by politicians (even if there is a relatively rich mythology as to how much power they used to have), but that they are increasingly made responsible for things which they have little control over. The growth of networks across national borders on many different levels, including companies, other interested organizations and agencies, has meant that the gap between responsibility and power may become impossible to bridge. Thus, there is a risk that we are moving towards a situation where it would, even in principle, be impossible to accept responsibility for an issue by appropriating it.

The argument is thus, not primarily a formal one, that the nation state transfers its sovereignty to European institutions. This is the case, but the problem goes much further than that. The main risk is that the arenas where the problems and solutions are versed, where issues are initiated and discussed and where the knowledge as to what should be done is generated, are not only de-nationalized but are also becoming increasingly technocratic and less and less transparent. European institutions do not have the same legitimacy as national institutions. The change can be defended on the grounds that experts provide the best solutions, but handing over the controls to experts has its own legitimacy concerns. The issue is to what

extent it is possible to create legitimacy for a system where politicians neither are allowed nor able to govern.

We would like to direct attention towards the legitimacy concerns, which accompany transnationalization, even though we are aware that politics have never been completely autonomous. We do not want to create an image of national politics as victim of a transnational evil. There is definitely a lot to be gained by becoming a part of the transnational weave. Many would also assert that most things have remained the same as far as politics are concerned, and that citizens, politicians and social scientists can continue to trust parliamentary proceedings to present an accurate picture of what is happening in the world. On the other hand, we do believe that there are some risks involved in national politics becoming interwoven with the world in a partially new way.

The solution to the problems that we have outlined above could, of course, be to create responsible political institutions on a European level, or on a global level. Many view this as a rather poor solution, however, and for those who do see it as a solution, it is still a very distant one. The tendency appears to be the opposite: global markets are combined with regulatory institutions, regimes, or governance structures, which - though partially built on co-operation between states - may also be structured in a completely different way. The global economy needs regulations. These regulations appear, however, to be increasingly provided by international and other organizations consisting of experts, scientists and bureaucrats.

## 6. The paradoxes of Europeanization: a few conclusions

The internal market and membership in the EU changes both directly and indirectly the pre-conditions for most of the public administration. Those things considered important by most people in regards to government – for example transparency, regulatory capability and efficiency – are influenced. The influence is not noticeable everywhere or all the time and sometimes it is mostly superficial, but europeanization is important for three reasons: for changes of the nation state, for the relationship between the state and society and for the state's government organization.

We would like to conclude by drawing attention to three consequences of the increased transnational exchange of which europeanization is a part. Firstly, how an increased merger into European networks eradicates certain boundaries while, at the same time, strengthening others. Secondly, how the connection to a European regulatory framework reduces what politicians and executives can do, but also usually allows scope for local initiatives. Thirdly, how membership in the EU reduces national sovereignty but also strengthens the creation of nations as actors.

The first change has to do with borders, i.e. borders which are dissolved and which are created. Europeanization increases the merger into transnational networks in many areas. The discussion about the European Union is usually about the existing and desirable balance between the intergovernmental and the supranational. In

order to supplement the image of the EU we have emphasized a third image: the transnational. A result of the EU - as well as an ambition - is that changes take place across borders in various networks with agencies, companies, interest organizations and sometimes with politicians. There are networks on many different levels: some are connected to the Council of Ministers, some to the Commission and others have a more independent character.

EU organizations and the Swedish government can seldom be analysed separately. What is Swedish and what is European is becoming more and more interlinked. Important deliberations and decisions are made in networks between bureaucracies, expertize and companies. This is often done at a great distance from the voters and their representatives. The networks of experts can be difficult to gain insight into and to influence, both by citizens and by politicians. In this way boundaries are created which make changes hard to regulate and hard to legitimize. This means that even though a consequence of europeanization is the dissolution of boundaries, at the same time new ones are created. It is hard for those who are elected to both gain insight into and influence those things that they are held accountable for "back home".

The second change has to do with having scope to act. Europeanization changes how operations are justified and how they are organized; it is seldom possible to protect oneself against what is new. It is, of course, possible to assert that the EU budget is very small and that the core of welfare (schools, health care, geriatrics, transfer



systems, etc.) cannot be directly influenced by directives from Brussels. General transnationalization – which has a wider sphere of influence than the EU – does, however, influence these areas, and through the EU one aligns with certain sectors, which are usually considered politically central to a system of regulations, which in turn govern one's actions to a large extent.

We will also see, however, how these novel features are embedded into old ways of thinking and doing things. It is an old observation that what is new is rarely written on a tabula rasa but instead is added to what already exists. The meetings between that which has been historically created and that which is decreed (or offered) by europeanization is expressed in different ways. To completely prevent what is new from exerting its influence is hardly possible, but it is also hardly necessary or desirable to naively implement it. To institute new regulations has always been a process where results and intentions have not always coincided, and where the rules have been changed in the implementation process. Europeanization makes it necessary to think of new ways of organizing government.

The third change has to do with the future of the nation state. The main idea in the Swedish position vis-à-vis the EU has been that Sweden should ensure its own interests as good as it can. A great deal of effort is expended in defining what Sweden's interests are. We are of the opinion, however, that the significance of europeanization probably cannot be measured in degrees of influence over or in degrees of adaptation to Europe, but must be measured in a completely different way.

Through the participation in European networks one adopts not only regulations and procedures, but also, through exchanges with other countries, one learns what one wants in for example monetary co-operation, occupational safety and the surveillance of food products. Swedish interests, which must be ensured in the future in our co-operation with Europe, are created in this process.

Europeanization makes what is referred to as "Swedish" more important. Never before has there been so much reflection on "... what we think as Swedes," and how we should act to ensure Sweden's position. Others – whether it's the Commission, the Council of Ministers or the executives of other member states – want to know, in all possible situations, what Sweden thinks. Diagnoses regarding the disappearance of nation states seem to have a weak basis. The demand for national actors is increasing in European co-operation. Nations are continually pressed into discussion with others, both to "discover" and to promote their ideas, even though this is learned in conjunction with others. It can therefore be said that the national state is at the same time being diluted and recreated through the process of Europeanization.

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