

## Development Economics I: Households and the State

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**Coordinator:** Andreas Madestam (SU)

**Other lecturers:** Martina Björkman-Nyqvist (SSE), Abhijeet Singh (SSE), Laia Navarro Sola (IIES), Jakob Svensson (IIES), Anna Tompsett (IIES)

**Course Objectives:** The aim of this sequence is to familiarize students with the field of development economics so that they can (1) come up with interesting and original research topics and (2) acquire methodological skills (both theoretical and empirical) that are essential in the field. An integral part of the course is to combine economic theory with empirical research.

Development economics is a vast and heterogeneous field. We will cover most of the major topics in the field through the Development sequence, although they are not the exhaustive list of development economics research agenda. In Development I, we will study overarching topics essential to understanding development economics, many of which are also relevant to understanding broader questions about human welfare in other fields.

The course consists of nine 3-hour lectures. An overview is below, and a provisional reading list follows. See [here](#) for an up to date schedule. Note that the lectures given by Martina Björkman Nyqvist and Abhijeet Singh will be at SSE, while all other lectures will be at SU.

**Lecture 1** Institutions (JS)

**Lecture 2** Property Rights (AT)

**Lecture 3** Household Economics (AM)

**Lecture 4** Education I (LNS)

**Lecture 5** Education II (AS)

**Lecture 6** Welfare Programs (AS)

**Lecture 7** Health (MBN)

**Lecture 8** Gender (AM)

**Lecture 9** Conflict (AM)

### Method of Evaluation:

60% **Replication assignment** with a group and an individual component, presented at a workshop and evaluated based on a written submission.

40% **Written exam** on the content of the literature covered in class.

Additionally, all students are expected to attend **at least two research seminars or brown bags**, in development or other applied subjects, each week.

## Useful links

Michael Kremer (undated) “Writing papers: a checklist”

Jesse Shapiro (undated) “How to give an Applied Micro Talk”

Rachael Meager (2017) “Public speaking for academic economists”

Don Davis (2001) “Ph.D. Thesis Research: Where do I Start?”

de Janvry and Sadoulet (2004) “Guidelines for Referee Reports”

Duncan Thomas (undated) Information about data for development research

Chris Udry (2003) Fieldwork, Economic Theory and Research on Institutions in Developing Countries

The Development Impact Blog

## Methodological References

Acemoglu, D. (2010). Theory, general equilibrium, and political economy in development economics. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(3).

Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009). *Mostly harmless econometrics*. Princeton University Press.

Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D. (2009). In pursuit of balance: Randomization in practice in development field experiments. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(4).

Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kremer, M. *Using randomization in development economics research: A toolkit*. BREAD Working Paper 136. 2006.

## Reading List for Development I (tentative)

### Lecture 1: Institutions

#### Assignments:

- \* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

#### Required Readings

- Acemoglu, D. (2008). *Introduction to modern economic growth* [Chapters 1 and 4]. Princeton University Press.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369–1401.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1231–1294.
- Olken, B., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. *Annual Review of Economics*, 4, 479–509.

#### Further Readings

- Acemoglu, D. (forthcoming). Modeling inefficient institutions [In press]. In R. Blundell, W. Newey, & T. Persson (Eds.), *Advances in economic theory and econometrics: Proceedings of 2005 world congress of the econometric society*. Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(5).
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the west extend the franchise? democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4), 1167–1199.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary african development. *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113–152.
- Sanchez de la Sierra, R. (2020). On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern congo. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(1), 32–74.
- Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3), 19–42.

## Lecture 2: Property Rights

### Assignments:

- \* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(5).
- Besley, T. (1995). Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and evidence from Ghana. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 103(5), 903–937.
- Field, E. (2007). Entitled to work: Urban property rights and labor supply in Peru. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4), 1561–1602.
- Goldstein, M., & Udry, C. (2008). The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6).

### Further Readings

- Agyei-Holmes, A., Buehren, N., Goldstein, M., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., & Udry, C. (2020). *The effects of land title registration on tenure security, investment and the allocation of productive resources* [World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9376].
- Ali, D. A., Deininger, K., & Goldstein, M. (2014). Environmental and gender impacts of land tenure regularization in Africa: Pilot evidence from Rwanda. *Journal of Development Economics*, 110.
- Bühler, M. (2022). On the other side of the fence: Property rights and productivity in the united states. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 21(1), 93–134.
- Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3.
- Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. *Science*, 162(3859).
- Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(2).
- Wren-Lewis, L., Becerra-Valbuena, L., & Hounghbedji, K. (2020). Formalizing land rights can reduce forest loss: Experimental evidence from Benin. *Science Advances*, 6.

## Lecture 3: Household Economics

### Assignments:

- \* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Ashraf, N. (2009). Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental study in the Philippines. *American Economic Review*, 99(4).
- Ashraf, N., Bau, N., Low, C., & McGinn, K. (2020). Negotiating a better future: How interpersonal skills facilitate intergenerational investment. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(2), 1095–1151.
- Ashraf, N., Field, E., & Lee, J. (2014). Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in Zambia. *American Economic Review*, 104(7), 2210–2237.
- Browning, M., Bourguignon, F., Chiappori, P.-A., & Lechene, V. (1994). Incomes and outcomes: A structural model of intrahousehold allocations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(6), 1067–1096.
- Duflo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old age pension and intra-household allocation in South Africa. *World Bank Economic Review*, 17(1), 1–25.
- Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach. *Journal of Human Resources*, 25(4), 635–664.

### Further Readings

- Chiappori, P.-A., & Mazzocco, M. (2017). Static and intertemporal household decisions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55(3), 985–1045.
- Goldstein, M., & Udry, C. (2008). The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6), 981–1022.
- Udry, C. (1996). Gender, agricultural production and the theory of the household. *Journal of Political Economy*, 104(5), 1010–1046.

## Lecture 4: Education I

### Assignments:

- i. You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.
- ii. For each required reading, submit three questions / issues that were unclear / things you would like to discuss to Laia by noon the day before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Albornoz, F., Berlinski, S., & Cabrales, A. (2018). Motivation, resources, and the organization of the school system. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 16(1), 199–231. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvx001>
- Dizon-Ross, R. (2019). Parents' Beliefs about Their Children's Academic Ability: Implications for Educational Investments. *American Economic Review*, 109(8), 2728–2765. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171172>
- Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment. *American Economic Review*, 91(4), 795–813. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.795>
- Jensen, R. (2012). Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women's Work and Family Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(2), 753–792. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs002>

### Further Readings

- Ashraf, N., Bau, N., Nunn, N., & Voena, A. (2020). Bride Price and Female Education. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(2), 591–641. <https://doi.org/10.1086/704572>
- Atkin, D. (2016). Endogenous Skill Acquisition and Export Manufacturing in Mexico. *American Economic Review*, 106(8), 2046–2085.
- Attanasio, O. P. (2015). The Determinants of Human Capital Formation during the Early Years of Life: Theory, Measurement, and Policies. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13(6), 949–997. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12159>
- Attanasio, O. P., Meghir, C., & Santiago, A. (2012). Education Choices in Mexico: Using a Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 79(1), 37–66. <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr015>
- Baird, S., McIntosh, C., & Ozler, B. (2011). Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(4), 1709–1753. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr032>
- Bursztyn, L., & Coffman, L. C. (2012). The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Favelas. *Journal of Political Economy*, 120(3), 359–397. <https://doi.org/10.1086/666746>
- Jensen, R. (2010). The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(2), 515–548. <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.515>
- Montenegro, C. E., & Patrinos, H. A. (2014). Comparable Estimates of Returns to Schooling Around the World. *World Bank Group*, (Policy Research Working Paper 7020). <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7020>

Parker, S. W., & Todd, P. E. (2017). Conditional cash transfers: The case of progresas/oportunidades. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55(3), 866–915.

## Lecture 5: Education II

### Assignments:

- i. You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.
- ii. For each required reading, submit three questions / issues that were unclear / things you would like to discuss to Abhijeet by noon the day before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Kremer, M. (2011). Peer effects, teacher incentives, and the impact of tracking: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in kenya. *American Economic Review*, 101(5), 1739–74. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.5.1739>
- Muralidharan, K. (2017). Field experiments in education in developing countries. In *Handbook of economic field experiments* (pp. 323–385, Vol. 2). Elsevier. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214658X16300125>
- World Development Report 2018: Learning to Realize Education's Promise (Overview)*. (2018). Washington D.C.: The World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28340/211096ov.pdf>

### Further Readings

- Andrabi, T., Das, J., & Khwaja, A. I. (2017). Report cards: The impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets. *American Economic Review*, 107(6), 1535–63.
- Banerjee, A. V., Cole, S., Duflo, E., & Linden, L. (2007). Remedying education: Evidence from two randomized experiments in india. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3), 1235–1264.
- Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. (2012). Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school. *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1241–78.
- Epple, D., Romano, R. E., & Urquiola, M. (2017). School vouchers: A survey of the economics literature. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55(2), 441–92.
- Muralidharan, K., Singh, A., & Ganimian, A. J. (2019). Disrupting education? experimental evidence on technology-aided instruction in india. *American Economic Review*, 109(4), 1426–60.
- Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2015). The aggregate effect of school choice: Evidence from a two-stage experiment in india. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(3), 1011–1066.
- Romero, M., Sandefur, J., & Sandholtz, W. A. (2020). Outsourcing education: Experimental evidence from liberia. *American Economic Review*, 110(2), 364–400.



## Lecture 6: Welfare Programs

### Assignments:

- i. You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.
- ii. We will cover Alatas et al. (2012, 2016), Dupas et al. (2016), Banerjee et al. (2018), Niehaus et al. (2013) and Muralidharan et al. (2016) during the lecture. You are expected to familiarize yourself with their content.
- iii. For each required reading, submit three questions / issues that were unclear / things you would like to discuss to Abhijeet by noon the day before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Banerjee, A., Niehaus, P., & Suri, T. (2019). Universal basic income in the developing world. *Annual Review of Economics*, 11, 959–983.
- Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018). Universal basic incomes versus targeted transfers: Anti-poverty programs in developing countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 32(4), 201–226.

### Further Readings: Targeting

- Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012). Targeting the poor: Evidence from a field experiment in indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1206–1240.
- Alatas, V., Purnamasari, R., Wai-Poi, M., Banerjee, A., Olken, B. A., & Hanna, R. (2016). Self-targeting: Evidence from a field experiment in indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 124(2), 371–427.
- Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1992). Workfare versus welfare: Incentive arguments for work requirements in poverty-alleviation programs. *The American Economic Review*, 82(1), 249–261.
- Dupas, P., Hoffmann, V., Kremer, M., & Zwane, A. P. (2016). Targeting health subsidies through a nonprice mechanism: A randomized controlled trial in kenya. *Science*, 353(6302), 889–895.
- Haushofer, J., Niehaus, P., Paramo, C., Miguel, E., & Walker, M. W. (2022). *Targeting impact versus deprivation* (Working Paper No. w30138). National Bureau of Economic Research.

### Further Readings: Administrative Burdens and Constraints to Participation

- Banerjee, A., Finkelstein, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., Ornaghi, A., & Sumarto, S. (2021). The challenges of universal health insurance in developing countries: Experimental evidence from indonesia's national health insurance. *American Economic Review*, 111(9), 3035–3063.
- Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Kyle, J., Olken, B. A., & Sumarto, S. (2018). Tangible information and citizen empowerment: Identification cards and food subsidy programs in indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(2), 451–491.
- Romero, M., & Singh, A. (2023). *The incidence of affirmative action: Evidence from quotas in private schools in india* (tech. rep.). Working paper.

### Further Readings: Leakage

- Barnwal, P. (2023). Curbing leakage in public programs with direct benefit transfers [Conditionally accepted at AER].

Niehaus, P., Atanassova, A., Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2013). Targeting with agents. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 5(1), 206–238.

### **Further Readings: State Capacity for Implementation**

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S. (2016). Building state capacity: Evidence from biometric smartcards in india. *American Economic Review*, 106(10), 2895–2929.

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P., Sukhtankar, S., & Weaver, J. (2021). Improving last-mile service delivery using phone-based monitoring. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 13(2), 52–82.

## Lecture 7: Health

### Assignments:

\* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kothari, D. (2010). Improving Immunisation Coverage in Rural India: Clustered Randomised Controlled Evaluation of Immunisation Campaigns with and without Incentives. *British Medical Journal*, 340(7759), 1291.
- Björkman, M., & Svensson, J. (2009). Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2), 735–769.
- Björkman Nyqvist, M., Corno, L., De Walque, D., & Svensson, J. (2018). Incentivizing Safer Sexual Behavior: Evidence from a Lottery Experiment on HIV Prevention. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 10(3), 287–314.
- Cohen, J., Dupas, P., et al. (2010). Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(1), 1–45.
- Miguel, E., & Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities. *Econometrica*, 72(1), 159–217.
- Thornton, R. L. (2008). The Demand for, and Impact of, Learning HIV Status. *American Economic Review*, 98(5), 1829–63.

### Further Readings

- Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2007). Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6), 925–985.
- Adhvaryu, A. (2014). Learning, Misallocation, and Technology Adoption: Evidence from New Malaria Therapy in Tanzania. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 81(4), 1331–1365.
- Baird, S., Hicks, J. H., Kremer, M., & Miguel, E. (2016). Worms at Work: Long-Run Impacts of a Child Health Investment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131(4), 1637–1680.
- Björkman, M., Svensson, J., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2018). *Can Competition Reduce Lemons? A Randomized Intervention in the Antimalarial Medicine Market in Uganda* (Working paper).
- Cohen, J., Dupas, P., & Schaner, S. (2015). Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and Targeting of Malaria Treatment: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial. *American Economic Review*, 105(2), 609–45.
- Currie, J. (2009). Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: Socioeconomic Status, Poor Health in Childhood, and Human Capital Development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 47(1), 87–122.
- Dupas, P. (2011). Do Teenagers Respond to HIV Risk Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(1), 1–34.
- Dupas, P., & Miguel, E. (2017). Impacts and Determinants of Health Levels in Low-Income Countries. In *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments* (pp. 3–93, Vol. 2). Elsevier.
- Jayachandran, S., & Pande, R. (2017). Why are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference. *American Economic Review*, 107(9), 2600–2629.

## Lecture 8: Gender

### Assignments:

- \* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., & Nunn, N. (2013). On the origins of gender roles: Women and the plough. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(2), 469–530.
- Bursztyn, L., Gonzalez, A., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2020). Misperceived social norms: Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia. *American Economic Review*, 110(10), 2997–3029.
- Dhar, D., Jain, T., & Jayachandran, S. (2022). Reshaping adolescents' gender attitudes: Evidence from a school-based experiment in India. *American Economic Review*, 112(3), 899–927.
- Field, E., Pande, R., Rigol, N., Schaner, S., & Troyer Moore, C. (2021). On her own account: How strengthening women's financial control impacts labor supply and gender norms. *American Economic Review*, 111(7), 2342–2375.
- Fletcher, E., Pande, R., & Troyer Moore, C. (2019). Women and work in India: Descriptive evidence and a review of potential policies [Working paper].
- Hyland, M., Djankov, S., & Goldberg, P. K. (2020). Gendered laws and women in the workforce. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 2(4), 475–490.

### Further Readings

- Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., & Topalova, P. (2009). Powerful women: Does exposure reduce bias? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1497–1540.
- Hsieh, C.-T., Hurst, E., Jones, C., & Klenow, P. (2019). The allocation of talent and US economic growth. *Econometrica*, 87(5), 1439–1474.
- La Ferrara, E., Chong, A., & Duryea, S. (2012). Soap operas and fertility: Evidence from Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 4(4), 1–31.
- Wheaton, B. (2022). Laws, beliefs, and backlash [Working paper].

## Lecture 9: Conflict

### Assignments:

- \* You are expected to read the required readings before the lecture.

### Required Readings

- Acemoglu, D. (2003). Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31, 620–652.
- Ager, P., Bursztyn, L., Leucht, L., & Voth, J. (2022). Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance, and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939-45. *Review of Economic Studies*, 89(5), 2257–2292.
- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114, 1243.
- Algan, Y., Hémet, C., & Laitin, D. D. (2016). The Social Effects of Ethnic Diversity at the Local Level: A Natural Experiment with Exogenous Residential Allocation. *Journal of Political Economy*, 0, 000–000.
- Arbatli, C. E., Ashraf, Q. H., & Galor, O. (2015). *The Nature of Conflict* (tech. rep. No. 21079). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1), 3–57.
- Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padro i Miquel, G. (2015). The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, 105, 1817–1851.
- Cage, J., Dagorret, A., Grosjean, P., & Jha, S. (n.d.). Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Combat Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France [Forthcoming]. *American Economic Review*.
- Cao, Y., Enke, B., Falk, A., Giuliano, P., & Nunn, N. (2023). *Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor* (Working Paper). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Chassang, S., & Padro-i-Miquel, G. (2010). Economic Shocks and Civil War. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 4(3), 211–228.
- Condra, L. N., Long, J. D., Shaver, A. C., & Wright, A. L. (2018). The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence. *American Economic Review*, 108, 3199–3231.
- Dell, M. (2015). Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War. *American Economic Review*, 105, 1738–1779.
- Dell, M., & Querubin, P. (2018). Nation Building through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2), 701–764.
- Desmet, K., Ortuño-Ortín, I., & Wacziarg, R. (2017). Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity. *American Economic Review*, 107, 2479–2513.
- Dippel, C., & Heblich, S. (2021). Leadership in Social Movements: Evidence from the "Forty-Eighters" in the Civil War. *American Economic Review*, 111(2), 472–505.
- Duclos, J.-Y., Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2004). Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation. *Econometrica*, 72, 1737–1772.
- Durante, R., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2018). Attack When the World Is Not Watching? US News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126, 1085–1133.
- Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2008). On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict. *American Economic Review*, 98, 2185–2202.

- Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization*, 49(3), 379–414.
- Gambetta, D., & Hertog, S. (2017). *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton University Press.
- Guarnieri, E., & Tur-Prats, A. (2023). Cultural distance and conflict-related sexual violence. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 138(3), 1817–1861.
- Heldring, L. (2021). The Origins of Violence in Rwanda. *Review of Economic Studies*, 88(2), 730–763.
- Hjort, J. (2014). Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129, 1899–1946.
- Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013). Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict. *Science*, 341(6151), 1235367. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235367>
- Jha, S., & Wilkinson, S. (2023). *Revolutionary Contagion* (tech. rep. No. 4084). Stanford GSB Research Paper.
- Kelly, R. C. (1985). *The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System*. University of Michigan Press.
- Marchais, G., Mugaruka, C. M., Sanchez de la Sierra, R., & Wu, D. Q. (2023). *The Forging of a Rebel* (tech. rep. No. 28714). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Marchais, G., Mugaruka, C. M., Sanchez de la Sierra, R., & Wu, D. Q. (2022). *The Prosocial Determinants of Violent Collective Action: Evidence from Participation in Militias in Eastern Congo* (Working Paper).
- McGovern, M. (2011). Popular Development Economics—An Anthropologist among the Mandarins. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(2), 345–355.
- McGuirk, E. F., & Nunn, N. (2024). Transhumant Pastoralism, Climate Change, and Conflict in Africa. *Review of Economic Studies*, forthcoming.
- Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996). *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South*. Westview Press.
- Ottinger, S., & Rosenberger, L. (2023). *The American Origins of the French Revolution* (Working Paper).
- Padro i Miquel, G. (2007). The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear. *Review of Economic Studies*, 74, 1259–1274.

## Replication Assignment

The main course assignment is to replicate an empirical paper related to development economics. You may work individually or in pairs on the first part of the replication assignment. Each individual or pair will be assigned a faculty mentor throughout the process.

The replication task involves the components listed below. Assignments will be penalized for lack of clarity either in the descriptions or the tables or figures. Acquiring the skills to produce a professional and clear description of a piece of research is a key component of your training. The task is evaluated as follows:

### Working individually or in pairs (Total: 30/60)

1. Obtain the data for the empirical paper (either from journal websites, author websites, or primary data sources)
2. (15/30) Replicate the main results i.e. the central table and figure that summarize the main results of the study, and the specification tests or robustness checks that you consider to be the most critical to the case in defense of the identification strategy. Agree these in advance with your faculty mentor.
3. (7.5/30) Provide a descriptive analysis of the process of replication, including obtaining the data, understanding the data, any difficulties in understanding the specification from the paper, and to what extent and how you were able to resolve these difficulties.
4. (7.5/30) Provide additional evaluation of the empirical strength of the paper, and use this, in combination with the original evidence provided, to draw a conclusion about the empirical strength of the original paper. Additional evaluation of the empirical strategy might include:
  - Alternative visualizations of the data or results
  - Alternative robustness checks

### Working individually (Total: 30/60)

5. (15/30) Evaluate to what extent the paper successfully answers the question it set out to answer and to what extent the paper advances our knowledge on this research question. To address this question, you will need to review the literature identified in the paper as constituting the research frontier and critically evaluate the paper's claims with respect to contribution to the literature. For older papers, you may reflect on how the paper influenced later literature.
6. (15/30) Develop a short research proposal for possible further work, drawing on your replication assignment and evaluation of the contribution of this paper to the literature. Try to identify further questions that are raised by the paper or unanswered dimensions of the original question.

## Key milestones

The replication assignment has a number of key milestones which you need to hit. These are essential to completing a high-quality replication. You do not need to hand in any written work for the first two deadlines.

### Deadline 1: 22nd September

You must choose a paper for replication by this date, and have this approved by **Anna Tompsett**, verbally or over email. Once it is approved, you will be assigned a faculty mentor. You are free to choose one of the course readings.

### Deadline 2: 6th October

By this date you should *as a minimum* have completed step 1, i.e. obtained the data, or at the least, have made considerable efforts to obtain the data. By this point, you should also have agreed with your faculty mentor, verbally or over email, what the main results, figures and robustness checks constitute.

### Deadline 3: November/December, date TBC

You must present progress in a class workshop. We expect you to have completed most of the replication analysis at this time and be ready to discuss your individual component. Depending on the final number of groups, you should expect to present and discuss your individual or group work on the replication for around **15-20 minutes** and your idea for future research for around **5-10 minutes**

### Deadline 4: TBC

Submit the final report to the course faculty by email.



## Where to start with the replication exercise

The paper you choose should be **relevant**, **replicable** and **worth replicating**, defined as follows.

1. **relevant** for understanding important questions related to development economics. You must justify this.
2. **replicable** the replication must be feasible i.e. you must be able to obtain and use the data from the paper, based on an initial evaluation.
3. **worth replicating** the empirical strategy employed in the paper must be sufficiently plausible to be worth replication i.e. the paper must provide a clear identification strategy or a clear testable hypothesis. Alternatively, the paper must be sufficiently influential to be worth replicating, even if we have ex-ante concerns about identification, in which case the replication must involve a thoughtful discussion of these concerns.

There are three main places you can obtain replication data:

**Journal websites** More and more journals are adopting replication policies, meaning that papers that have recently been published in top general interest or field journals are likely to have replication data available, with a direct link from the journal website. A caveat is that not all original data sources are publicly available: sensitive data, particularly on health outcomes, is unlikely to be readily available. Check that **all** key data sources are publicly accessible before deciding on a paper to replicate i.e. don't just verify that a file labelled replication data and code exists, but confirm that it actually contains the data that you need, or instructions for how to obtain the data that are feasible for you to follow (watch out for data that needs special permissions or costs money to access).

Minor note: articles in the American Economic Review May issue (volume 5 in any given year) are Papers and Proceedings from the AEA conference. They are typically shorter and less developed than papers from a regular issue.

**Researcher websites** Another approach is to look on researcher websites. If there's a paper you like on this course, look at the other papers that the same author or authors have worked on, and see if there is data posted. Some researchers post data even for much older papers which pre-date contemporary replicability requirements.

**Other data repositories** Finally, there is data available on repository sites such as the Harvard Dataverse, so if you really like a paper but cannot find the data on the journal website or author website, it's worth googling the name of the paper and "replication data" and checking if the data has been posted anywhere else.

**Age of paper and replicability** The relationship between paper age and replicability is an inverse U. In general, the older the paper, the harder it is to find replication data. However, very influential older papers may have replication data available somewhere. Some may even have been replicated publicly elsewhere. (If so, we expect you to also have read the replication reports that are publicly available and to reference them in your report.) Older papers may have empirical problems by today's standards that were not recognized as problems at the time of publication (e.g. weak instruments, or standard errors that don't correctly account for correlation between units of

analysis or over time). *Very* new papers (i.e. working papers or papers that are forthcoming at a journal) may not yet have replication data available, although those that use accessible data may still be replicated.

**Use of code** Replication materials vary. Sometimes, you may simply find the data available, with no code posted. Other times, the code may be available, but may not run immediately. Other times, the code may have errors. In some cases, rarer than they should be, the code may run perfectly and produce exactly the results of the paper. We do not take a strong stance on how you should use the available code. Some students prefer to try to replicate the results without using the code, then refer to the code if they have difficulty producing the same results. Others prefer to work through the code line by line, being sure to understand each step correctly.

Note that the goal of the exercise is to *understand* and *reflect critically* on the empirical approach and how it is implemented, so the assignment requires you to do more than simply reproduce the results.

### **Important notes**

Replication is often difficult, and you will almost certainly encounter obstacles to replicating the empirical papers you choose. Throughout the assignment, we give credit for effort exerted and thoughtful reflections on challenges faced. There is no penalty, conditional on effort and reflection, for being “unsuccessful” in replicating a paper.

In general, however, **please do not reach out and contact the authors of the studies without first discussing the problems you face with your faculty mentor.** Contacting authors during a replication is quite reasonable, but it’s important to be strategic about how and when to approach them, and to first rule out the possibility that the obstacle is your own understanding, or perhaps your own coding errors, rather than a problem with their data, code or description.