Mathias Herzing

Mathias Herzing

FD, Forskare

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Arbetar vid Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Telefon 08-16 30 43
Besöksadress Universitetsvägen 10 A, plan 4 & 7
Rum A678
Postadress Nationalekonomiska institutionen 106 91 Stockholm

Om mig

Jag doktorerade 2005 vid Institutet för internationell ekonomi, Stockholms universitet, och har sedan 2006 varit affilierad vid nationalekonomiska institutionen. Min undervisning är inom mikroekonomi och spelteori. Forskningsmässigt är jag främst intresserad av mikroekonomi, industriell organisation, regleringar och tillämpad spelteori. Under senare år har mitt huvudfokus varit på tillsyn.


I urval från Stockholms universitets publikationsdatabas
  • 2011. Mathias Herzing. Canadian Journal of Economics 44 (2), 561-579

    P>This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in finite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely.Ce memoire etudie l'impact de l'information cachee sur l'interaction strategique dans le contexte des accords de commerce. Quand il y a asymetrie de l'information, il est possible qu'emerge une relation d'equivalence entre la liberalisation et la viabilite de la cooperation. On montre qu'il peut etre optimal de s'entendre sur un degre de liberalisation associe a une probabilite ex ante strictement positive qu'une deviation va se produire. Dans ce cas, la cooperation va s'effriter dans une periode finie, et le degre optimal de liberalisation ne tient pas indefiniment.

  • 2015. Rikard Forslid, Mathias Herzing. Health Economics 24 (6), 726-741

    This paper analyzes the profit maximizing capacity choice of a monopolistic vaccine producer facing the uncertain event of a pandemic in a homogenous population of forward-looking individuals. For any capacity level, the monopolist solves the intertemporal price discrimination problem within the dynamic setting generated by the standard mathematical epidemiological model of infectious diseases. Even though consumers are assumed to be identical, the monopolist will be able to exploit the ex post heterogeneity between infected and susceptible individuals by raising the price of vaccine in response to the increasing hazard rate. The monopolist thus bases its investment decision on the expected profits from the optimal price path given the infection dynamics. It is shown that the monopolist will always choose to invest in a lower production capacity than the social planner. Through numerical simulation, it is demonstrated how the loss to society of having a monopoly producer decreases with the speed of infection transmission. Moreover, it is illustrated how the monopolist's optimal vaccination rate increases as its discount rate rises for cost parameters based on Swedish data. However, the effect of the firm discount rate on its investment decision is sensitive to assumptions regarding the cost of production capacity.

  • 2016. Jonas Häckner, Mathias Herzing. Journal of Economic Theory 163, 141-166

    This paper discusses how marginal costs of public funds are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Under a quite general tax scheme, these costs turn out to be lower the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, marginal costs of taxation are lower in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. In cases when marginal costs of public funds cannot easily be assessed we ask if pass-through rates can provide useful information for policy makers. The market characteristics that we analyze are shown to have opposite effects on pass-through and marginal costs of public funds. It is also demonstrated that the marginal cost of public funds is generally lower for ad valorem taxes than for unit taxes. The main results are based on a linear demand system, but a number of extensions confirm that our main results are reasonably robust.

  • 2017. Jonas Häckner, Mathias Herzing. Resources and Energy Economics 48, 83-97

    This study focuses on the consequences of inducing compliance with environmental legislation through inspections in oligopolistic markets. Adherence to the law is associated with environmental gains, but also with losses in surpluses as firms incur abatement costs. By relating the net social benefit of deterring breaches of legislation to inspection costs, the impact of various market characteristics on the effectiveness of inspections can be assessed, thus providing guidance for environmental inspection agencies that have to prioritize among sectors given a fixed budget.

  • 2019. Mathias Herzing, Adam Jacobsson. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 78, 1-9

    High hygienic standards are essential to avoid the spread of infectious diseases, not least in environments with many children. This paper uses an experimental design to examine the impact of feedback information following a public health safety inspection on future behavior of pre-schools in three Swedish municipalities. We find no effects of information at the municipality level. However, we find that pre-schools that were informed about a bad result improved more than comparable pre-schools that received no feedback. Conversely, informed pre-schools with a good result worsened their results compared to similarly performing uninformed pre-schools. Our results thus lend support to the so called boomerang effect.

Visa alla publikationer av Mathias Herzing vid Stockholms universitet

Senast uppdaterad: 3 juni 2020

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