This pioneering Research Handbook provides a comprehensive and in-depth scholarly overview of the field of soft law, exploring the scope of current thinking in the field as well as proposing future pathways for soft law research. Organized into four broad themes, the Research Handbook offers important and unique insights into the dynamic and complex nature of soft law. The first section delves into the conceptual history and development of soft law. Second, the Handbook explores the disciplinary understandings of soft law, examining how scholars from different fields investigate the topic. The third theme focuses on the public and private actors and institutions involved in soft law-making, providing a detailed analysis of the complex relationships that shape soft law. Finally, the fourth theme explores the role of soft law in addressing major global societal challenges, including among others climate change, gender inequality, and the regulation of artificial intelligence. This Research Handbook will be a key resource for students and scholars in constitutional and administrative law, public international law, regulation and governance, public administration and policy, and law and politics. Practitioners and policymakers seeking to better understand the role of soft law in domestic and international law, policy and governance will also find this book beneficial.

Allowing private companies to de facto exercise legal authority is becoming increasingly common in several countries. Externalizing legal authority is sustained by a discourse replacing a conventional institutional approach to law enforcement with a functional approach where the agent is less important than efficiency and expected outcomes. Drawing on two brief case studies in Sweden—automobile inspections and reviews of international financial transactions—we argue that legal authority is transferred to for-profit actors with only a minimum of safeguards and accountability. For-profit actors are legal authority insiders but outsiders in the democratic chain of accountability.

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyse how lawyers in two of the largest European economies manage the contradictory requirements set by anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) legislation on the one hand and professional codes of ethics on the other hand.Design/methodology/approach - The study is based on qualitative interviews with French and German lawyers. It asks How do European lawyers handle the conflicting demands ensuing from their roles as frontlines workers? The paper uses lawyers' day-to-day practices and variations in member states' transpositions of the European Union directives as a starting point to study AML/CTF in the miniscule.Findings - The article shows that contextual institutional restraints and cultural factors have significant impact on the possibility to enlist for-profit actors in the fight against terrorism an organised crime.Research limitations/implications - This research highlights several factors inherent in AML/CTF regulation that warrant further research. Not only should further work be carried to broaden the understanding of lawyers but also other actors included in this policy area.Practical implications - The study explains why French and German lawyers do not comply as expected by the legislator. If increased compliance is required, then the paper provides input into what measures can be taken, by policy, enforcement and supervision.Originality/value - The study focusses on a hard-to-reach group of actors in AML/CTF regulation that has never before been studied in detail. As recent scandals have shown, lawyers are key actors in global finance but have rarely been scrutinised in their AML compliance norms and routines.

This article discusses the role of private actors in the finance-security nexus. It analyses how the delegated authority bestowed upon private actors in anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing (AML/CTF) may be perceived not as empowerment but as an expression of a threatening invasive and hegemonic order: To reap the possible benefits offered by the security paradigm in the 'war on terror', private actors must relinquish a degree of self-determinacy. This threat to self-determinacy, it is argued, foregrounds (affective) resistance among for-profit professionals. The article probes how for-profit professionals engage in (affective) resistance through self-authorship. Evoking Hansen's discourse analysis on linkages and differentiation, the empirical analysis delineates how lawyers in the UK and France resist being resilient subjects in AML/CTF. It shows how for-profit professionals use self-authorship for purposes of (affective) resistance. Specifically, it finds that the linkages and counter-values subjects pin to the perceived invasive order of AML/CTF serve as poles in the fence protecting a space where professional identity is safeguarded. In this way, actors became resisting subjects when faced with obligations to be resilient. In conclusion, the article affords nuance to the role of private actors in the finance-security nexus by outlining how the forging of the first link in De Goede's security chain is undermined.

Can, and will, lawyers police their clients? This article aims to shed light on the private front-line workers of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF). The analysis is based on a study of how Swedish lawyers perceive and handle obligations to police clients within FATF style risk-based anti-money laundering/counter terrorism (AML/CTF) regulation. We find that the lawyers were reluctant to taking on the responsibility for AML/CTF, and that their front-line work was directed towards being compliant enough. Relatedly, we identify several practices of separation that serve to mediate between the conflicting aims and interests in the everyday of this form of private policing. Another finding is that the lawyers by and large position themselves as knowledgeable actors, and view risks of AML/CTF as knowable. Nevertheless, lawyers experienced a principle clash between being 'not banks', and being front-line workers for FATF. In particular, the lawyers perceived their role as front-line workers to be more complex due to their professional norms and ethics on client privilege, and what they saw as the proper role of lawyers, being in conflict with the obligation to report clients and their transactions. In concluding, we suggest that paying more attention to the everyday experience of front-line workers when devising regulatory tools may be a way to promote engagement in 'true' crime prevention on their part.