ANALYSIS: Avoiding a fishing catastrophe – erring on the side of caution?

Major herring fisheries in the Baltic should be closed next year. That is the content of the scientific advice. But you won’t find that message in the headline advice that most readers focus on. It is buried deep in the text. This may be a result of leaving it to biologists to interpret a political decision, writes Charles Berkow in an analysis of the latest ICES advice on Baltic Sea fisheries.

Advocacy and Analysis Officer Charles Berkow. Photo: Lisa Bergqvist

The scientists at ICES appear to have faced a very difficult choice this year. Too many signs were pointing towards an ecological catastrophe in the Baltic Sea, and an imminent disaster for the fishing sector and the communities who benefit from fishing. There are also expectations from the sector, its political friends, governments, and maybe sections of the European Commission, to continue to be able to carry on business more or less as usual.

Given the situation on the one hand, the expectations on the other, and the uncertainties riddling both the environmental, political and legal contexts, it would not be surprising if the scientists opted for erring on the side of caution.

But what caution?

Background: The need for regulation

It is generally accepted that fishing needs to be regulated somehow. Otherwise fishing stocks would be depleted, as they have been time after time over the centuries, not the least in Northwestern Europe and the Baltic.

In principle, there are two ways to do this. Those who fish can get together and regulate themselves. Or the government has to do it.

With technological advances allowing fishers to travel farther and farther to find stocks to replace the more depleted local stocks, and allowing fishers to catch more fish in larger vessels with the aid of more advanced instruments it is less and less practical for the fishers to regulate themselves.

In the Baltic Sea, for examples, there are fishers from nine different countries. And even within the countries fishers who have larger boats and can fish over greater distances have different interests, at least in the short term, from small-scale fishers more dependent on local resources (and often using less destructive methods).

So regulation is up to the governments. But in the Baltic, fish stocks can straddle the different national zones or may migrate from one zone to another. Eight of the nine coastal states have banded together for common management of several of the key stocks – such as herring, sprat, cod, and salmon – through the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union. And the EU, in turn, has an agreement on cooperation with Russia on management of these species. (But that is another story; suffice it to say here that Russia and the EU have not managed to agree on catch limits, that they are not allowed to fish in each other’s zones and that 95 percent of the Baltic waters are in the EU zone.

Even if fishing rights are privatised, as some advocate in a purportedly market-oriented Third Way, government intervention is needed to regulate entry (in effect establishing protected oligopolies), to ensure that rules are followed, and to assess how much can be fished and set rules for allowable catches.

The scientists' dilemma

This was the challenge faced by the scientists at the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES). They are designated by the EU (and Russia) to give advice as to how much fish can be caught sustainably the coming year. This advice is used by governments in the EU to negotiate an annual political deal on how much fishing to allow, so-called Total Allowable Catches (TACs) or quotas.

This is such a unique situation it merits a moment of reflection. I know of no other business so directly dependent on annual political decisions made on the basis of advice from a particular group of scientists. The aim, again, is to avoid depletion of the resource – and, as a result, the long-term destruction of the business.

Except it isn’t working. When the scientists sat down to crunch the numbers and make their estimates – an extremely difficult task in the best of circumstances, (think of the challenges economists have in trying to make predictions about inflation, the rate of interest and unemployment next year) – the signs were disturbing.

ICES' assessments

The scientists at ICES are not free to make assessments of what could be sustainable fishing as they see fit. They are constrained by an agreement with the EU Commission and a multiannual plan for management of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic (MAP). They are obliged to supply a range of catches around a target called maximum sustained yield.

These ranges give options for the politicians in making their decisions about quotas. But the MAP also requires that “fishing opportunities shall in any event be fixed in such a way as to ensure that there is less than a 5 % probability of the spawning stock biomass falling below B lim” (Article 4.6).

“Fishing opportunities” is a technical term for what is more commonly called total allowable catches (TACs) or quotas.

“Spawning stock biomass” (SSB) is technical jargon for the amount of fish, in tonnes, of a size suitable for commercial fisheries and sexually mature.

“Blim” (which can be read as biomass limit) is a limit below which the stocks should not be allowed to sink, in order to avoid a collapse of the stock and long-term or even permanent damage. Technically, it is defined by ICES alternately as a “limit reference point for spawning stock biomass” or “as the stock size below which there is a high risk of reduced recruitment”.

It is understandable that the EU does not want fish population to fall below the crisis level Blim. They want to avoid a collapse of the stocks.

But none of this is as simple as it may appear. It is difficult enough to estimate how much fish there is in the sea now. It is of course even more difficult to estimate how much there may be next year if a given amount is caught. (This is done with simplified – though complex – models based on assumptions of parameters such as the rate of reproduction, the rate of growth and the rate of fish dying from natural causes, each of which is tricky enough, given that they can be affected by factors such as the impact of the temperature on the food of the fish at different stages of the life cycle. And based on data from different sources, including commercial catches – which in some cases are suspected to be incorrectly reported.)

In addition, the target values, MSY as the jargon goes, are even stickier to estimate, as they are the products of all factors mentioned above – and may be assumed to change all the time. Against this background, the level of precision in ICES headline advice, with recommendations specified down to the nearest ton, conveys a false impression of a level of certainty that simply does not exist.

Thus, it is not easy to determine what limits on fisheries are needed to prevent a risk for collapse – Blim. Not to mention the less than 5% probability of the stock falling below Blim next year given as mandated in the MAP.

ICES’ choice

Still, let us assume that the scientists did their best. And this year, when they gathered the data (such as it is), tweaked the models and crunched the numbers, the result was not positive. For two of the key stocks, the Gulf of Bothnia herring and the central Baltic herring, ICES wrote that even a closure of the fishery would not meet the minimum condition of the EU plan. That is, even a zero catch in 2024 will not bring the stock above Blim with a 95 percent probability in 2025.

For two other stocks, the western Baltic herring and the eastern Baltic cod, ICES has for several years recommended a zero catch for the coming year. For the eastern Baltic cod the situation is so uncertain (and poor) that ICES was not able to calculate the ranges required in the MAP. But they felt they could calculate these ranges for the central Baltic and Gulf of Bothnia herring.

The scientists then faced the question of what fishing levels to recommend for these two herring stocks. On the one hand, the MAP requests ranges of sustainable fishing (expected to give “maximum sustainable yield”). On the other hand, the MAP requires that fishing is set at levels to avoid the stock falling below the crisis level at the end of the next year.

Normally, if an EU regulation is unclear those implementing it should ask the European Commission, in its role as Guardian of the Treaty, for an interpretation. If no such clarification is forthcoming, it is up to the scientists at ICES to interpret the rules.

Not being lawyers, it is natural that they would opt for a cautious approach.

But cautious in which direction?

If they would take a precautionary approach regarding the environment and the future development of the stock, ICES would recommend a zero catch. If they would take a precautionary approach in terms of avoiding complaints from the fishing sector and the politicians who want to allow the sector to fish more or less as usual for at least one more year they would opt for some continued fishing quotas for 2024.

Photo: Leif Ingvarsson /Mostphotos

It looks as if the scientists ended up agreeing on a compromise. In the headline advice, the part read by politicians used to getting executive summaries (and avoiding jargon-ridden understated scientific texts), ICES wrote of the central Baltic herring:

ICES advises that when the EU multiannual plan (MAP) for the Baltic Sea is applied, catches in 2024 that correspond to the F ranges in the plan are between 41 706 (corresponding to FMSY lower × SSB2024/MSY Btrigger) and 52 459 tonnes (corresponding to FMSY × SSB2024/MSY Btrigger).

On page six it is clarified that the catch corresponding to ICES advice is 52,459 tonnes.

But in the middle of page three there is another message: not even a zero catch will fulfil the requirement of the MAP of getting the stock above the crisis limit.

The Gulf of Bothnia herring was handled in the same way. On page one, referring to the MAP, the headline advice recommended at catch of 63 049 tonnes. On page three was the warning that even a zero catch would not fulfil the requirement of the MAP.

Politically, administratively and from the point of view of competence (after all, these are scientists, not lawyers) such a compromise can beunderstood as cautious.

From an environmental perspective it may be seen as reckless.

On to the ministers in October

It is a series of combinations of scientific recommendations, Commission proposals, political decisions and fishing activities, tending to err on the side of caution (about the short-term consequences for the industry) that have led to the disastrous developments for the Baltic fish, and the fisheries. A muddy quadrangle (as opposed to an iron triangle) where it is difficult assign accountability, but easy to shift the blame.

It is not possible to do much about the impacts of eutrophication and climate change on fish stocks in the short term. It is possible to avoid compounding those impacts through fishing activities.

For the cod, even a closure of the fishery appears to have been been too little, too late. There is more uncertainty about the future of the herring stocks.

What is not uncertain is the importance of herring for the ecosystem. Both as predator and prey. When this key forage fish is depleted it impacts on higher trophic levels, both commercially fished species such as cod and other species such as seabirds and seals.

In any case, ICES advice is now on the table. In August the Commission will make its proposal about next year’s fishing. In this proposal the Commission will have to show how it interprets the advice – and, if only between the lines, the multiannual plan. That is, if the Commission bases its proposal on the number in the headline advice, or the warning on page three.

In October the EU ministers will have an opportunity to take their responsibility. Will they stick to the numbers in the headline and pretend they have not read the alarm in the main body of the text?

In the meantime, it is up to them and their civil servants, the industry and the NGOs, the media and anyone else interested, to read the ICES advice closely, reflect on the consequences, and encourage all the ministers to act more responsibly.

Text: Charles Berkow, Policy Analyst, Stockholm University Baltic Sea Centre