ANALYSIS: “Those are our rules, and if you don’t like them, well, we’ll make others”

In October, the fisheries ministers in the Council decided to break a rule in European legislation. In December, the Commission proposed to delete the rule. The European Parliament and the Council had made the rules in the first place. Will the Parliament go along with the change?

For years, European fisheries ministers agreed on fishing quotas that were unsustainably high. While perhaps popular with some in the fishing industry in the short run, in the longer term the result was depleted fish stocks and poor earnings for fishers. It was, of course, also harmful for the marine environment, though those effects are not as easily noticed in some circles.

Probably due to the longer term social and economic impacts of the depleted stocks for coastal communities, the politicians realized that things needed to be done differently. An answer was long-term management plans, with rules for setting fishing quotas that would hopefully lead to more robust fish stocks. Sort of like Odysseus tying himself to the mast so he could listen to the sirens songs without being tempted to crash his vessel.

These longer term multiannual plans were a keystone in the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2013. The first to be adopted, and the template for the others, was the Baltic Sea Multiannual Plan (MAP), covering seven fish stocks of herring, cod and sprat. Adoption was delayed until 2016 due to a battle between the Council and the European Parliament over who gets to decide on the plan. The Parliament won in court, so the plan was adopted by both co-legislators.

In practise it hasn't worked 

Despite being the result of a somewhat messy compromise between the two institutions, the plan has a certain logic to it. Article 4 contains the rules for setting fishing quotas, or total allowable catches (TACs). Article 5 has some extra safeguards (and some redundancies).

Articles 4 and 5 in the multiannual plan

A simplified version of Article 4 goes like this:

4.1 sets the overarching goal: TACs should be set within a range of values for the fishing pressure consistent with maximum sustainable yield (FMSY, the range being Fupper to Flower).

4.2 stipulates that these values should be estimated by scientists at the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES) or some similar independent scientific body.

4.3 sets the basic rule: TACs should be set between the point value of FMSY and Flower.

4.4 has an optional exception from the basic rule: TACs may always be set lower than Flower. No conditions need to be met.

4.5 has another optional exception: TACs may be set between FMSY and Flower. But only if certain conditions are met.

4.6 has another exception, but this is obligatory: TACs “shall in any event” (in unusually sharp and clear language for EU legislation) be set so that the probability of the stocks falling below a limit level (Blim) is less than 5%.

Article 4.6 can be seen as a seat belt: when stocks fluctuate, fishing pressure should be kept low enough so that they do not fall too close to a tipping point where they may collapse. At the time when the MAP was adopted, this seat belt was probably seen as superfluous. After all, the main objective of the CFP reform and the MAP was to restore and maintain stocks at target levels far higher than the limit value.

Towards that end, the MAP has safeguards in Article 5.

Again, in a simplified version,

5.1 says that when the stock falls below a trigger level (reasonably, below the target level) “all appropriate remedial measures shall be adopted to ensure rapid return of the stock” to levels above the target level. Then it states redundantly that a condition for applying the exception in 4.5 is not fulfilled, so that exception is not allowed.

5.2 says that when the stock falls below the limit level even more “remedial measures shall be taken to ensure rapid return of the stock” to levels above the target level. Then it states redundantly that this may include suspending the targeted fishery.

On paper, it looks nice. In practise, it hasn’t worked.

Since its adoption in 2016, three of the seven stocks managed by the Baltic Sea Multiannual Plan have crashed, in the sense that ICES has in essentially advised that the targeted fishery be closed.

First out was the Western Baltic Spring Spawning herring. For 2018, (under the new MAP) the ICES advice was for a TAC below around 35 thousand tonnes or less. By 2019 the ICES advice was for a 0 catch. It has been there since.

Next to crash was the Eastern Baltic cod, (albeit not due to overfishing). For 2018, the ICES advice was for a TAC of about 26 thousand tonnes or less. In the summer of 2019 the fishery was banned. It has been only a low by-catch ever since.

Third in line was the Western Baltic cod. For 2018, the ICES advice was for a TAC of about 3.5 thousand tonnes or less. By 2022 the advice was for a TAC of less than 7 hundred tonnes, and that was only by-catch in the flatfish fishery. The advice has been only for by-catches since, dropping to a mere 24 tonnes or less for 2024.

The optimist would be disappointed

All the remedial measures taken under Article 5 have not prevented the crashes, nor, together with quota cuts (too little, too late) led to a return of the stock to even the limit level, much less the trigger level, not to mention the target level. Nor that the return was to be rapid.

Needless to say, with a few short years’ perspective, these developments have not been good for coastal communities or from a socio-economic perspective.

An optimist might hope that Baltic fisheries ministers and others involved in setting quotas would learn from these failures.

The optimist would be disappointed.

If anything, they have played a blame game.

Some blame the seals or cormorants.

Some blame deteriorating environmental conditions because of global heating or overfertilization of the sea.

Some blame the Member States for not following EU environmental rules.

Some blame the Russians.

Even if there were some truth in all of these (which there might not be), it begs the question: what can you change in the short run, while trying to deal with the climate or eutrophication etc. in the longer term?

 

Commission is removing the safety belt

We at the Baltic Sea Centre have pointed out that the TAC decisions are based on forecasts over stock growth, and that they by nature are uncertain. That it is imprudent to base management decisions on the assumption that the growth forecasts will always be realised in full. There are plenty of examples of fish growth forecasts not being realised. It would make sense to apply a bigger precautionary buffer.

Instead, the Commission is now proposing to remove the safety belt.

This year, the scientists at ICES pointed out that the stocks of herring in the Central Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia were so close to crashing that it was time to put on the seat belt. That is, the conditions for implementing Article 4.6 in the MAP were fulfilled. The Commission agreed, and duly proposed closing at least the targeted fisheries on the two herring stocks.

Fisheries ministers balked: they opted for rather toothless remedial measures instead.

Some have pointed out that this was a violation of the EU legislation. The ministers may have silently agreed this: they demanded a change of the rules.

And now the Commission has obliged them. Less than a week before the next fisheries ministers meeting, the Commission is proposing to delete Article 4.6 in the Baltic MAP and its counterparts in MAPs covering two other regions.

In contorted logic, the Commission now argues that the MAP is inconsistent.

It claims that application of the seat belt may not be compatible with other provisions of the MAP, presumably the safeguard “remedial measures” that have failed to deliver. After all, Art. 5.2 only says that targeted fisheries MAY be closed, not that they MUST be closed. That is, its redundancy is not detailed enough.

The Commission also says that applying the seat belt may “result in potentially severe socioeconomic implications”. Not reflecting on the socioeconomic implications of two more herring stocks potentially going down the tubes like the cod and Western Baltic herring.

And by the way, the Commission asserts that the normal procedure of conducting impact assessments or public consultations is not necessary in this case. After all, it has consulted with the industry-dominated Baltic Sea Advisory Council and the Baltic coastal EU Member states in a presumably closed session of the government cooperation body “BaltFish”.

Perhaps the Commission will come to its senses, depending on the reaction to the consultation it opened after presenting its proposal.

 

Up to the Parliament

Otherwise, that leaves the Parliament. Who, after all, went to court for the right to be co-legislator on the multiannual plan. Will it also defend its content? Or will it tell the ministers in the Council, in the spirit of Groucho Marx “those are our rules, and if you don’t like them, well, we’ll make others”?
 

Text: Charles Berkow