If adopted, these changes will increase the risk that fish stocks will continue to collapse. The losers will be fishers, the associated industries, their communities and, most importantly, the marine environment. This article attempts to clarify the issues. The focus will be on the Baltic, where the first multiannual plan was adopted and where a controversy this autumn sparked the drive to weaken the plans.

The controversy, call for change and Commission cave

The central tool of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) after the reform in 2013 is multiannual plans (MAPs) for managing fisheries. 

In May, 2023 scientists at the International Council for Exploration of the Sea (ICES) pointed out that the risk for the stocks slipping below a limit level was too high, even if there were no fishing at all. 

Referring to the provision of the Baltic MAP under these circumstances (article 4.6, also called "the 5% rule"), the Commission proposed in August 2023 a closure of targeted fisheries on these two herring stocks (with a substantial by-catch quota for central Baltic herring in other fisheries). The proposal provoked a strong reaction from both major fishing interests and Member States. They objected to the proposed closure of targeted fisheries and wanted higher quotas for the herring (and sprat). 

In October, ministers rejected the Commission proposal and instead agreed on large quotas of both central Baltic herring and Gulf of Bothnia herring, while also agreeing on restrictions on trawling herring for limited periods as so-called remedial measures, which are suposed to ensure the rapid increase in the fish stocks. 

In a statement in connection with the Council decision, the European Commission expressed understanding for the Member States’ request for a targeted amendment to the MAP, but pointedly reminded the Council that “it is notably for the Commission to appreciate the timing and content of any such proposal”. 

Just a few weeks later, on December 6th, the Commission submitted a

proposal for a removal of Article 4.6 in the MAP to the Council and the Parliament. There had been no public consultation and no impact assessment, as is normal procedure before the Commission presents a proposal; the Commission claimed that they weren’t needed. Nonetheless, the same day, the Commission in a case of mixed signals, initiated a public consultation on the proposal, open until the end of January 2024. 

The Working Party on Fisheries Policy (that is, civil servants from the governments in the Member States) examined the proposal already the next day. The Council Presidency presented a compromise (with little change in substance from the Commission proposal) that the Working Party examined and approved on the 18th of December. At least two Member States, however, entered “parliamentary scrutiny reservations”, giving their parliaments a chance to express an opinion. The presidency compromise was then sent to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) for formal approval, or further discussion, if needed. 

Two lines of argument

In essence, the Commission has two lines of argument. The first is that there may be “inconsistencies” between article 4.6 in the MAP on the one hand and Article 2 and/or Article 5 on the other. The second is that applying the 5% rule could “have potentially severe socio-economic implications”. Article 4 is about setting fishing quotas for the coming year (a more detailed presentation may be found here).

Claiming inconsistency is like comparing apples and oranges

The Commission claims that the safeguard in Article 4.6 is essentially redundant. It points out that the main rule for setting TACs is that quotas should be set between F-ranges estimated by ICES, and, crucially, that these values are capped such that the probability of the stock falling below Blim is no more than 5%. This follows from the definition of “range of FMSY values” in Article 2(2). (see Box below)

The 5% rule in Article 4.6 is, however, not the same as the 5% rule in Article 2.2. The two 5% rules are based on different time frames and different levels of concreteness. The 5% rule in 4.6 is about the actual risk over the next year based on the most up-to-date information. The 5% rule in 2(2) is about hypothetical risks over the long term, based on simulations  often covering 50 or more years. 

In other words, there are no inconsistencies between the 5% rules in Articles 4.6 and 2(2), except that 5% refers to different entities. 

Put more simply, it is like comparing apples and oranges: they are both round fruits, but they are different.

Evidence that 5% rule for F-ranges in Article 2.2 does not apply to the next year can be seen in the latest ICES advice for the central Baltic herring and Gulf of Bothnia herring. There, ICES presents F-ranges that give a probability of SSB<Blim in 2025 of over 20%. 

Dropping the 5% safeguard in Article 4.6 in favour of the 5% definition in Article 2.2 means increasing the risk for a stock collapse. 

 Article 4.6 vs. 5

The Commission claims (in recitals 8-11) that there may be inconsistencies between Article 4.6 and Article 5. A detailed and somewhat technical comparison between Articles 4.6 and 5 (see box below) show that is not the case.

A close reading of Articles 4.6 and 5 suggests that the differences between them are clear and completely in order. They have different starting points, different targets and different time frames. While there is some overlapping regarding the measures, there is no conflict or problematic “inconsistency” between the two.

Severe socio-economic impacts

As a closer examination of the alleged inconsistencies between Article 4.6 and other provisions of the MAP shows that there are in fact no such inconsistencies, that leaves the socio-economic impacts as a justification for the change of the MAP.

When Member States in the Council refer to “socio-economic impacts” they normally refer to consequences for fishers and the processing industry in the coming year. These consequences are used as arguments for higher quotas than the European Commission has proposed and/or ICES advised are compatible with the MAP. 

However, the short-term consequences must be weighed against the consequences if the stock is perennially depleted or crashes. When stocks are held at anemic levels for year after year the catches are less than they would be if the stocks were more robust. A short-term reduction in catches can then be seen as an investment in larger stocks and catches in the medium term. 

As no impact analysis has been presented for the Council/Commission proposal it appears that it is only the impacts in the immediate term that are being considered. 

The impacts on the marine environment are seldom mentioned but can be assumed to be severe when top predators like the Baltic cod or low-trophic level keystone species like the Baltic herring are depressed. 

Before an amendment is approved it would be useful for the Council and Commission to present their assessments on the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the proposed changes. 

Next steps

As a result of the consultation it has opened after the fact, the Commission may realize that its proposed change of the MAP was based on a misunderstanding of the MAP and the science and withdraw the proposal. 
If the Council and Commission maintain their current positions the proposal will go to a three-way “trialogue” negotiation with the European Parliament. It will then be up to the Parliament to defend the integrity of the MAP for which it fought for the status of co-legislator.

Then again, perhaps someone will appeal the decisions made under the MAP to the Court of Justice so it can determine if they are consistent with the provisions in the basic regulation of the CFP. 

Text: Charles Berkow