The EU Commission's latest proposal to stop all directed fishing for herring and sturgeon in the Gulf of Bothnia and the central Baltic Sea has been met with harsh criticism.

"Sick”, thundered Anton Paulrud, CEO of the pelagic fishing industry organization Swedish Pelagic Federation PO.
"Devastating", said Wilhelm Liljeqvist, CEO of the fishmeal factory in Kasnäs, Finland.

That the loudest criticism comes from the large-scale and more industrially oriented parts of the fishing industry is perhaps not so strange. Almost all of the catches in the Baltic large-scale pelagic fisheries are sold to fishmeal factories which requires access to large quantities of herring and sprat.

"Who can you trust?"

Part of the anger is probably also rooted in the fact that the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea's (ICES) latest advice sets herring quotas of a maximum of almost 49,000 tonnes in the Gulf of Bothnia and just over 41,0000 tonnes in the central Baltic Sea for next year, in accordance with the fishing mortality ranges found in the multiannual management plan for the Baltic Sea (MAP).

How come the European Commission's wish to see less fishing than what is said in the ICES advice?

Or as the Swedish Fisheries Industry's national organization put it: "Who can you trust?".

At first glance, it is easy to believe that the European Commission is going against science. But the Commission's proposal is actually based on ICES's analysis – but not on the quota intervals, but on the clear warnings that ICES also raises in its advice.

The quotas follow the principle of MSY (maximum sustainable yield). But the MSY concept has several well-known shortcomings and is not sufficient to deal with the serious situation of herring stocks in the Baltic Sea.

According to ICES, using the advised quotas to the maximum during next year would itself entail major risks for both herring stocks – risks that exceed the level that is acceptable according to the MAP. The EU Commission's proposal is thus not a denial of science but the result of a scientifically based risk assessment.

Politically awkward

Many details of the proposal are still unclear. The Commission has asked ICES for further information to be able to propose 1) bycatch quotas for herring, and 2) a reasonable quota for the sprat fishery, in which herring is also caught.

In addition, the small-scale coastal fishermen are hoping for exemptions that will allow them to continue fishing for human consumption.

In October, EU fisheries ministers meet to decide on next year's catch quotas. They are of course aware of the politically awkward situation that the Commission's proposal has created for them.

If the ministers allow extensive targeted herring fishing next year, they show that they are prepared to take rather large ecological risks. Such a decision would also signal that the Baltic MAP does not carry much weight when it really matters. The plan was decided by the EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and is part of EU law.

If they instead choose to follow the Commission's line and stop targeted herring fishing in the entire Baltic Sea next year (except in the Gulf of Riga), the fishing industry will likely be hit hard. It would undoubtedly be a painful decision.

But in the history of European fisheries management, there are at least two examples that show that it can be worth it in the long run.

North Sea herring recovered in five years

The spawning stock biomass of herring in the North Sea dropped from over 5 million tonnes in the 1950s to less than 50,000 tonnes in the 1970s as a result of severe overfishing by vessels from at least 14 countries.

In January 1977, the North Sea countries extended their economic fishing zones to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Shortly afterwards, Great Britain introduced a total ban on all directed fishing for North Sea herring in the British zone. During the summer, Dutch vessels made their way to British waters to fish for 'maatjes' (traditional cured herring), as they had always done. Two of the ships were stopped and boarded by the British Navy.

Other North Sea countries soon realized that the once large and productive herring stock was disappearing for good, and in June 1977 all directed fishing on the North Sea herring was banned.

The ban lasted six years, until June 1983, and had major economic and social consequences. Many ship-owners went bankrupt and both professional fishermen and processing industries disappeared. But seen in retrospective, the ban turned out to be an ecological and economic success.

The North Sea herring responded very well to the reduced fishing pressure. The trend reversed and spawning stock biomass grew to nearly 2 million tons around 1990. Since then, spawning stock biomass has fluctuated between 1 and 2 million tons and is above both the precautionary level Bpa and the critical level (Blim) when the stock's ability to reproduce is seriously threatened.

The important of spawning components

Was it the fishing ban that saved the North Sea herring?

The answer is undoubtedly: yes. The fairly quick stock recovery is considered to be partially due to successful recruitment with large year-classes during the recovery period. Another important factor was that the ban was enforced consistently and with full force.

The North Sea herring consists of at least four spawning components or sub-populations. These components have different growth rates and migration patterns, and spawn in different places. This means that they are affected by fishing in different ways during different parts of the year – and that they recover at different rates.

During the overfishing that led to the collapse in the 1970s, the various spawning components were depleted one by one, from south to north, and as the stock decreased, the herring retreated to its core spawning grounds. Since fishing was stopped in the entire distribution area, the stock was allowed to grow and could slowly recolonize even the more peripheral spawning areas.

Diversity strengthens stock resilience

Even if the spawning stock biomass of a collapsed fish stock grows above a certain limit, it does not necessarily mean that the stock has fully recovered. It may be at least as important to maintain the population's spatial and behavioral diversity and to make sure that the different spawning components are protected against over-exploitation. Especially since diversity generally makes fish stocks stronger and more resistant to both exploitation and environmental and climate change.

This is a highly topical issue for the Baltic herring stocks. In both the Gulf of Bothnia and the central Baltic Sea, genetic research has been able to define several stock components with varying life histories and adaptation to different spawning periods and migration patterns.

At present, the administration does not take this into account. Both in the Gulf of Bothnia and in the central Baltic Sea, herring stocks are managed as homogeneous stocks. The lack of large herring along the Swedish east coast suggests that several spawning components might have been decimated due to intensive large-scale fishing.

There are also clear indications that there are different spawning components within the sub-populations, and that these components spawn in different places but are not necessarily genetically distinct from each other.

This whole amazing mosaic of different sub-stocks and spawning components is what builds the productivity of different fish species.

NVG herring took longer to recover

The other good example concerns the Norwegian spring spawning herring, also called Atlanto-Scandinavian herring or NVG herring for short.

During the first half of the 20th century, the NVG herring constituted Europe's largest population of vertebrates. But in just 20 years, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the stock was fished to the bottom. The spawning stock biomass dropped from just over 10 million tonnes to less than 10,000 tonnes. In 1971, a fishing moratorium was imposed and annual catches fell from 1-2 million tonnes to… zero.

The recovery took significantly longer than for North Sea herring. The first strong year class in decades arrived in 1983. At the end of the 1980s, a small and strictly controlled fishery resumed and during the first half of the 1990s new strong year classes arrived, which further contributed to the recovery.

Fishing gradually resumed, the spawning stock biomass continued to grow, and by the end of the 1990s the annual catches were again between 0.5 and 1 million tonnes. In other words, it took almost 30 years of restrictive quota setting for the stock to recover reasonably.

New technology brought overfishing

The reasons for the collapse of the NVG herring were above all a long-term and unsustainably large total take of fish and a long-term overfishing of small/young herring. The vigorous fishing was made possible by new technology; in this case the use of a new hydraulic winch (the power block).

The issue of sub-populations and spawning components was key also for the NVG herring. The near-extinct stock remained in its core area in Norwegian waters and stopped migrating to the Atlantic. When the fishing pressure ceased the recovery began, and around 1990, the researchers saw how the NVG herring again began to migrate to areas outside Norway's economic zone. Today, the spawning stock biomass of the NVG herring is estimated at around 4 million tonnes and is above the biologically sustainable limit and ICES annually advice catch quotas of around 500,000 tonnes.

Action must be taken in time

Both the North Sea herring and the NVG herring were saved from an acute threat. Stock-wise, they are far from their former glory days. They still have the potential to grow larger. But the fates of both stocks show that it is actually possible to save fish stocks and make them recover, if only the measures are powerful enough and done in time. The big challenge is to identify when it is time - and act accordingly.

Text: Henrik Hamrén