Abstract

What is the relation between judgments of normative reason and motivation to act? On a plausible version of the so-called Enkratic Principle, if one (fully) accepts that one has conclusive normative reason to φ, one is motivated to φ or one is in that regard irrational. In this talk, building on joint work with Ragnar Francén at the University of Gothenburg, I first suggest that support for that principle naturally supports EnkrasiaPlus, a comprehensive enkratic principle requiring alignment between motivation and a wider range of reason judgments. While intuitions may support EnkrasiaPlus, I then argue that this support relies on a tacit empirical assumption, “the motivational hypothesis”, according to which the role of normative reason judgments is to ensure that one acts in accordance with normative reasons. This assumption contrasts with “the political hypothesis”, according to which their role is instead to justify one’s action to others, in order to present oneself as a suitable partner for cooperation. Drawing on Mercier and Sperber’s account of reasoning, I argue that the political hypothesis is empirically possible, and if true, necessitates a less demanding principle of rational motivation, EnkrasiaMinus. This reveals the contingency of principles of rational motivation, challenging standard armchair methodology. Furthermore, the truth of EnkrasiaMinus would make standard moral motivation internalism implausible and call for a rethinking of moral worth.