Abstract

We all remember Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas” (Quine 1951). Grice and Strawsons “In defence of a dogma” (1956) is also well known. There is another study of the distinction from the same period, which has been somewhat neglected in the debate, and that is the series of papers Waismann wrote between 1949 and 1953 (Waismann 1949, 1950, 1951a, 1951b, 1952, 1953).

There are many similarities between Quine’s and Waismann’s views, butalso some important differences. Waismann shares some of Quine’s objections to analyticity, but he draws different conclusions from them.

My talk examines Waismann’s notion of analyticity, and stresses how his views employ a conception of language and meaning as essentially open.There is no final determination of what analyticity amounts to, or of which truths that are analytic. At times, analyticity rests on a decision. Parallels with some current theories of meaning (Ludlow, Rayo, Richard, Wilson) are briefly discussed.