Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy: Michael McKenna (Arizona)
Seminar
Date: Tuesday 4 October 2022
Time: 13.15 – 15.00
Location: D700
Toward a Robust Theory of the Free Will Ability
Abstract
Philosophers working on the metaphysics of ability often suggest that their inquiry into the modality of abilities can provide insights into the nature of free will, and especially to the question as to whether it is compatible with determinism. I will argue that philosophers especially interested in the free will ability should instead examine the free will ability when it is actually exercised. This, it turns out, helps us to understand the nature of the ability at issue when it is claimed that free will requires—or just is—the ability to do otherwise. My aim here is not to defend a source-theoretic view of free will according to which free will does not require the ability to do otherwise but rather resides only in the actual causal sources of free actions. It is, instead, to explore a leeway-theoretic view according to which free will does after all require the ability to do otherwise.
Last updated: September 27, 2022
Source: Department of Philosophy