Philosophy of Science Higher Seminar: Jan Sprenger (Torino)
Seminar
Date: Thursday 30 May 2024
Time: 13.15 – 15.00
Location: D700
The Productive Model of Explanation in Psychology and Beyond
Abstract
The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. We address this shortcoming by characterizing the nature of explanation in psychology along the following lines: a theory explains a phenomenon if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation:
(a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model,
(b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and
(c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns.
Finally, we compare our proposal to other models of explanation from philosophy of science.
Last updated: May 29, 2024
Source: Department of Philosophy