Abstract

One of the most common skeptical arguments found in the history of epistemology runs as follows:
 
(P1) We are unable to distinguish the Good Case (e.g., seeing an apple) from the Bad Case (e.g., having a non-veridical experience as of an apple). 
(P2) If we are unable to distinguish the Good Case from the Bad Case, then the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world. 
( C ) Therefore, the Good Case cannot be a good basis for our knowledge of the external world.
 
In this talk, I aim to show three different ways to deny (P2) suggested by 14th-century Latin philosophers in their theories of intuitive cognition (notitia intuitiva): (1) the perception-first approach (e.g., John Duns Scotus), (2) the appearance-first approach (e.g., Peter Auriol), and (3) the evidentness-first approach (e.g., William Ockham). The disagreement between these three approaches, as I will argue, gives a strong reason to think that the current, somewhat monotonic understanding of later medieval epistemology in general needs to be revised.