Abstract

Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to “representational skepticism”: the refusal to uncritically take over the concepts one is handed. Representational skepticism is not sustainable, though. Representational complacency, the opposite of skepticism, is even less advisable, plus, arguably, there is no reasonable “hybrid” position. 

I outline an alternative to these options, called “critical concept conservatism” (CCC). CCC is the conjunction of two attitudes: (i) one, meta-conceptual conservative attitude, stating that having a concept K makes it rational to retain K, and (ii) the other, meta-meta-conceptual critical attitude, stating that the attitude whereby it is rational to retain K may be questioned, were appropriate grounds to emerge. If the reasons for the conservative attitude are – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the critical attitude, then it will be rational for one to retain K. If the reasons for the critical attitude were to become – at a certain context – stronger than the reasons for the conservative attitude, then it will become appropriate to question whether it is rational to retain K.

CCC – and especially its conservative component, are bolstered by both positive and negative considerations. On the positive side, there are pro tanto reasons to retain a concept that is adequately entrenched and has a reputable (epistemic or non-epistemic) career. On the negative side, it seems inconvenient, in normal circumstances and absent strong reasons to do so, to question an entrenched concept, as that would potentially jeopardize communication and inquiry. 

Unlike Cappelen’s representational skeptic, the CCC theorist does not doubt concepts from the very start of inquiry. Rather, they accept and retain those concepts, unless there are grounds for questioning them. Furthermore, because they endorse the “unless there are grounds to doubt…” condition, the CCC theorist is not a representationally complacent inquirer.