Profiles

Anandi Hattiangadi

Anandi Hattiangadi

Professor

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Works at Department of Philosophy
Email anandi.hattiangadi@philosophy.su.se
Visiting address Universitetsvägen 10 D, plan 7
Room D 742
Postal address Filosofiska institutionen 106 91 Stockholm

About me

Anandi Hattiangadi is Professor of Philosophy at Stockholm University. She received a BA in Philosophy from York University, Toronto, an MA in Philosophy from the University of Toronto and a Ph.D from the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge. In 2000, she took up a Research Fellowship at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, and from 2005 to 2013, she was University Lecturer at the Philosophy Faculty and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St Hilda’s College, both at the University of Oxford.

Hattiangadi specializes in the philosophy of mind and language, and has research interests in the philosophy of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, meta-ethics, and philosophy of science. She is currently working on a new monograph provisionally entitled The Fundamentality of Intentionality, in which she will argue that intentionality is fundamental: the semantic properties of mental and linguistic representations – their meaning or content –  do not supervene on the non-semantic.


In Progress:

'The Normativity of MEANING and the Hard Problem of Intentionality.' Contribution to a symposium on Allan Gibbard's Meaning and Normativity. Herman Cappelen, ed. Inquiry.

'Normativity and Intentionality'. Contribution to Daniel Star, ed. Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

'The Normativity of Meaning'. Contribution to Bob Hale, Alex Miller and Crispin Wright, eds. Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.


Publications:

Books:

2007. Oughts and Thoughts: Rule Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Articles:

2015. 'Metasemantics out of Economics?' In A. Reisner and I. Hirose, eds. Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2015. 'The Limits of Expressivism.' Forthcoming in Stephen Gross, ed. Minimalism, Pragmatism, Expressivism: Essays on Language and Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2013. With Krister Byvist. 'Belief, Truth and Blindspots.' In Timothy Chan, ed. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford Univresity PRess.

2013. With Tim Bayne. In Nikolaj Nottelman, ed. New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

2013. With Corine Besson. 'The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion.' Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 251-271.

2010. 'The Love of Truth.' In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 14 (4): 422-423.

2009. 'Semantic Normativity in Context.' In S. Sawyer, ed. New Waves in the Philosophy of Langauge. London: Palgrave MacMillan.


 

 

Research

Anandi Hattiangadi has research interests in the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, the philosophy of psychology, and meta-ethics. 

She is currently working on three major research projects. First, she is writing a monograph, provisionally entitled Representation: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, in which she argues that the semantic properties of representations are fundamental – meanings and contents are real, yet they do not supervene on any class of non-semantic properties. In addition, she is the principal investigator of a research project on the Foundations of Epistemic Normativity, funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (2018-2021). This project investigates the semantics, metaphysics and epistemology of epistemic norms, including logic and norms of reasoning.

 

Publications

A selection from Stockholm University publication database
  • 2021. Anandi Hattiangadi, H. Orri Stefánsson. Synthese

    This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desires, and means without recourse to any further empirical information. One of the most compelling arguments for the possibility of radical interpretation, associated most closely with David Lewis and Donald Davidson, gives a central role to decision theoretic representation theorems, which demonstrate that if an agent's preferences satisfy certain constraints, it is possible to deduce probability and utility functions that represent her beliefs and desires. We argue that an interpretationist who wants to rely on existing representation theorems in defence of the possibility of radical interpretation faces a trilemma, each horn of which is incompatible with the possibility of radical interpretation.

  • 2020. Anandi Hattiangadi. Philosophy and phenomenological research 101 (2), 283-303

    This paper takes issue with Lewis' influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the non-semantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non-semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. It is argued in this paper that the radical interpreter faces an insoluble aggregation problem: the radical interpreter must jointly apply several criteria for evaluating interpretations in order to determine which interpretation is best overall. First, the situation of the radical interpreter is formally modeled using the machinery of social choice theory. Second, it is argued that either Arrow's impossibility theorem or a variant of it applies to the situation of the radical interpreter. The upshot is that radical interpretation is impossible, and Lewis' argument for semantic supervenience fails.

  • 2019. Anandi Hattiangadi. Inquiry 62 (9-10), 1091-1103

    In a recent paper, Alexander Greenberg defends a truth norm of belief according to which if one has some doxastic attitude towards p, one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true (DA). He responds, in particular, to the 'blindspot' objection to truth norms such as DA: in the face of true blindspots, such as it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining, truth norms such as DA are unsatisfiable; they entail that one ought to believe p, but if one does believe p, they entail that it is not the case that one ought to believe p. In this paper, it is argued that Greenberg's response to the blindspot objection is unsatisfactory.

  • 2018. Anandi Hattiangadi. Metaepistemology
  • 2018. Anandi Hattiangadi. Canadian journal of philosophy 48 (3-4), 592-615

    It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

  • 2018. Anandi Hattiangadi. Inquiry 61 (7), 742-754

    This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms.

  • 2015. Anandi Hattiangadi. Weighing and Reasoning, 52-60
  • 2015. Anandi Hattiangadi. Meaning without representation, 224-244

    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that the concept of meaning is normative, and that his own brand of expressivism can be applied in the semantic and intentional domain. In this paper, I  argue that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense self-undermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are semantic sentences, and if these are understood to express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind, the expressivist’s explanations are spurious.

  • 2014. Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi. Philosophical Studies 167 (2), 251--271

    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

  • 2013. Anandi Hattiangadi, Tim Bayne. New Essays on Belief, 124-144
  • 2013. Krister Bykvist, Anandi Hattiangadi. The Aim of Belief, 100-122
Show all publications by Anandi Hattiangadi at Stockholm University

Last updated: May 6, 2021

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