Profiles

Fredrik Jansson

Fredrik Jansson

Forskare

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Works at Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies
Email fredrik.jansson@su.se
Visiting address Wallenberglaboratoriet, Lilla Frescativägen 7
Room 442
Postal address Centrum för evolutionär kulturforskning 106 91 Stockholm

Publications

A selection from Stockholm University publication database
  • 2017. Yi-ting Wang (et al.). European Journal of Political Research 56 (4), 735-756

    What determines countries’ successful transition to democracy? This article explores the impact of granting civil rights in authoritarian regimes and especially the gendered aspect of this process. It argues that both men's and women's liberal rights are essential conditions for democratisation to take place: providing both women and men rights reduces an inequality that affects half of the population, thus increasing the costs of repression and enabling the formation of women's organising – historically important to spark protests in initial phases of democratisation. This argument is tested empirically using data that cover 173 countries over the years 1900–2012 and contain more nuanced measures than commonly used. Through novel sequence analysis methods, the results suggest that in order to gain electoral democracy a country first needs to furnish civil liberties to both women and men.

  • 2016. Kimmo Eriksson, Fredrik Jansson. Judgment and decision making 11 (3), 205-212

    A strategy activated in one task may be transferred to subsequent tasks and prevent activation of other strategies that would otherwise come to mind, a mechanism referred to as procedural priming. In a novel application of procedural priming we show that it can make or break cognitive illusions. Our test case is the 1/k illusion, which is based on the same unwarranted mathematical shortcut as the MPG illusion and the time-saving bias. The task is to estimate distances between values of fractions on the form 1/k. Most people given this task intuitively base their estimates on the distances between the denominators (i.e., the reciprocals of the fractions), which may yield very poor estimations of the true distances between the fractions. As expected, the tendency to fall for this illusion is related to cognitive style (Study 1). In order to apply procedural priming we constructed versions of the task in which the illusion is weak, in the sense that most people do not fall for it anymore. We then gave participants both strong illusion and weak illusion versions of the task (Studies 2 and 3). Participants who first did the task in the weak illusion version would often persist with the correct strategy even in the strong illusion version, thus breaking the otherwise strong illusion in the latter task. Conversely, participants who took the strong illusion version first would then often fall for the illusion even in the weak illusion version, thus strengthening the otherwise weak illusion in the latter task.

  • 2015. Fredrik Jansson, Mikael Parkvall, Pontus Strimling. Language Dynamics and Change 5 (1), 1-51

    Various theories have been proposed regarding the origin of creole languages. Describing a process where only the end result is documented involves several methodological difficulties. In this paper we try to address some of the issues by using a novel mathematical model together with detailed empirical data on the origin and structure of Mauritian Creole. Our main focus is on whether Mauritian Creole may have originated only from a mutual desire to communicate, without a target language or prestige bias. Our conclusions are affirmative. With a confirmation bias towards learning from successful communication, the model predicts Mauritian Creole better than any of the input languages, including the lexifier French, thus providing a compelling and specific hypothetical model of how creoles emerge. The results also show that it may be possible for a creole to develop quickly after first contact, and that it was created mostly from material found in the input languages, but without inheriting their morphology.

  • 2015. Fredrik Jansson. Journal of Theoretical Biology 373, 100-110

    There is an increasing wealth of models trying to explain the evolution of group discrimination and an ingroup bias. This paper sets out to systematically investigate the most fundamental assumption in these models: in what kind of situations do the interactions take place? What strategic structures – games – support the evolution of an ingroup bias? More specically, the aim here is to find the prerequisites for when a bias also with respect to minimal groups – arbitrarily defined groups void of group-specific qualities – is selected for, and which cannot be ascribed to kin selection.

    Through analyses and simulations of minimal models of two-person games, this paper indicates that only some games are conducive to the evolution of ingroup favouritism. In particular, this class does not contain the prisoners’ dilemma, but it does contain anti-co-ordination and co-ordination games. Contrasting to the prisoners’ dilemma, these are games where it is not a matter of whether to behave altruistically, but rather one of predicting what the other person will be doing, and where I would benefit from you knowing my intentions.

    In anti-co-ordination games, on average, not only will agents discriminate between groups, but also in such a way that their choices maximise the sum of the available payoffs towards the ingroup more often than towards the outgroup. And in co-ordination games, even if agents do manage to co-ordinate with the whole population, they are more likely to co-ordinate on the socially optimal equilibrium within their group. Simulations show that this occurs most often in games where there is a component of risk-taking, and thus trust, involved. A typical such game is the stag hunt or assurance game.

  • 2013. Fredrik Jansson, Patrik Lindenfors, Mikael Sandberg. Technological forecasting & social change 80 (8), 1546-1556

    Recent ‘democratic revolutions’ in Islamic countries call for a re-consideration of transitions to and from democracy. Transitions to democracy have often been considered the outcome of socio-economic modernization and therefore slow and incremental processes. But as a recent study has made clear, in the last century, transitions to democracy have mainly occurred through rapid leaps rather than slow and incremental steps. Here, we therefore apply an innovation and systems perspective and consider transitions to democracy as processes of institutional, and therefore systemic, innovation adoption. We show that transitions to democracy starting before 1900 lasted for an average of 50 years and a median of 56 years, while transitions originating later took an average of 4.6 years and a median of 1.7 years. However, our results indicate that the survival time of democratic regimes is longer in cases where the transition periods have also been longer, suggesting that patience paid in previous democratizations. We identify a critical ‘consolidation-preparing’ transition period of 12 years. Our results also show that in cases where the transitions have not been made directly from autocracy to democracy, there are no main institutional paths towards democracy. Instead, democracy seems reachable from a variety of directions. This is in line with the analogy of diffusion of innovations at the nation systems level, for which assumptions are that potential adopter systems may vary in susceptibility over time. The adoption of the institutions of democracy therefore corresponds to the adoption of a new political communications standard for a nation, in this case the innovation of involving in principle all adult citizens on an equal basis.

  • 2013. Mikael Parkvall, Fredrik Jansson, Pontus Strimling. Acta Linguistica Hafniensia. International Journal of Structural Linguistics 45 (2), 265-273

    This paper presents a computer simulation of the genesis of Mauritian Creole. The input consists of detailed demographic data and typological information on Mauritian as well as the languages which contributed to its birth. The simulation is deliberately a simplistic one – the idea is to have as few potentially controversial assumptions as possible built into the model, and add additional parameters only to the extent that its output differs from the real-world result. As it turns out, the model generates a language which is highly similar to Mauritian as it is spoken today, and thus, very little “tweaking” seems necessary. Most notably, the model produces the desired result without the postulation of targeted language acquisition, and while one cannot conclude that this was not a part of the creolisation process, our simulation suggests that it is not a necessary assumption.

  • 2012. Patrik Lindenfors, Mikael Sandberg, Fredrik Jansson. Gaudeamus (1), 13-15
  • 2012. Patrik Lindenfors, Mikael Sandberg, Fredrik Jansson. de Facto
  • 2011. Patrik Lindenfors, Fredrik Jansson, Mikael Sandberg. PLoS ONE 6 (11), e28270

    Transitions to democracy are most often considered the outcome of historical modernization processes. Socio-economicchanges, such as increases in per capita GNP, education levels, urbanization and communication, have traditionally been found to be correlates or ‘requisites’ of democratic reform. However, transition times and the number of reform steps havenot been studied comprehensively. Here we show that historically, transitions to democracy have mainly occurred throughrapid leaps rather than slow and incremental transition steps, with a median time from autocracy to democracy of 2.4 years,and overnight in the reverse direction. Our results show that autocracy and democracy have acted as peaks in an evolutionary landscape of possible modes of institutional arrangements. Only scarcely have there been slow incremental transitions. We discuss our results in relation to the application of phylogenetic comparative methods in cultural evolutionand point out that the evolving unit in this system is the institutional arrangement, not the individual country which isinstead better regarded as the ‘host’ for the political system.

  • 2010. Kimmo Eriksson, Fredrik Jansson, Jonas Sjöstrand. The Ramanujan journal 23, 371-396

    Bentley et al studied the turnover rate in popularity toplists in a ’random copying’ model of cultural evolution. Based on simulations of a model with population size N, list length ℓ and invention rate μ, they conjectured a remarkably simple formula for the turnover rate: ℓ√μ. Here we study an overlapping generations version of the random copying model, which can be interpreted as a random walk on the integer partitions of the population size. In this model we show that the conjectured formula, after a slight correction, holds asymptotically.

Show all publications by Fredrik Jansson at Stockholm University

Last updated: September 13, 2018

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