A selection from Stockholm University publication database

• Tillitsparadoxen: När fortsatt NPM-styrning främjar tillit

  2021. Susanna Alexius, Janet Vähämäki. Organisation och samhälle : O&S : svensk företagsekonomisk tidskrift (1), 10-15

  Article

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• In Proper Organization We Trust: Trust in Interorganizational aid relations

  2020. Susanna Alexius, Janet Vähämäki.

  Report

  The aim of this study is to contribute to our knowledge of how donors and recipients of aid cope with the uncertain world in which development aid takes place. When and how does trust become a substitute for certainty and what makes donors and recipients of aid actually trust one another? What may explain current trust patterns and what are their implications for the organization of aid? 

  In recent years, management trends associated with New Public Management have been increasingly criticized. As a response to this criticism, in 2016, the Swedish government launched a “Trust Delegation” (Tillitsdelegationen) with interest in “trust based management”, which partly has been seen as a response to the NPM criticism. Even though the development aid sector has not formally been targeted by the Trust commission, it is clear that ideas on trust and alternative management styles have spurred a lot of interest and discussion, also in the aid sector. One of the intentions for this study is to bring empirical input and theoretical nuances to this discussion.

  Relations in the aid field are characterized by three particular coordination conditions: distance, inequality and complexity, which all contribute to perceptions of uncertainty. In an uncertain setting such as that of development aid, trust becomes a precious substitute for the much sought after certainty. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that trust has long been regarded a key component for successful aid projects and a fundamental component for all aid relations, and operations. However, somewhat paradoxically, distance, inequality and complexity also present challenges to interpersonal trust.

  In this report we show that actors involved in aid relations attempt to solve or at least handle their uncertainty by transferring trust from a range of different sources of trust. We argue that a prominent such source of trust is formal organizing following ideal-typical characteristics of what we here call the “proper organization”. Our empirical studies indicate that there is a general ideal for how an actor involved in an aid project should be organized. This ideal emphasizes formal organizing and conformity among different types of organizations and projects, for example conformity stemming from using similar control systems and management technologies.

  We conclude that most often, actors involved in aid relations try to solve the paradox of distance, inequality and complexity by putting their faith in a range of different sources of trust, where a strong – and dare we say – dominating source of trust is trust in formal organizing and organizations, or structures and processes of “proper” organizations, such as certain management technologies or control structures. 

  The three field conditions; distance, inequality and complexity, help to determine not only the need for trust to coordinate aid relations, but also how trust is assessed, maintained, at times lost and then hopefully restored. Our analysis suggests that the greater the distance, inequality and complexity – the lower the chances are to achieving certainty, which in turn implies a greater need for trust to bridge this gap. However – and somewhat paradoxically: our data also suggests that the greater the distance, inequality and complexity, the more likely is trust transference from an impersonal source of trust, such as a management technology or a particular legitimate organizational structure or process.

  The core of our analysis concerns who trusts whom on what grounds, that is “What makes a certain trustor in the aid field trust a certain trustee?” What are preferred sources of trust and how are they used to transfer trust onto trustees? What general patterns of trust can we identify and how may these be explained? We examine the following key questions: 

  1.       What makes a donor trust a recipient? What makes a donor not trust a recipient? 

  2.       What makes a recipient trust a donor? What makes a recipient not trust a donor? 

  In our empirical study we are interested in intermediary organizations in so called aid chains (or as we will later claim: aid nets). In these nets of relations, organizations often play dual roles, being both a donor and a recipient of aid, both a rule-follower and a rule-setter, both an auditor and an auditee. In one situation, the organization will play the role of the donor, in another, the role of the recipient of aid. As a recipient, the organization interprets what its needs to do in order to receive further financing. As a donor, it regulates what the next actor in line needs to do in order to obtain financing. Theory as well as empirical data suggest that these social roles and how actors switch between them have an impact on trust patterns in aid. We therefore call for more studies as well as practitioner reflection on these issues. 

  Our research design departs from Sida’s categorization of different actor groups who receive Swedish public aid funding; a) civil society organizations b) private sector actors, c) Swedish authorities in the public sector and d) research cooperation (see www.sida.se). The first intermediary in the case organizations studied are thus always located in Sweden, which means that we have been able to keep the aid providing country a constant variable (Sweden, a high trust country). Thereby we have also been able to study whether there are any differences in how trust is experienced inbetween the different actor groups, since the four groups formally have the same amount of rules and requirements. The actor groups represent different institutional contexts in society; public sector, market and civil society, all with different organisational forms, owners, purpose, stakeholders and sources of financing.

  In our empirical study we have thus departed from the organizations based in Sweden, implying that the majority of our illustrative examples are taken from such Sweden based organisations. As a second step however, we have also studied whether and how the empirical findings are applicable in a few intermediary organizations acting as both donors and recipients in the aid net, i.e. the empirical material covers intermediary organizations from the Ministry of Forein Affairs to final recipients of aid. Interestingly, despite differences in origin, size etc. we have found the social role scipts of the donor and recipient to apply and to be interepreted in a similar fashion by the organizations studied.

  Providing “food for thought” on how trust influences aid, the study draws upon theory as well as illustrative examples from case studies (including ongoing case studies) in the four actor groups. However, the report makes no claims to give a fully representative picture of every donor and recipient involved in the aid nets in development aid. We do however earnestly believe that the propositions and tentative findings put forth here are well-worth considering. We also welcome further testing and elaboration of our tentative findings by both researchers and practitioners in the field. The reader should bear in mind that exploring to generate promising hypotheses, as we do in this report, is not the same as designing exloratory studies to test such hypotheses on a larger sample. Needless to say though, without exploratory research of this kind, there would be far less interesting hypotheses around to test and elaborate further.

  Empirical findings on sources of trustWe discuss seven sources of trust in aid relations: control systems and management technologies; external experts and expertise; the VIP-partner status; the institutional context; thematic and domain specific knowledge; results and interpersonal relations. The sources of trust have been mentioned by the interviewees in our case studies. Our main findings concerning these are listed below: 

  Control systems and management technologiesOur empirical cases demonstrate that control systems such as the management technology The Logical Framework, is a prominent source of trust from which donors frequently transfer trust onto recipients of aid. 

  First, we have found that being without such a system or technology is generally not a viable option for a recipient, since not having one would affect the recipient’s assessed trustworthiness negatively. Having and using a management technology is generally seen as a sign that the recipient is a rational decision maker, a core characteristic of a “proper organization”. 

  Second, we have noted that there has in several cases been a discrepancy between an organization’s formal decision to trust (or not) and the informal trustworthiness assessments made by individual employees of the same organization. 

  Third, we have found that different social roles (donor or recipient) may explain differences in the perception of a certain control technology. Despite recent calls for simplification and less of control exercise, the tendency seems to be that this is not happening, since the intermediary organizations act according to different social scripts in their roles as donors and recipients. While happy to drop and criticize control measures in the role of the recipient, the same organization may perceive the same control measures as very reasonable, necessary and also expected in the role of the donors. 

  Fourth, in some of the case studies, we have seen that trust in a control system or a management technology has developed over time. A recipient organization might thus both learn to use the technology and find it beneficial, for example to gain legitimacy and trustworthiness from the donor.

  External experts and expertise Experts and expert knowledge play a crucial part in many aid relations and to demonstrate expertise is a means for the recipient organization to demonstrate its ability. 

  First, we have found that recipients and donors have different perceptions in regard to the value of third parties. While hiring of third parties may be considered necessary and trust enhancing by the donor, the recipients of aid may consider these third party involvements as signs of distrust. 

  Second, we have seen indications that since external experts are carriers of historical data this may give them influence over the agenda. This means that, with expert involvement, the agenda of the “proper organization” might have been driven tighter than donors perhaps otherwise would have called for. 

  Third, we have found that recipients appreciate analyses from experts that are knowledgeable about the recipients’ local context and domain specificities. However, a perception among several of the recipients studied is that such more specialized experts are being outnumbered by more general management experts.

  Selected partners (“VIP-partners”)Organizations that act in the donor role may attempt to reduce the risks and uncertainties involved in assessing recipients by selecting and shaping some so called “VIP partners” into having certain (often similar) qualities, structures, processes etc. An acquired VIP- status often implies less control from the donor. 

  The rationale for creating VIP partners may be integrity on the part of the donor – treating all potential recipients equally. Another interpretation is the donor’s wish to draw on the market mechanism of competition and take on the role of the independent and distant buyer that is not embedded in any problematically close relationships with the recipient representatives. A third interpretation could be that this is done due to the large number of actors in the development aid field, the disbursement pressure, and that VIP-partners are considered able to channel aid funds quicker and more effectively. A fourth is that this is done with the rationale or the felt need to transfer risks to selected trusted intermediary partners. 

  First, we have found that the requirements for a VIP-status tend to benefit large and already financially strong organisations. Smaller organizations that do not have resources to invest in this process tend to fall out. 

  Second, despite ambitions to treat organizations equally, we have found that the VIP selection process looks a bit different depending on the actor group. For example, while “VIPs” among public agencies are mainly selected by the MFA, and where a VIP status signifies to receive aid funds directly in their budget, civil society organizations are to compete to become so called Strategic Partner Organisation’s. 

  Third, we find that a potential downside of the VIP partner status is that it may contribute further to isomorphism (taking on similar form) on the part of recipient organizations. This contradicts with the ambitions that different institutional specificities should be supported and maintained. 

  The institutional contextThe diversity amongst the four actor groups studied (the agency, the company, the association and the university) is commonly described as a key to successful aid. However, our overarching finding on this theme is an underlying conflict in the field concerning the degree to which this diversity should be respected, and how. 

  First, despite general control systems, management technologies, structures and processes spreading across the wider aid field, different money norms (still) apply to recipients of different legal forms. The different money norms are based on different aims for the actor groups. For instance, the norm for civil society organisations is that aid money should leave the Swedish organization and to the extent possible be handed over to the final recipients. For support through Swedish agencies the money norm is different. Money should to a large extent stay in Sweden as it is used for exporting Swedish competence or domain specific knowledge to developing countries.

  Second, there exist differences inbetween the actor groups’ in terms of their dependency on the donor. Civil society organizations are for example often more dependent on aid funds than private companies. This has implications for trust patterns. Dependency may call for trust due to the increased uncertainty. But dependency may also be misinterpreted as trust by the counterparty. Highly dependent recipients may distrust donors and still keep up the relation as best they can, for fear of going “out of business”.

  Thematic and domain specific knowledge Underlying the official organization of the aid field are assumptions that that specific recipient domains (such as those of universities, agencies, unions and car companies) should be respected and protected for their different kinds of thematic or domain specific knowledge and the value these bring to aid in general. However, on the contrary from what this assumption suggests, we have found that organizations acting in the donor role tend not to appreciate and trust in domain specific expertise, at least not to the same degree as they trust in general management expertise. 

  ResultsResults, and how aid funds contribute to long term outcomes and impact, are frequently talked about as the primary factor that determines and steers actions. 

  First, we have found that outcome information, which tends to be more complex, may be toned down or even ignored in processes of trustworthiness assessment. Complex results information may confuse rather than qualify and hence will not result in a higher trust assessment from a donor.

  Second, in line with neoinstitional theory, results technologies are often used as “approximations” for actual outcomes and effects. Having the technology in place is then interpreted as a result in itself and simply having the technology in place may then grant the organization legitimacy as well as a higher trustworthiness assessment.

  Third, there are difference in “results cultures” between the institutional contexts that may give rise to misunderstandings and a lower level of trust in the relation (for example, a meeting may not be considered a result in a corporate context, but may well be seen as a prominent result in a civil society context). 

  Interpersonal relations Interpersonal relations often function as sources of trust in aid practice, however, they are officially seen as insufficient and not looked upon as “prominent” enough. 

  First, we have found a tendency to officially “hide” or downplay interpersonal relations as sources of trust despite the fact that in parallel with the interorganizational relationships, there are typically several interpersonal relationships between key employees at the donor and recipient organization. 

  Second, we have seen that donors seldom mention interpersonal relations and key individuals as sources of trust. The reason for this could be a fear of individual sources contributing to corruption or nepotism. 

  Third, it seems that the closer a donor gets is to the final recipient, the more value is placed in key individuals and interpersonal relationships as prominent sources of trust. 

  Fourth, long lasting personal relations may be more likely to create conditions for continued trust-building and trust maintenance.

  When comparing how organizations in the donor and recipient roles assess trust, we find that the trust patterns are different for the two main roles (that all of our studied case organizations alternate between). Whilst donors willingly transfer trust from control systems and management technologies, external experts (in general management) and the VIP status, these are also seen as sources of trust by the recipients, but not to the same degree. 

  In contrast, whilst recipients expect their trustworthiness to be largely based on their institutional context and domain specific knowledge and experience and more complex results, donors do not see these as prominent (enough) sources of trust. Both parties find interpersonal relations to be an insufficient source of trust that needs to be complemented with other sources.

  General conclusions The social roles of donor or recipient contribute to define perceptions of control or trust. We argue that it is not the case that a certain control technology per se always increases or decreases perceptions of trust in the relation, but that its perception depends on from who’s perspective and what role one looks. In our studied cases, we have found that organizations, in their role as recipient, often perceive that they need less control technologies and oversight, while when they act in the role of a donor, they wish to add on more control measures and oversight. This means that control measures and oversight tend to increase in the aid chains, from the donor on the top of the aid chain to the final recipients. Control may then give rise to even more control. 

  However, since the organizations, in their different roles, experience control differently, increasing oversight, control technologies and measurements do not always lead to a decrease in trust, as often suggested in popular debate. 

  Depending on the role (donor or a recipient) but also the specific experience within the organization, the same kind and amount of control technologies may be perceived as welcome or unwelcome, necessary or unnecessary, trust enhancing or as trust deteriorating. While an organization in the recipient role may perceive it as hindering work, organizations in the donor role may perceive that the control technologies support work and role-fulfillment. Recipients who are more dependent on aid funds and who do not have resources to handle too many control technologies seem to find it more difficult to perceive control techonologies as trust enhancing and supporting. 

  What contributes greatly to explaining how control technologies are perceived is whether they are introduced with or without explanation on the purpose they serve. Therefore, a self-reflexive dialogue and understanding of how the donor and recipient roles influence decision making is suggested to add valuable learning. 

  Trust cannot be mandated; trust has to be earned. The idea of “Trust Based Management”, if applied and understood in narrow terms as a mandate coming from the top, is not feasible. Our cases show clearly that trust is something experienced at the individual level, and when the individual trust assessment goes against that made at an organizational or systems level, the individual will likely hang on to its own assessment (hence to the sources of trust he/she believes in). For example, whenever a donor takes a formal decision to trust a certatin recipient, we must expect and look out for possible deviation where individual representatives of the donor organization do not in fact perceive trust and hence take their chances at double agency – that is letting their own decisions and actions depart from a hierarchical decision or order.

  We suggest that organizations in the aid field would benefit from acknowledging the actual impact that interpersonal relations (including more informal ones) have on trust assessments in the field. 

  Watch out for conflicting ideals – diversity and conformity ideals may collide. We have found a potential conflict between the ideal of good results stemming from encouraging a diversity amongst actors (actors from different institutional domains, operating in domain specific ways) and the ideal of good results stemming from conformity (actors from different institutional domains, operating in a similar way, shaped by general management knowledge). We suggest that recognising and discussing the conflict that the diversity and conformity ideals may give rise to is important to get an understanding of all the different kinds of results that are being produced. As a core finding – trust in “proper organization” characteristics is found to act as an uncritical yet prominent approximation of future results. We suggest that putting more emphasis on domain-specific conditions and expertise is a fruitful path forward.

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• A chain of gold? A comparative study on intermediaries, trust and control in complex global aid chains

  2019. Susanna Alexius, Janet Vähämäki.

  Conference

  In this paper, we aim for a better understanding of the roles of intermediaries in complex anduncertain contexts. The quest for faith and certainty is constantly pressing the actors in thepoliticized global field of development aid. Operating on the taxpayers’ money and faced withconditions which render knowledge of previous results and prediction of future results a realchallenge, what do they do? To what extent and how are results extrapolated from the use oforganizational structures and management technologies? To what extent and how are resultsrather extrapolated from interpersonal and interorganizational trust? How are the two related?We explore these research questions empirically in a comparative study of two “aid chains”consisting of numerous organizations interlinked in the coordination and operations of aidprojects (in this case aimed for capacity building in unions and universities in the globalsouth). Intermediaries are often criticized for adding “unnecessary” transaction costs to aidprojects. Based on our preliminary findings, we suggest that the understanding of theintermediary and its roles should be reconsidered. Analyzing the messiness and dynamics ofhow intermediaries handle trust and control opens up for a more nuanced understanding, notonly of the roles played by intermediaries but also of how complex systems are coordinated.

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• A chain of gold? A comparative study on intermediaries, trust and control in complex global aid chains

  2019. Susanna Alexius, Janet Vähämäki.

  Conference

  In this paper, we aim for a better understanding of the roles of intermediaries in complex and uncertain contexts. The quest for faith and certainty is constantly pressing the actors in the politicized global field of development aid. Operating on the taxpayers’ money and faced with conditions which render knowledge of previous results and prediction of future results a real challenge, what do they do? To what extent and how are results extrapolated from the use of organizational structures and management technologies? To what extent and how are results rather extrapolated from interpersonal and interorganizational trust? How are the two related? We explore these research questions empirically in a comparative study of two “aid chains” consisting of numerous organizations interlinked in the coordination and operations of aid projects (in this case aimed for capacity building in unions and universities in the global south). Intermediaries are often criticized for adding “unnecessary” transaction costs to aid projects. Based on our preliminary findings, we suggest that the understanding of the intermediary and its roles should be reconsidered. Analyzing the messiness and dynamics of how intermediaries handle trust and control opens up for a more nuanced understanding, not only of the roles played by intermediaries but also of how complex systems are coordinated.

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• Learning from results-based management evaluations and reviews

  2019. Janet Vähämäki, Chantal Verger.

  Report

  What have we learned from implementing results-based management in development co-operation organisations? What progress and benefits can be seen? What are the main challenges and unintended consequences? Are there good practices to address these challenges?

  To respond to these questions this paper reviews and analyses the findings from various evaluations and reviews of results-based management systems conducted by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD/DAC Results Community Secretariat and other bodies in the past four years (2015-2018). It also draws on emerging lessons from new methods for managing development co-operation results.

  This analytical work aims to:

  1. identify recent trends in results-based management,
  2. explore challenges faced by providers when developing their results approaches and systems,
  3. select good practices in responding to these challenges that can be useful for the OECD/DACResults Community, considering new approaches, new technologies and evolving contexts.

  This body of evidence will inform the development of a core set of generic guiding principles for results-based management in development co-operation.

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• Idéer om tillit och kontroll kommer i reformvågor

  2018. Janet Vähämäki. Organisation & Samhälle (2), 32-37

  Article

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• Obsessive Measurement Disorder: Can a metaphor help us understand, manage and prevent it?

  2018. Janet Vähämäki, Susanna Alexius.

  Conference

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• The Rise and Fall of "Results Initiatives" in Swedish Development Aid

  2018. Janet Vähämäki.

  Report

  Janet is a researcher at Stockholm Center for Organizational Research (SCORE). In 2017 she defended her doctoral thesis Matrixing Aid- The Rise and Fall of ‘Results Initiatives’ in Swedish Development Aid at Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University. This brief presents the main conclusions of her thesis. 

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• Matrixing Aid: The Rise and Fall of 'Results Initiatives' in Swedish Development Aid

  2017. Janet Vähämäki.

  Thesis (Doc)

  Reform ideas, such as results measurement and management, tend to come and go in different ‘tides of reforms’. The purpose of this thesis is to increase our understanding of tides of reforms by identifying and discussing mechanisms that drive the rise, as well as the fall, of management reforms. This is done by studying four so-called ‘results initiatives’ launched at Sida, the Swedish International Development Agency in 1971, 1981, 1998 and 2012. The thesis tries to understand what happened both in Sida’s external environment as well as within the agency prior to the initiation, during implementation and when the four results initiatives fell out of favor.

  The life of each of the four results initiatives can be understood as having taken place in five phases: 1) the pressure phase, 2) the launch, 3) implementation, 4) point of re-do or die, 5) phase of opening up for something new. During these five phases different internal and external mechanisms contributed to either further institutionalization or to de-institutionalization of the results measurement and management ideas and technologies.

  It is argued that the need to gain legitimacy can be seen as the main mechanism that has driven the initiation of the results initiatives. During implementation, problems and difficulties arise. It is argued that whilst resistance towards the initiatives, as well as changed external demands, accelerates de-institutionalization, these mechanisms do not explain why the initiatives fall. In turn, the failure to find a standardized reporting category for “results”, the non-use of the results information produced and the fact that the initiatives no longer fulfill the function of providing legitimacy, are mechanisms that lead to the final death of the initiatives.

  The study concludes that whilst different external pressures can be considered important in initiating reforms, it is mainly internal mechanisms, within the organization, that explain the reason why the initiatives fall. Earlier literature has argued that tides of reforms are driven by hope and optimism to be and to be seen as effective. The findings in this study show that also the solidarity rationale, i.e. the wish to do good for someone else, and the feeling of doing so, drives the reforms. It is moreover argued that the reforms are also driven by fear and other emotions. In general, the occurrence of tides of reforms can be understood by the tension between the two rationales in development aid: solidarity and effectiveness.

  The study contributes with insights to what happens within an organization and over a longer time perspective when public agencies are faced with conflicting demands. It provides a broader understanding of reasons behind the quest to report on results and also what happens when results are not reportable. Since new and similar reforms will most probably arise in the future, findings from this study ought to be interesting not only in development aid but in all public policy sectors, for any policy maker or practitioner involved in the implementation of such reforms.

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• The results agenda in Swedish development cooperation: cycles of failure or reform success?

  2015. Janet Vähämäki. The Politics of Evidence and Results in International Development

  Chapter

  Sida, the Swedish International Development Agency, has repeatedly, over decades, tried to introduce a stronger focus on 'results' and it has always resulted in a (re-)introduction of a management technology , based on a derivate of the logical framework. Since 2006, the 'results agenda' has been a top political priority, with large organizational and cultural changes within Sida. The chapter concludes that, although there might be factors that support the success of the current effort, these changes may hamper the achievement of development results on the ground and be just another 'tide of reform'. 

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• When and how do results management reforms rise and fall?

  2015. Janet Vähämäki.

  Conference

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• Simplifying the world: The use of Logical Models and Result Matrixes in the field of Development Cooperation

  2013. Janet Vähämäki. 22nd Nordic Academy of Management Conference, 78-79

  Conference

  In this paper three, result initiatives will be analysed by using a framework exemplifying different stages of political- and management reform. Since the 1960’s, a focus on ‘results’ has been incorporated in the planning and follow-up of the Swedish Development Cooperation. Historically, results initiatives have arisen with the decision to apply certain tools, such as logical models. However, specific models have typically been declined with new models, with a different name and slightly different setting, being introduced. Logical models provide an often quantified, simplified overview, of the expected linear change process in a development project/programme. Today, as part of the politically driven ‘Results Agenda’ in Development Cooperation, the request for logical models and quantifiable indicators, is stronger than ever. This paper contains empirical data from a qualitative analysis from results initiatives undertaken at Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, Sida in 1971, 1998 and 2012. The paper concludes that some of the environmental factors that contributed to the fall of the previous initiatives have been counteracted, which may imply that the current initiative face a different destiny than previous ones.

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