The Swedish response to the coronavirus crisis has, at least initially, deviated from those in most other comparable countries and the Swedish strategy has gained attention worldwide. Only a few binding restrictive measures have been enacted and the Swedish model has, at least initially, been to mostly rely on informal and voluntary measures based on recommendations from the Public Health Agency (PHA). No lockdowns, as in mass quarantines or stay-at-home orders, or mandatory mask wearing have, as of February 2021, been introduced. However, during the ‘second wave’ of the pandemic, in Autumn 2020, the strategy somewhat changed and new restrictions have gradually been introduced. The development brought to light the need for new legislative tools and at the beginning of 2021 the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, enacted the temporary COVID-19 Act, delegating further powers to the Government. It may be submitted that the constitutional framework, in essence, has been respected. However, the strong position of Swedish public authorities in the area of communicable diseases, together with the vast delegation of powers to the Government, has in practice impacted on the traditional division of tasks for implementing policies in a manner unprecedented in modern Swedish constitutional history.

During the COVID-19 pandemic many states have resorted to proclaiming a state of emergency (SOE), expanding executive powers and curtailing civil liberties. Why have some states have declared SOEs when others have not? Our legal analysis suggests that although international law provides states with the option of declaring an SOE and derogating from human rights obligations to ensure the life of the nation, other ways to handle the pandemic without declaring an SOE do exist. Our theoretical analysis leads to three main propositions centred on the impact of regional diffusion, democratic institutions, and pandemic preparedness. Our empirical analysis combines a range of quantitative data sources to analyse the SOE decisions of 180 states during the first half of 2020. The results suggest that states' declarations of SOEs are driven by both external and internal factors. A permissive regional environment, characterised by many simultaneously declared SOEs, may reduce the reputational and political costs of emergency powers, making their employment more palatable. At the same time, internal characteristics, specifically democratic institutions and pandemic preparedness, have shaped governments' decisions. Weak democracies with poor preparedness have been considerably more likely to opt for an SOE than dictatorships and robust democracies with higher preparedness.