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Ludvig BeckmanProfessor

Om mig

Ludvig Beckman är professor i statsvetenskap vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen. Du kan läsa mer om Ludvig Beckman på den engelska sidan (klicka på jordgloben i det högra hörnet).

Forskning

Books (monographs):

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. “Democratic Legitimacy, Institutions for Future Generations and the Problem of Constitutional Power”, in Hélène Ruiz Valérie Rosoux Alessandra Donati (eds.), Representing the Absent, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. 

Ludvig Beckman, 2022. The Boundaries of Democracy. A Theory of Inclusion, London: Routledge. Open access: https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/94371

Beckman, Ludvig, 2021. All makt till folket: om en bortglömd idé, Stockholm: Fri Tanke.

Ludvig Beckman, 2011. Den rimliga integrationen, Stockholm: Dialogos Förlag.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. Frontiers of Democracy. The Right to Vote and its Limits, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ludvig Beckman, 2005. Grundbok i idéanalys, Stockholm: Santérus Förlag.

Ludvig Beckman, 2001. The Liberal State and the politics of Virtue, (revised ed.), New Jersey: Transaction Press.

Ludvig Beckman, 2000. The Liberal State and the Politics of Virtue, Stockholm: City University Press.

Books (edited volumes):

Ludvig Beckman, (edited with Eva Erman), 2012. Territories of Citizenship, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ludvig Beckman, (edited with Ulf Mörkenstam), 2009. Politisk teori, Stockholm: Liber.

Ludvig Beckman, (edited with Maria Carbin, Ulf Mörkenstam, Sofia Näsström, Jouni Reinikainen, Maria Wendt Höjer), 2009. Texter i samtida politisk teori, Stockholm: Liber.

Ludvig Beckman, (guest editor with Edward Page), 2008. Perspectives on Justice, Democracy and Global Climate Change, Special Issue, Environmental Politics, 17:4.

Ludvig Beckman, (edited with Emil Uddhammar (ed.), 2002. Virtues of independence and dependence on virtues, New Jersey: Transaction Press.

Ludvig Beckman, (edited with Michelle Micheletti, Emil Uddhammar, m.fl., 2001. Dygder som drivkraft och föredöme, Stockholm: City University Press.

Refereed articles:

Beckman, Ludvig, 2024. “Public services demokratiska uppdrag. Fri åsiktsbildning och offentligt förnuft”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 126:2, 355-372.

Beckman, Ludvig, 2024. “Authority and Coercion Beyond the State? The Limited Applicability of Legitimacy Standards for Extraterritorial Border Controls”, Jus Cogens, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-024-00092-5

Wangmar, C., & Beckman, L. 2024. "Excluding Citizens: Belongership and the Constitutional Demos in British Overseas Territories", Ethnopolitics, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2024.2355792

Norman, Ludvig and Ludvig Beckman, 2024. “Democratic self-defense and public sphere institutions”, Constellations, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12737

Ludvig Beckman (with Jonas Hultin Rosenberg) 2022. “The Democratic Inclusion of Artificial Intelligence? Exploring the Patiency, Agency and Relational Conditions for Demos Membership”, Philosophy and Technology 35(24)

Ludvig Beckman (with Jonas Hultin Rosenberg and Karim Jebari) 2022. "Artificial intelligence and democratic legitimacy. The problem of publicity in public authority", AI and Society.

Beckman, L. (2022). Three Conceptions of Law in Democratic Theory. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 1-18. DOI:10.1017/cjlj.2022.22

Ludvig Beckman, Kirsty Gover & Ulf Mörkenstam (2021) The popular sovereignty of Indigenous peoples: a challenge in multi-people states, Citizenship Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2021.2011142

Beckman, Ludvig, 2021. “Democracy”. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.

Beckman, Ludvig,  2019. “Popular sovereignty facing the deep state. The rule of recognition and the powers of the people”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2019.1644583

Beckman, Ludvig (med Aaron Maltais och Jonas Hultin Rosenberg), 2019. “The Demos and Its Critics”. The Review of Politics, 81(3), 435-457.

Beckman, L. 2018. Democratic legitimacy does not require constitutional referendum. On ‘the constitution’ in theories of constituent power. European Constitutional Law Review, 14(3), 567-583.

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. “Personhood and legal status: reflections on the democratic rights of Corporations”, Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, 47:1, pp. 13-28.

Ludvig Beckman, 2017. “Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1390661

Ludvig Beckman, 2017. “Is there a moral right to vote?", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20 (4), 885-897.

Beckman, Ludvig. 2017. “Legal Power and the Right to Vote: Does the Right to Vote Confer Power?”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30(1), 5–22.

Ludvig Beckman and Jonas Hultin Rosenberg, 2017. “Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion”, Res Publica. doi:10.1007/s11158-016-9348-8

Ludvig Beckman, 2016. “Power and future people’s freedom: intergenerational domination, climate change, and constitutionalism”, Journal of Political Power, 9 (2), 289-307.

Ludvig Beckman, 2015. "Political Representation of Future Generations and Collective Responsibility", Jurisprudence, 6 (3), 516-534.

Ludvig Beckman, 2014, “Democracy and the right to exclusion”, Res Publica: A Journal of Moral and Political Philosophy, 20, (4), 395-411.

Ludvig Beckman, 2014. “The Right to Democracy and the Human Right to Vote: The Instrumental Argument Rejected”, The Journal of Human Rights, 13, (4), 381-394.

Ludvig Beckman, 2014. "The Subjects of Collectively Binding Decisions: Democratic Inclusion and Extraterritorial Law", Ratio Juris, 27, 2.

Ludvig Beckman, 2013. ”The Accuracy of Electoral Regulations: The Case of the Right to Vote by People with Cognitive Impairments”, Social Policy and Society, 13 (2), 221–233.

Ludvig Beckman, 2013. “Irregular migration and Democracy: The case for inclusion”, Citizenship Studies, 17, (1), 48-60.

Ludvig Beckman, 2012. “Democracy, national responsibility and climate change justice”, Democratization, 19, (4), 843-864.

Ludvig Beckman, 2008. “Democratic Inclusion, Law and Causes”, Ratio Juris, 21, (3), 348-364.

Ludvig Beckman, 2008. Do global climate change and the interest of future generations have implications for democracy?, Environmental Politics, (4), August, 610-624.

Ludvig Beckman, 2008. “Who should vote? Conceptualizing universal suffrage in studies of democracy”, Democratization, 15 (1), Feb 2008, 29-48.

Ludvig Beckman, 2008. “Public Justifiability and Children”, The International Journal of Children's Rights, 16 (1), 141-152.

Ludvig Beckman, 2007. “The professionalization of politics reconsideed. A study of the Swedish Cabinet 1917-2004”, Parliamentary Affairs, 60 (1), 66-83.

Ludvig Beckman, 2007. “Political equality and the disenfranchisement of people with intellectual impairments”, Social policy and Society, 6 (1), 13-23.

Ludvig Beckman, 2006. “Citizenship and voting rights: Should resident aliens vote?”, Citizenship Studies, 10 (2), 153-165.

Ludvig Beckman, 2006. “The competent Cabinet? Ministers in Sweden and the problem of competence and democracy”, Scandinavian Political Studies, 29 (2), 111-129.

Ludvig Beckman, 2005. “Democracy and genetic privacy: the value of bodily integrity”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 8 (1), 97-103.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Genetic privacy from Locke’s point of view”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 38 (2), 241-251.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Are genetic self-tests dangerous? Assessing the commercialization of genetic testing in terms of personal autonomy”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 25 (6) 387-398.

Ludvig Beckman, 2003. ”Human dignity and legal reactions to reproductive cloning: Is the principle too vague?”, Human reproduction and genetic ethics, 9 (2), 387-398.

Ludvig Beckman, 2001. ”Rights, rights-talk and children”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35 (4): 509-515.

Book chapters:

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. “Democratic Legitimacy, Institutions for Future Generations and the Problem of Constitutional Power”, in Hélène Ruiz Valérie Rosoux Alessandra Donati (eds.), Representing the Absent, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

Ludvig Beckman, 2022. "Makten över folkmakten", Niklas Bolin m.fl (red.), Snabbtänkt 2.0 22. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare,Sundsvall: Mittuniversitetet.

Ludvig Beckman, 2021. “Is weak popular sovereingty possible?”, in Sovereignty as Value, Andre Santos Campos, Susana Cadilha (eds.), Rowman & Littlefield.

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. "Rösträttsåldern och demokratins avgränsningsproblem", Demokratins framtid, Katarina Barrling och Sören Holmberg (red.), Stockholm: Sveriges riksdag.

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. “Fri åsiktsbildning och yttrandefrihet som individuell rättighet”, i Bo Lindberg (red.), Opinionsfrihet och religion, Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien.

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. ”Children and the right to vote”, in Gheaus, Anca, Calder, Gideon, and De Wispelaere, Jurgen, eds. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. Milton: Routledge.

Ludvig Beckman and Fredrik Uggla, 2016. “An Ombudsman for Future Generations, Legitimate and Effective”, Institutions For Future Generations,  Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (red.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 117-134

Ludvig Beckman, 2015. “Folket i demokratin”, i Raino Malnes and Dag-Einar Thorsen (red.), Demokratiet, Oslo: Dreyer.

Ludvig Beckman, 2015. “Climate Change Duties and the Human Right to Democracy”, i Aaron Maltais och Catriona McKinnon (red.), The Ethics of Climate Governance, London: Rowmand and Littelfield.

Ludvig Beckman, 2014. “Must democratic rights serve the rights-bearer? The right to vote of people with severe cognitive impairments”, in Anna Yeatman and Peg Birmingham (eds.), The Aporia of Human Rights Explorations in citizenship in the era of human rights, London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Ludvig Beckman, 2013. “Global diffusion and the role of courts in shaping the human right to vote”, in Alison Brysk (ed.), The Politics of the Globalization of Law. Getting from Rights to Justice, London: Routledge.

Ludvig Beckman, 2013. “Democracy and Future Generations. Should the unborn have a voice?”, in Jean-Christophe Merle (ed.), Spheres of Global Justice, Berlin/Paris: Springer, pp. 775-788.

Ludvig Beckman, 2012. “Is residence special? Democracy in the Age of Migration and human mobility”, in Ludvig Beckman and Eva Erman (eds.), Territories of Citizenship, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ludvig Beckman, 2012. ”Democratization and inclusion”, in Jeffrey Haynes (ed), Routledge Handbook on Democratization, Abingdon: Routledge.

Ludvig Beckman, 2010.”De ’kunnige’ och ’erfarne’ statsråden? Demokratin och kravet på politisk kompetens”, in Jörgen Hermansson (ed.), Regeringsmakten i Sverige. Ett experiment i parlamentarism 1917-2009, Stockholm: SNS Förlag, sid. 84-106.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. ”Jämlikhet”, in Ludvig Beckman och Ulf Mörkenstam (ed.), Politisk teori, Stockholm: Liber.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. ”Introduktion” (with Ulf Mörkenstam), i Ludvig Beckman and Ulf Mörkenstam (ed.), Politisk teori, Stockholm: Liber.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. ”Idéanalys” (with Carina Ljungwald), in Anna Hollander and Katarina Alexius Bergström (ed.), Juridik och rättsvetenskap i socialt arebete, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 65-75.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. “Introduktion”, in Ludvig Beckman, Maria Carbin, Eva Erman, m.fl. (ed.), Texter i Samtida Politisk Teori, Stockholm: Liber, 170-177.

Ludvig Beckman, 2007. “Genteknik och personlig integritet”, in Kurt Almqvist and Erik Wallrup (ed.), Medvetande, genetik och samhälle, Stockholm: Atlantis.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Demokratin och debatten om de utländska medborgarnas rösträtt”, in Karin Borevi and Per Strömblad (ed.), Engagemang, mångfald och integration, Integrationspolitiska maktutredningen, SOU 2004:49.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Skyddet för den genetiska integriteten”, in Genetikens problem och möjligheter, Tommy Möller (ed.), Stockholm: Pensionsforum.

Ludvig Beckman, 2003. ”Demokrati och kompetenskrav. Barn, ungdomar och rätten till politiskt inflytande”, in Demokrati och lärande, Britta Jonsson & Klas Roth (ed.), Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Ludvig Beckman, 2002. ”Personal independence and social justice: Contradictions of liberal virtues?” in Ludvig Beckman and Emil Uddhammar (ed.), 2002. Virtues of independence and dependence on virtues, New Jersey: Transaction Press.

Ludvig Beckman, 2001. ”Sustainability and liberal values” in John Barry and Marcel Wissenburg (red), Sustaining Liberal Democracy, London: Palgrave.

Ludvig Beckman, 2001. ”Barnkonventionen och den svenska grundlagen”, in Göran Gunner and Sia Åkermark (ed.), Mänskliga rättigheter - Forskningsperspektiv, Stockholm: Justus Förlag.

Ludvig Beckman, 1999. ”Föräldrars dygder och barns rätigheter”, in Emil Uddhammar and Patrik Aspers (ed.), Framtidens Dygder. Etik i praktiken, Stockholm: City University Press, s 324-351.

Ludvig Beckman,  1997. “Going native or being a coloniser? Liberalism and the possibility of cultural criticism”, in Erik Peurell and Ewa Hemmungs-Wirtén (ed.), The interpretation of Culture and the Culture of Interpretation, Uppsala: Avdelningen för Litteratursociologi, s 115-132.

Articles in non-reviewed journals:

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. “Power, representation and the demos in transnational democracy”, Let me vote in your country, and I’ll let you vote in mine. A proposal for transnational democracy, Joachim Blatter and Rainer Bauböck (eds.), EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/25, 10-13. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/62225

Ludvig Beckman, Ulf Mörkenstam and Jouni Reinikainen, 2016. “Popular Sovereignty, globalization and political rights”, Portugese Journal of Political Science, No. 6, pp. 155-178.

Ludvig Beckman, (with Ulf Mörkenstam), 2010. ”’Vad kan politiska teoretiker som någon har det minsta nytta av?’ Om normativ politisk teori och politisk praktik”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 112:5, 363-374.

Ludvig Beckman, 2006. ”Idékritik och statsvetenskapens nytta”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 108:4, 331-342.

Ludvig Beckman, 2006, ”Godtagbart i ett demokratiskt samhälle? De hemliga tvångsmedlen och rätten till personlig integritet”, Svensk Juristtidning, 91:1, 1-22.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Demokrati och genetisk integritet”, Svensk Juristtidning, 89:5/6, 487-503.

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Krishantering och legitimitet”, Politologen, Nr 1, 15-24.

Ludvig Beckman, 2000. ”Om tvivel dogmer och den neutrala staten”, Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, Nr 3.

Ludvig Beckman, 1997. ”Konventioner, kultur och kritik”, Filosofisk Tidskrift, Nr 3, s 22-28.

Ludvig Beckman, 1997. ”Charles Taylor och den sociala tesen. Är kommunitarismen förenlig med liberalismen?”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 100:2, s 177-197.

Reports:

Ludvig Beckman, 2016. Självcensur, yttrandejämlikhet och yttrandefrihet, Konstnärsnämndens skriftserie 2016:2.

Ludvig Beckman, 2009. Demokratipolitikens metoder. Insatser för ett ökat valdeltagande – en kunskapsöversikt, Rapporter från Riksdagen, RFR 2008/09:15, Konstitutionsutskottet, Sveriges Riksdag.

Ludvig Beckman, 2003. Demokratin och mordet på Anna Lindh, Stockholm: Krisberedskapsmyndigheten.

Academic Reviews:

Beckman, Ludvig, recension av Demokratiparadoxen (Tommy Andersson), Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, Nr 3, 2023, s. 38-41

Ludvig Beckman, 2018, Recension av Folk och Vilja (Torbjörn Tännsjö och Folke Tersman), Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, Nr 3, 2020, s. 1-13.

Ludvig Beckman, 2017. Review of Kevin Olson’s Imagined Sovereignties, Contemporary Political Theory, doi:10.1057/s41296-017-0093-3

Ludvig Beckman, 2004. ”Fairness. The theory and practice of distributive justice”, Review of Metaphysics.

Ludvig Beckman, 2002. ”Review of Kant and Modern Political Philosophy”, Theoria, Nr 2.

Ludvig Beckman, 1998.”Just Institutions Matter”, Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, Nr 3, s 52-62.

Public debate:

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. ”Grundlagsreformen går omotiverat långt”, SvD Debatt 2 april.

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. ”Oklart om oron för demokratin är befogad”, DN Debatt Repliker, 28 mars.

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. "Stormningen i Brasilien blottar demokratins problem", Forskning och Framsteg 2023-01-17. Länk

Ludvig Beckman, 2023. Är demokratiska datorer verkligen önskvärt?, Svensk Filosofi 2023-01-17. Länk

Ludvig Beckman, 2021. ”Folksuveräniteten är en ännu olöst fråga”, Under strecket, Svenska Dagbladet, 20/1.

Ludvig Beckman, 2020. ”Det politiska spelet är ingen tillfällighet”, recension av Leif Lewins Konsten att bilda regering när ingen har majoritet, Respons, 3.

Ludvig Beckman, 2019. “Idealism och realism i invandringsfrågan”, Svenska Dagbladet, 7 maj.

Ludvig Beckman, 2019. “Principer och pragmatism”, Poliologen, 6 juni.

Ludvig Beckman, 2018. ” Det finns goda skäl att överväga om Sverige bör införa röstplikt”, Sydsvenskan, 9/9.

Ludvig Beckman, 2017. “Behöver politiska beslut skyddas mot väljarnas okunnighet?”, recension av Jason Brennan, Efter demokratin, Respons, nr 4, 68-70.

Ludvig Beckman, 2016. ”Möjligheten att uttrycka sig är ingen rättighet”, Svenska Dagbladet, replik, 2016-09-02.

Ludvig Beckman, 2016. ”Självcensur – ett hot mot demokratin?”, Svenska Dagbladet, kultursidorna, 2016-08-29.

Ludvig Beckman, (med Eva Erman och Gustaf Arrhenius), ”Esaiasson har missförstått representativa demokratin”, DN-Debatt på nätet, 16/2 2016.

Ludvig Beckman, 2014. ”Utlandsröstning inte självklart demokratiskt”, DN-debatt på nätet, 2014-08-18.

Ludvig Beckman, 2012. “Liberalismens fäder var inte särskilt liberala”, Respons, Nr 6, 29-31.

Ludvig Beckman, 2012. Sänkt rösträttsålder utvidgar demokratin – inte ombudsröstning”, DN-debatt på nätet, 2012-03-29.

Forskningsprojekt

Det demokratiska självförsvarets dilemman i europeisk public service

Detta projekt studerar hur public service-organisationer i Europa har svarat på den växande närvaron av brett definierade populistiska och extremistiska partier, politiska aktörer som tenderar att motsätta sig skyddet av minoriteter, jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män, migranters och flyktingars rättigheter och som har sett ett ökat stöd de senaste åren.

Forskning

Publikationer

I urval från Stockholms universitets publikationsdatabas

  • Artificial intelligence and democratic legitimacy. The problem of publicity in public authority

    2022. Ludvig Beckman, Jonas Hultin Rosenberg, Karim Jebari. AI & Society

    Artikel

    Machine learning algorithms (ML) are increasingly used to support decision-making in the exercise of public authority. Here, we argue that an important consideration has been overlooked in previous discussions: whether the use of ML undermines the democratic legitimacy of public institutions. From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, it is not enough that ML contributes to efficiency and accuracy in the exercise of public authority, which has so far been the focus in the scholarly literature engaging with these developments. According to one influential theory, exercises of administrative and judicial authority are democratically legitimate if and only if administrative and judicial decisions serve the ends of the democratic law maker, are based on reasons that align with these ends and are accessible to the public. These requirements are not satisfied by decisions determined through ML since such decisions are determined by statistical operations that are opaque in several respects. However, not all ML-based decision support systems pose the same risk, and we argue that a considered judgment on the democratic legitimacy of ML in exercises of public authority need take the complexity of the issue into account. This paper outlines considerations that help guide the assessment of whether a ML undermines democratic legitimacy when used to support public decisions. We argue that two main considerations are pertinent to such normative assessment. The first is the extent to which ML is practiced as intended and the extent to which it replaces decisions that were previously accessible and based on reasons. The second is that uses of ML in exercises of public authority should be embedded in an institutional infrastructure that secures reason giving and accessibility.

    Läs mer om Artificial intelligence and democratic legitimacy. The problem of publicity in public authority

  • Three Conceptions of Law in Democratic Theory

    2022. Ludvig Beckman. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 1-18

    Artikel

    Democratic theory tends to proceed on the assumption that law requires democratic legitimation because it is coercive. However, the claim that law requires democratic legitimation is distinct from claims about the nature of law. This paper takes issue with the notion that law is coercive by an exploration of three distinct understandings of the nature of law: the state-based conception of law, law as the rules of institutionalized normative systems, and law as social norms. Drawing on insights from legal and democratic theory, the paper defends the view that the ‘law’ to which democratic claims apply are the rules of conduct of institutionalized normative systems. Since rules that belong to such systems are found in associations beyond or below the level of the state, the scope of democratic participation is significantly wider than is usually recognized.

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  • All makt åt folket: Om en bortglömd idé

    2021. Ludvig Beckman.

    Bok

    Från höger och vänster framträder just nu rörelser i Sverige och i många andra länder som anser sig tala för folket. Att all politisk makt utgår från folket kallas med ett hävdvunnet uttryck för folksuveränitet och är den självklara utgångspunkten i en demokrati. Men vilka är ”folket” i folkstyret?

    En förvirrande situation har uppstått där föreställningen om det suveräna folket underblåser kritiken mot demokratins, folkstyrets, organisering. Så hur kan och bör vi förstå demokratins löfte om att makten utgår från folket?

    All makt åt folket ger läsaren ögonöppnande perspektiv och redskap till ett kritiskt – och självkritiskt – granskande av demokratins mest grundläggande princip.

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  • The Democratic Inclusion of Artificial Intelligence? Exploring the Patiency, Agency and Relational Conditions for Demos Membership

    2022. Ludvig Beckman, Jonas Hultin Rosenberg. Philosophy & Technology 35 (2)

    Artikel

    Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic decisions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer depends on the relationship between the political unit and the entity that is either affected or subjected to its decisions. The relational conditions for inclusion as stipulated by the all-affected (AAP) and all-subjected principles (ASP) determine the spatial extension of democratic inclusion. Thus, AI qualifies for democratic inclusion if and only if AI is either affected or subjected to decisions by the political unit in relevant ways. This paper argues that the conventional view is too simple; that it neglects democratic reasons to recognize only agents and/or moral patients as participants in decision-making. The claim defended is that AAP and ASP implicitly affirm requirements for agency and patiency. In ASP, the entity included must be an agent understood either in terms of legal status, capacity to comply with the law or ability to recognize legitimate authority. In AAP, the entity included must be a patient, understood either in terms of capacity for sentience or consciousness. Thus, the idea here is to explore the potential democratic inclusion of artificial intelligences by an updated account of the relevant conditions of agency and patiency that are implicit in democratic theory. Although conceivable that AI is or will be either affected or subjected in relevant ways to decisions made by political units, it is far less clear that AI will ever be agents or patients in the sense required for democratic inclusion.  

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  • The popular sovereignty of Indigenous peoples: a challenge in multi-people states

    2021. Ludvig Beckman, Kirsty Gover, Ulf Mörkenstam. Citizenship Studies 26 (1), 1-20

    Artikel

    The doctrine of popular sovereignty holds that the 'supreme authority of the state' belongs to the people, not to the political institutions exercising public power. What are the implications of this view when there is more than one people in the territory of that state? The case of Indigenous peoples highlights this question, as they are unequivocally peoples who are distinct from the majority population. This paper subjects to criticism of the received view according to which the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in democratic institutions is sufficient for the realization of their popular sovereignty. Instead, we argue that their constituent power must be recognized - the power to create and negotiate the constitutional order. The realization of popular sovereignty in settler states thus necessitates a process where the constitutional order is negotiated by Indigenous peoples and the majority population in conditions where the two parties are mutually recognized as sovereign.

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  • Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy

    2019. Ludvig Beckman. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (4), 412-431

    Artikel

    The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and sub-versions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making.

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  • Popular sovereignty facing the deep state: The rule of recognition and the powers of the people

    2021. Ludvig Beckman. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 24 (7), 954-976

    Artikel

    This paper investigates the relationship between the idea of popular sovereignty and the conditions for legal validity and argue that the latter imposes definitive limits to the former. Popular sovereignty has been defined as the condition when the will of the people is the "supreme authority in the state". Following this conception, there is no authority above the people and this is traditionally understood to mean that the authority of the people is above the constitution. Legal validity, though admittedly still debated, is here understood along Hart's "rule of recognition" According to which the validity of norms ultimately depends on the social practices of public officials. Though presumably uncontroversial that democratic peoples are entitled to remake the constitution, the powers of the people with respect to the substance of the law are nevertheless limited with respect to decisions of legal validity. The most basic rules in a legal system are not found in the constitution as they are the rules deciding what is to count as a legal norm within that system. They are more fundamental than the constitution because they also define what norms is the constitution legally speaking.

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  • Democracy

    2021. Ludvig Beckman. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

    Kapitel

    Democracy is a term that is used to denote a variety of distinct objects and ideas. Democracy describes either a set of political institutions or an ideal of collective self-rule. Democracy can also be short for a normative principle of either legitimacy or justice. Finally, democracy might be used to denote an egalitarian attitude. These four uses of the term should be kept distinct and raises separate conceptual and normative issues.

    The value of democracy, whether democratic political institutions or democratic self-rule, is either instrumental, non-instrumental, or both. The non-instrumental value of democracy derives either from the alleged fairness of majority rule or from the value of the social relationships enabled by participation in democratic procedures. The instrumental value of democracy lends support from a growing body of empirical research. Yet, the claim that democracy has a positive causal effect on public goods is inconclusive with respect to the moral justification of democratic institutions. Normative reasons for democracy’s instrumental value must instead appeal to the fact that it contributes to equality, liberty, truth, or the realization of popular will.

    Democracy as a principle of either political legitimacy or justice is a normative view that evades concerns with the definition and value of democracy. Normative democracy is a claim about the conditions either for legitimacy or justice of either public authority or coercion. Debates in normative democracy are largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical concerns that inform studies of democracy elsewhere.

    The boundaries of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions is a question that applies to all four uses of democracy. The boundary question raises three distinct issues. The first is the extent of inclusion required among the members of the unit. The second is if membership in the unit is necessary for inclusion or if people that are not recognized as members are on certain conditions also entitled to participate. The third and final issue concerns the boundaries of the unit itself.

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  • The Demos and Its Critics

    2019. Aron Maltais, Jonas Hultin Rosenberg, Ludvig Beckman. Review of Politics 81 (3), 435-457

    Artikel

    The “demos paradox” is the idea that the composition of a demos could never secure democratic legitimacy because the composition of a demos cannot itself be democratically decided. Those who view this problem as unsolvable argue that this insight allows them to adopt a critical perspective towards common ideas about who has legitimate standing to participate in democratic decision-making. We argue that the opposite is true and that endorsing the demos paradox actually undermines our ability to critically engage with common ideas about legitimate standing. We challenge the conception of legitimacy that lurks behind the demos paradox and argue that the real impossibility is to endorse democracy without also being committed to significant procedure-independent standards for the legitimate composition of the demos. We show that trying to solve the problem of the demos by appeal to some normative conception of democratic legitimacy is a worthwhile project that is not undermined by paradox.

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  • Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion

    2018. Ludvig Beckman, Jonas Hultin Rosenberg. Res Publica 24 (2), 181-198

    Artikel

    According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures non-domination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation.

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  • Personhood and legal status: Reflections on the democratic rights of corporations

    2018. Ludvig Beckman. Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (1), 13-28

    Artikel
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  • Is there a Moral Right to Vote?

    2017. Ludvig Beckman. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4), 885-897

    Artikel

    The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the individual. The account developed in this paper holds that moral voting rights can be justified once we acknowledge that voting by a sub-set of citizens is among the necessary preconditions for democratic institutions making a significant difference to their collective interests. The justification of a moral right to vote does not, then, apply to each individual citizen but only to a sub-set of them. In order to justify inclusive moral voting rights, the further consideration must be added that individuals have critical interests in public recognition of equal status. An inclusive moral right to vote accordingly depends on both collective interest in the outcomes of democratic institutions and on individual interest in equal recognition.

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  • Legal Power and the Right to Vote: Does the Right to Vote Confer Power?

    2017. Ludvig Beckman. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 30 (1), 5-22

    Artikel

    It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This paper evaluates this notion on the basis of two conceptions of political power: the causal view, according to which power equals the ability to exert causal effect, and the legal view, according to which power equals the legal ability to produce legal effect. The proposition defended is that causal conceptions of power are unable to account for the view that voting rights confer power to either individuals or collectives. In particular, the theory according to which the powers conferred by the vote equal the probability of being decisive or “pivotal” in elections does not justify the ascription of power to voters. It does not because the probability of being influential is not a valid interpretation of power as the capacity to mobilize sufficient causal effect to determine an outcome. In addition, causal conceptions of power are unable to recognize the people as the unique owner of political power. The powers exercised by the members of the electorate appear to be just one among several causes that contribute to determine electoral outcomes. In the end, the legal analysis of power proves superior. Power in a democracy is placed with the people as a legal category vested with the legal capacity to revise the legal relationship between individuals and the state.

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  • Power and future people’s freedom: intergenerational domination, climate change, and constitutionalism

    2016. Ludvig Beckman. Journal of Political Power 9 (2), 289-307

    Artikel

    Intergenerational domination is the idea that future people’s freedom is violated insofar as they are vulnerable to the capacity of the people living before them to interfere. This paper explores the extent to which intergenerational domination applies to two familiar phenomena: climate change and constitutionalism. The first part of the paper argues that the emission of greenhouse gases does not amount to intergenerational domination. Being hurt by climate change does not equal subjection to the capacity of previous generations to interfere. The second part argues that intergenerational domination is under certain conditions applicable to the relationship exemplified by political constitutionalism. Hence, this study shows that constitutional provisions introduced in order to protect future generations from climate change is more likely to contribute to rather than to protect them from intergenerational domination.

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  • Democracy and the Right to Exclusion

    2014. Ludvig Beckman. Res Publica 20 (4), 395-411

    Artikel

    A defining feature of democracy is the inclusion of members of the political association. However, the corresponding right to exclusion has attracted undeservedly scant attention in recent debates. In this paper, the nature of the right to exclusion is explored. On the assumption that inclusion requires the allocation of legal power-rights to the people entitled to participate in the making of collective decisions, two conceptions of the right to exclusion are identified: the liberty-right to exclude and the claim-right to exclude. The choice between them depends on the nature of the interests that justifies the power-rights of people included. The position is defended that if rights to democratic participation are power-rights, we must also accept that the people included have claim-rights to the exclusion of non-members.

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  • Territories of Citizenship

    2012. .

    Bok (red)

    Territories of Citizenship explores citizenship transitions in light of increasedglobal interconnectedness, ethnic diversity, and migration. The focus of the book is two prone.The first part evaluates the ramifications of conventional citizenship within thetraditional physical and legal boundaries of the nation-state for the democracy of itsinhabitants. An important concern in the first part of the book is the effect on migration flowsand citizen mobility on citizenship. How should democracies view citizenship rights now thatsocieties increasingly include resident citizens, resident non-citizens, and naturalized citizens?And why is residence special for belonging to the political community? Chapters for this partof the book compare the duties of residents and citizens, ask why it matters for democraticdecision-making if its inhabitants have different forms of belonging to the politicalcommunity, and consider naturalization legislation from a normative democratic perspective.The chapters thus illustrate several democratic problems associated with traditional territorialcitizenship. Part two focuses on the potentials for new citizenship space and place beyond theterritorial confine of the nation-state. Its chapters concern the role of international institutionsand multilevel governance as guarantors of citizenship and both ask and answer questionsabout the prospect of empowering individuals and creating transnational public sphere andglobal solidarity in global governance. 

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