I urval från Stockholms universitets publikationsdatabas

• Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer leauge

  2017. Sten Nyberg, Mikael Priks. Journal of Public Economics 153, 1-8

  Artikel

  Should organizers of events share the associated costs of maintaining public order? We address this question by using unique data from the Swedish soccer league where co-payment for police were introduced for some clubs only. The difference-in-differences analysis shows that co-payments increased private guards by 40% and suggests a reduction of unruly behavior by 20%. The results are consistent with our model, where co-payments alleviate under-provision in efforts by organizers to combat problems such as hooliganism due to externalities and free-riding on police services. The model also sheds light on the critique that co-payments could lead financially constrained organizers to provide less security.

  Läs mer om Public order and private payments

Visa alla publikationer av Mikael Priks vid Stockholms universitet