Forskningsprojekt Moralteorins natur: en utforskning av den medeltida föreställningen om moralisk kunskap

Purpose and aims
Is it always wrong to lie? When should we help those in need? Are we allowed to kill in selfdefense? These are all questions about what we ought to do. A central feature of much
contemporary moral philosophy is a commitment to generalism. Broadly stated, generalism is
the view that general moral principles are paramount for both understanding and knowledge
about what ought to be done. This view stands in contrast to a particularist approach on which
morality is seen as too varied and context dependent to be captured by any general principles.
Instead, particularists argue that we should not rely on general principles because they will
lead us astray and moral philosophy should not aim to develop such principles.
Aristotle’s moral philosophy has been an inspiration to the particularist approach due
to its emphasis on the inexactness of ethics, the central role given to personal experience and
a trained judgment for practical wisdom. Whether Aristotle was a forbearer of particularism is
disputed by scholars of ancient philosophy (Irwin 2003; Leibowitz 2013; Nielsen 2015). This
project focuses on the Aristotelian tradition and more specifically the Parisian Master of Arts
John Buridan (c. 1300–1362) and his influential commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics. Buridan’s moral philosophy while little studied speaks directly to the question if general
principles are part of a broadly Aristotelian account of moral knowledge. The medieval
discussion of moral knowledge is formed by an initial contrast between the expertise
possessed by an experienced person with practical wisdom (prudentia) and the systematic
knowledge possessed by the moral theorist (scientia moralis). I will argue in this project that
Buridan’s account is generalist in that he thinks that the moral theorist and the practically wise
person relies on the same moral knowledge and that this knowledge is captured by general
principles.
Buridan’s account of these matters had considerable influence on generations of moral
philosophers. We know that Buridan was widely read at different universities in Europe until
the seventeenth century (Flüeler 2007). Moral philosophy was for a long time done on the basis
of the questions raised in Buridan’s commentary, and generations of philosophers had an indepth
knowledge of Buridan’s ethics that we largely lack today. Without a more detailed picture
of Buridan’s account, including the institutional tradition that led up to his philosophy, we cannot
fully understand the medieval contribution to the development of Western moral philosophy.
Scholars have brought attention to that the introduction of the idea that moral theory is
a “science” or systematic inquiry (scientia) in medieval philosophy plays a central role in the
development of moral thought (Celano 1995, 2016; Lutz-Bachmann 2008; Fidora 2013).
However, there are two problems with this line of research that this project aims to address:
(A) The recent studies have mainly focused on Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). The
problem is that the most systematic reflection on the nature of moral thought in the medieval
discussion is found after Aquinas, notably in the works by Buridan. If we are interested in the
influence of medieval ethics on Western moral thought, Buridan’s account, while severely
understudied, is of the greatest importance.
(B) Current research on medieval philosophy has identified a broad agreement among
scholastic philosophers that moral theory ought to be seen as a form of systematic knowledge
and in scholastic terminology a science (scientia). However, this agreement is terminological
rather than substantial. While they agree that the systematic study of morality ought to be
called a “moral science” (scientia moralis), there is a considerable disagreement on what that
entails. However, this agreement is terminological rather than substantial. For example,
Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1306) argues that moral theory as a science concerns the same things
as practical wisdom but uses a demonstrative method. Radulphus Brito (d. 1320/21), in turn,
argues that moral theory as a science is more like rhetoric and is instead about persuasion.
The project will focus on the works by Brito, William Ockham (1287–1347), Gerald Odonis
(1285-1349) and Buridan. The texts studied in this project are chosen with regard to the
influence they had in the development of Buridan’s own account. A further central source is
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the discussion in prologues of Sentence commentaries about the status of theology as a
practical science. This leads to a detailed discussion of what is entailed by a practical science.
This project aims at developing a different approach to the debate. To understand the
development, we need to understand what scholastic philosophers disagree about in order to
identify what is unique with the medieval contribution. The initial hypothesis of this project is
that the debate about moral theory was prompted by the restrictions of an idealized
epistemology, in which any form of knowledge needs to be understood in relation to an ideal
notion of scientific inquiry developed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. The scholastic
debate must be understood as being about in what sense and in what way the systematic
study of morality falls short of such an ideal.
This approach enables the development of two further hypotheses. First, I will argue
that Buridan’s explicit denial that practical wisdom and moral theory really are distinct
dispositions as the previous tradition holds, depends upon a new account of the purpose of
moral theory itself. On this new view, moral theory is seen as uncertain and action guiding but
still a legitimate theoretical enterprise. Second, that a detailed study of the medieval discussion
will reveal that scholastic philosophers were engaged with topics in moral epistemology that
only recently have received interest in contemporary philosophy. Moral philosophy has recently
focused on developing a view of moral principles that both allows for good or right actions to
vary in different contexts and for morality as a whole to be captured by general principles
(Väyrynen 2006; McKeever and Ridge 2006; Lance and Little 2004). This second hypothesis
is that the medieval positions explored in this project concerning the scope and nature of moral
theory share central features with such moderate versions of moral generalism. The
connection between the contemporary and medieval discussion is not accidental. Both
discussions are shaped by a commitment that a proper account of moral knowledge both
needs to account for how a good or right action can vary heavily in relation to context of a
particular situation and that there is general knowledge of moral matters that is best captured
by general principles.
State–of–the–art
There is a vast literature on medieval ethics especially on the moral philosophy of Aquinas,
notably those works by Hoffmann (2013); MacDonald (2008); Irwin (1997); Lutz-Bachmann
(2008); and Jordan (1999). Also important are the studies on John Duns Scotus’s account of
moral knowledge by Hoffmann (2012) and Eardley (2006). However, the literature on the
nature of moral theory, after Aquinas, by the authors explored in this project is small. Regarding
Ockham there are the general studies by Niederberger (2013); King (2003); Freppert (1988);
Holopainen (1991); and Adams (1986), but they do not focus on Ockham's influence on the
subsequent debate. The moral philosophies of Brito and Odonis are almost entirely
unexplored. Notable exceptions are the studies on Brito by Costa (2008) and on Odonis by
Kent (1984). However, these studies do not explore the topics of this project. Buridan’s ethics
have started to receive more attention. Important are the studies by Zupko (2012); Krieger
(1986) and Walsh (1986). Krieger provides a broad overview of Buridan’s account of moral
theory but provides only a limited analysis. There are only a few studies that aim to establish
how the nature of moral theory develops in late medieval philosophy (Celano 1995, 2016; Lutz-
Bachmann 2008; Fidora 2013).
In contrast to the relatively small literature on fourteenth century ethics, there is a wealth
of relevant literature on medieval epistemology, notably those by Pasnau (2010; 2017; 1997);
Kilma (2001) and Zupko (2001). The work on medieval notions of experience by King (2003)
is central to the project as a whole. Further relevant to the project is the contemporary
discussion of the distinction between knowledge that and knowledge how (Ryle 2002; Stanley
2011).
This project will attempt to break new ground by connecting a recent discussion in
contemporary analytic philosophy with medieval philosophy. There is a recent discussion on
the nature and necessity of general principles and what the nature of exceptions and
statements that hold for the most part (defeasible generalization) are. Central to this debate
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are the works by McKeever and Ridge (2006); Lance and Little (2004); Asarnow (2017) and
Horty (2012). While there is little literature on how to account for the relation between this
aspect of medieval ethics and contemporary philosophy, there is significant work on this topic
in ancient philosophy, especially important are Nielsen (2015); Leibowitz (2013) and Woolf
(2007).
In contrast to moral philosophy, there is literature exploring the relationship between
medieval and contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The recent and excellent
studies by Brower (2016) and Brower and Brower-Toland (2008) will be essential to address
the methodological challenges brought about by the comparison between contemporary and
medieval thought.
(Key references are marked with an asterisk (*) in the bibliography)
Significance and scientific novelty
The project explores medieval texts that have not yet been given serious attention or that have
received insufficient philosophical analysis (insofar as they have been studied). Buridan’s
moral philosophy had great influence on generations of moral philosophers and a more
comprehensive understanding of his work is essential to understanding the development of
western moral philosophy.
The project provides a more detailed philosophical analysis but also draws directly from
developments in medieval history and medieval Latin philology. The project will expand the
understanding of how a modern notion of moral knowledge and moral philosophy emerges
from a medieval discussion. The project further improves our understanding of developments
of the Aristotelian tradition in medieval philosophy.
A problem with much of the scholarship on the moral philosophy of the period is that
little attention is given to similarities or differences between medieval and contemporary moral
philosophy. This project will highlight similarities and differences between the current and
medieval debates and show that the medieval account of the nature of moral knowledge is
much richer and has more connections with contemporary philosophy than often assumed by
both specialists in medieval philosophy and contemporary ethicists.
The project will contribute to a more complete understanding of the nature of general
moral knowledge and how the general account of morality can allow for exceptions and in what
sense generalizations are defeasible. The project will also contribute to our understanding of
the limit and scope of moral theory itself.
Preliminary and previous results
The foundation for a part of this research project was laid out in the final chapter of my
dissertation. I showed that Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1306) places a central importance on
experience in moral thought. Godfrey brings attention to three central distinctions: (1) practical
wisdom and moral science operate with different modes of thought. (2) Practical wisdom has
a bottom-up mode of direction (from the particular to the universal) while moral science is about
what is universal in itself. (3) Moral science is helpful but never necessary to know what to do
while practical wisdom is necessary to know what to do. We know that Godfrey's thoughts were
read in the beginning of the fourteenth century, but it remains to be shown whether his account
was influential or whether there is a competing understanding of these matters from other
authors (Lambertini 2007). This final chapter left me with the realization that we need a broader
understanding of this topic including fourteenth century discussions, and a more
comprehensive account of the relation between a medieval notion of moral science and
contemporary philosophy.
Project description
The project falls within the study of the history of philosophy. It aims at evaluating and
reconstructing different arguments and positions and exploring how a particular aspect of our
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intellectual history develops. This project draws on an analytic method that focuses on
understanding the structure and validly of the philosophical arguments in historical texts.
To achieve these goals with regards to medieval moral philosophy, we need both a
better overview of the medieval discussion and an interpretative framework to analyze
medieval moral philosophy. The project will have three distinct phases. To track the
development of this discussion is the main aim of phase I; to develop a more detailed
interpretive framework is the aim of phase II; phase III is comparative in nature. Each phase
corresponds to one year in this three-year project. The phases are structured as follows.
Phase I: This phase involves the collection of the relevant source material and an
overview of the development. Although the development of the epistemic nature of moral
theory up to Buridan's commentary is largely unknown, three authors are of relevance. Brito’s
commentary on Nicomachean Ethics is little studied but contains a substational prologue and
starts with a detailed discussion exploring the nature of moral theory. It remains to be shown
what the exact influence of his discussion is on the following debate. We know that Buridan
uses Brito’s commentaries in other fields. Hence, we have reasons to think that Buridan was
familiar with Brito’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics as well. We know that Buridan’s
account of knowledge in general is influenced by William Ockham. However, the connections
between Ockham’s moral theory and Buridan’s account needs to be further studied. We know
that Buridan used Gerald Odonis’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics to a large extent in
preparing his own. However, the exact influence on the topic of moral knowledge is unknown
to us. Also central to this phase is to identify whether there are other commentaries on
Aristotle’s NE that are relevant to this development.
The contrast between a medieval notion of moral science and Aristotle's original
position is often a starting point for general conclusions about the function of moral theory in
the medieval period. However, the notion that Aristotle himself thought of ethics as unscientific
is no longer widely held among contemporary scholars (Henry and Nielsen 2015). Due to this
trend it is less clear whether we can assume that medieval philosophy undermines or
transforms Aristotelian philosophy by introducing the idea of moral science. We need an
alternative general approach to the debate as a whole. We need an account of what the debate
of moral science was about. The first phase aims at the development of such an account.
This phase builds on the approach developed by Robert Pasnau (2010; 2017). He
argues that medieval philosophers are committed to what he calls idealized epistemology. This
epistemological approach is based on the idea that all forms of human knowledge ought to be
understood in relation to an ideal form of understanding that corresponds to the strictest notion
of science developed by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics. Here I intend to defend the hypothesis
that medieval discussions about the nature of moral science are related to a disagreement
about in what sense and to what extent moral theory is universal, explanatory, demonstrative
and about necessary truths. This approach will allow us to both have more of a historically
accurate account of what medieval debate was about and it will allow us see what is
philosophically relevant with this debate. To reflect on how moral theory falls short of such an
ideal becomes a way to provide an account of what is unique with moral epistemology. The
discussion of in what sense moral theory is non-ideal becomes for example a discussion in
what sense moral knowledge only holds for the most part.
Phase II: The second phase builds on the idea that moral theory is a non-ideal form of
human inquiry and aims to evaluate how the notion of moral theory as a science develops. I
intend to analyze the source material from three perspectives: (A) Practicality, (B) Uncertainty
and (C) Generalization.
(A) Practicality: There is an increasing focus on the will as central to ethics in the period,
and this development does bring with it considerable changes to the notion of practical
knowledge (Hoffmann 2012). For a previous generation of Aristotelians, there is a sharp divide
between moral knowledge that is a part of what makes an action come about (practical
wisdom) and moral knowledge that is about human actions (moral science). Ockham plays a
central role with regards to this development. On this new view, moral science needs not to be
less practical than practical wisdom. The central research question is how such new moral
psychology influences Buridan's discussion of moral theory and its relation to practical wisdom.
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(B) Uncertainty: There is considerable interest in the fourteenth century accounts of
certainty in the scholarly literature. Buridan is famous for developing, as a response to
skepticism, an account of how different types of inquiries have specific levels of certainty. The
central question here is whether, in Buridan’s account, moral theory as a science has a distinct
level of certainty. Gerald Odonis’s (c. 1285/90–1349) little studied but groundbreaking
commentary on the NE is central to this development. The central research question is whether
this new notion of certainty influences Buridan’s view of the function and purpose of moral
theory.
(C) Generalization: A central feature of Aristotle’s notion of ethics is that it aims at
knowledge that holds only for the most part (NE 1094b11–22). The central research question
is what role do these generalizations play in Buridan’s account of practical wisdom.
This phase will result in three articles (see article III, IV and V below).
Phase III: The third phase builds on the first and the second phases and consists in a
comparison between the medieval views established in phase I and II and contemporary
philosophy. The current debate entails a wide spectrum of different perspectives on moral
principles and a general structure of moral thought. This phase aims to support the hypothesis
that the accounts of moral theory developed in the medieval period share significant similarities
with the contemporary version of what can be called moderate generalism. Moderate
generalism is shaped by the commitment that morality is captured by general principles but
that what is a right or wrong action still depends on the context within which it is performed.
The connections are not coincidental both debates are shaped by a concern for accounting
that the context matters within a general account of morality. Our understanding of medieval
philosophy would benefit from clearly understanding the conceptual landscape concerning the
role of principles and generalizations in moral thought. Furthermore, our understanding of
medieval philosophy would benefit from clearly understanding the conceptual landscape
concerning the role of principles and generalizations in moral thought. The outcome of this
phase is one article (see article VI below).
Results
The production of at least five research articles on the following themes:
(I) Moral Theory – a practical science? - This paper explores the competing
perspectives of Godfrey and Brito. Godfrey thinks that moral theory is theoretical in the sense
that it uses a demonstrative method while Brito takes the view that moral theory does not rely
on such a method but sees moral science as more similar to rhetoric.
(II) Taxonomy of Types of Moral Knowledge in the Commentaries on Aristotle – This
paper aims to understand how the debate about the difference between moral theory, practical
skills, and practical wisdom develops in the late thirteenth and fourteenth century
commentaries on Aristotle’s NE. It develops a new approach to the material. It situates the
discussion of moral theory within a framework of idealized epistemology.
(III) Buridan on the Nature of Moral Thought - Buridan thought that moral knowledge
has a fundamentally lower certainty than logic and natural science. The paper aims to identify
why Buridan thinks that moral knowledge has such a fundamentally lower certainty. I propose
that Buridan's account is best understood as an attempt to integrate Aristotelian assumptions
that good actions depend on the context into a medieval account of moral science. Moral
science becomes an uncertain and non-ideal form of human inquiry. Buridan is in this sense
the start of a tradition of scholastic thought which leads to a discussion of moral probability in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
(IV) The Breakdown of a Distinction - This paper explores the reason why Buridan
denies a strict distinction between moral theory and practical wisdom as endorsed by the
previous tradition.
(V) Usefulness of Moral theory? - This article aims to explore Buridan’s account of the
usefulness of moral theory. How can moral theory change our behavior? The article explores
how moral theory has a direct practical aim and how moral philosophers need to use rhetoric
to put their knowledge to use. This article is a collaborative effort with Joseph Stenberg.
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(VI) The Structure of Medieval and Contemporary Moral Theory - This paper focuses
on the role of exceptions and how generalization might only hold for the most part in medieval
and contemporary philosophy. The paper aims to show that medieval moral epistemology is
of more contemporary relevance than often assumed (even if there are some basic and central
differences between the discussions).
Peer-reviewed journals appropriate for the distribution of articles I-VI include top
specialist journals in history of philosophy; British Journal of History of Philosophy, Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie and Journal of History of Philosophy, as well as journals that focus
on medieval philosophy specifically; Vivarium and Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy as
well as generalist journals; Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Ergo and Res Philosophica.
The project will also entail an article that explains what is unique with medieval
discussions of moral knowledge aimed at a broader audience. This article will be in Swedish
and is suitable for publication in Filosofisk Tidskrift, Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi or Modern
Filosofi.

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