Andreas Jemstedt Foto: Psykologiska institutionen/HD

Andreas Jemstedt


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Arbetar vid Psykologiska institutionen
Telefon 08-16 25 72
Besöksadress Frescati hagväg 14
Rum 131
Postadress Psykologiska institutionen 106 91 Stockholm


I urval från Stockholms universitets publikationsdatabas
  • 2018. Andreas Jemstedt, Bennett L. Schwartz, Fredrik U. Jönsson. Memory 26 (6), 807-815

    Processing fluency influences many types of judgments. Some metacognitive research suggests that the influence of processing fluency may be mediated by participants’ beliefs. The current study explores the influence of processing fluency and beliefs on ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments. In two experiments (Exp 1: n = 94; Exp 2: n = 146), participants made EOL judgments on 24 six-letter concrete nouns, presented in either a constant condition (high fluency) with upper-case letters (e.g., BUCKET) or an alternating condition (low fluency) with mixed upper- and lower-case letters (e.g., bUcKeT). After judging words individually, participants studied the words and completed a free recall test. Finally, participants indicated what condition they believed made the words more likely to be learned. Results show constant-condition words were judged as more likely to be learned than alternating condition words, but the difference varied with beliefs. Specifically, the difference was biggest when participants believed the constant condition made words more likely to be learned, followed by believing there was no difference, and then believing the alternating condition made words more likely to be learned. Thus, we showed that processing fluency has a direct effect on EOL judgments, but the effect is moderated by beliefs.

  • 2017. Andreas Jemstedt, Veit Kubik, Fredrik U. Jönsson. Metacognition and Learning 12 (3), 337-355

    When people begin to study new material, they may first judge how difficult it will be to learn. Surprisingly, these ease of learning (EOL) judgments have received little attention by metacognitive researchers so far. The aim of this study was to systematically investigate how well EOL judgments can predict actual learning, and what factors may moderate their relative accuracy. In three experiments, undergraduate psychology students made EOL judgments on, then studied, and were tested on, lists of word-pairs (e.g., sun – warm). In Experiment 1, the Goodman-Kruskal gamma (G) correlations showed that EOL judgments were accurate (G = .74) when items varied enough in difficulty to allow for proper discrimination between them, but were less accurate (G = .21) when variation was smaller. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 and 3, we showed that the relative accuracy was reliably higher when the EOL judgments were correlated with a binary criterion (i.e., if an item was recalled or not on a test), compared with a trials-to-learn criterion (i.e., how many study and test trials were needed to recall an item). In addition, Experiments 2 and 3 indicate other factors to be non-influential for EOL accuracy, such as the task used to measure the EOL judgments, and whether items were judged sequentially (i.e., one item at a time in isolation from the other items) or simultaneously (i.e., each item was judged while having access to all other items). To conclude, EOL judgments can be highly accurate (G = .74) and may thus be of strategic importance for learning. Further avenues for research are discussed.

  • 2018. Andreas Jemstedt (et al.).

    To learn efficiently, many situations require people to judge what will be easy or difficult to learn, or how well it has been stored in memory. These metacognitive judgments are important to understand because they most likely guide how people behave when they learn, and consequently how much they learn. In this thesis, I focus on what is referred to as ease-of-learning (EOL) judgments, that is judgments about how easy or difficult a material will be to learn. EOL judgments have received relatively limited attention in the metacognitive literature. Therefore, this thesis also considers for comparison the more extensively researched judgments of learning (JOL), which are judgments of how well a studied material has been learned or how likely it is to be remembered on a later memory test. I had two major aims with my research. First, I aimed to investigate how accurate EOL judgments are, that is, how well they can predict the ease of future learning, and what moderates this accuracy. More precisely, I investigated what affects EOL judgment accuracy by varying how much an item-set varies in a predictive item characteristic, as well as varying methodological aspects of the judgment situation. The second major aim was to investigate what sources of information people use to make EOL judgments and how the information is used to make metacognitive judgments. In three studies, participants made EOL judgments for word pairs (e.g., sun – warm), or single words (e.g., bucket), studied the items, and tried to recall them on memory tests. In Study II, participants also made JOLs after studying the items. To estimate the accuracy of the judgments, the judgments were correlated with recall performance on memory tests. The results of the thesis show that EOL judgments can be accurate when they are made on a to-be-learned material which varies in a predictive item characteristic (Study I and II). In some conditions, EOL judgments are even as accurate as JOLs (Study II). Study II also supports the cue competition hypothesis, which predicts that, when people judge memory and learning, they sometimes rely less on one source of information if other information is available. Furthermore, Study III shows that processing fluency (the experience of effort associated with processing information), may be an important source of information for EOL judgments, and that people’s beliefs about available information can moderate how the information is used to make EOL judgments. Overall, the results show when EOL judgments will be accurate and when they will not, and provides evidence that people may use processing fluency to make EOL judgments even when it contradicts their beliefs. Importantly, the results also indicate that when multiple sources of information are available, information may compete for influence over metacognitive judgments.

  • Fredrik U. Jönsson (et al.).
Visa alla publikationer av Andreas Jemstedt vid Stockholms universitet

Senast uppdaterad: 6 september 2019

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