Contact
If you wish to be in touch with the Research Scool, please contact the researchers below.
Members of the NoNo Research School
- Visiting address
Frescati Södra huset
Universitetsvägen 10 D, plan 7 Rum D740
- Visiting address
Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3 H
- Visiting address
Renströmsgatan 6
University of Gothenburg
Apollonios Livadiotis
The central research task of my PhD project is to delve into the debate of epistemic normativity and argue for a novel form of epistemic conventionalism. To this end, I want to explore the complex nature of epistemic normativity, focusing on how epistemic norms are often intertwined with non-epistemic considerations, such as moral or prudential, and arguing for a refined understanding of epistemic normativity.
A different but related objective is to advance the debate on epistemic conventionalism by introducing a novel framework that understands epistemic norms as a conventionally established by-product of the function of our basic needs and capabilities.
Together, I want to show that the opponents of epistemic conventionalism demand more than required and that epistemic conventionalism has the resources to deliver the correct verdict's.
Supervisors:
University of Gothenburg
Markus Tschögl
My project is about motivated reasoning in the moral domain. More specifically, I am interested in how the costs and benefits of moral beliefs influence the way we reason about moral issues and what that means for morality more generally.
We don’t just hold moral beliefs, we hold them dear. Regardless of what you might think about their actual truth-value, epistemological status, social utility, or evolutionary usefulness, they are clearly not just things that track or express values, they are also things that have value for us as individuals.
The holding of moral beliefs can be beneficial, but also costly to the ones who hold them. In my thesis, I want to take this idea seriously and explore some of its implications and explanatory value. I think that looking at moral beliefs from that angle can help us better understand why it is so hard to find agreement about moral issues.
Supervisors:
Anne-Sofie Munk Autzen
Uppsala University
Seyyedeh Mahdiyeh Mousavi
I'm interested in exploring the normative nature of various notions within the domain of moral responsibility, such as blameworthiness, excuses, and forgiveness. I'm primarily a proponent of reason-based analysis of normative concepts, aiming to investigate whether it's possible to provide such an analysis for the aforementioned concepts.
Forgiveness, excuses, exemptions, and justifications all play their normative roles by rendering blaming attitudes inappropriate in different ways. My objective is to create a normative framework based on reasons, where all these concepts are coherently related to each other and to our broader concept of responsibility. A framework that distinguishes the unique normative role of each concept while maintaining its collaborative relationship with other concepts in the area of responsibility.
Supervisors:
Stockholms University
Mac Willners Aräng
I am researcher in climate ethics with a focus on carbon offsetting and climate engineering (or geoengineering). My PhD focuses on the issues of global distributive and procedural justice, compensation, and alternative actions that the prospect of climate engineering gives rise to.
Supervisors:
Uppsala University
Silvana Hultsch
My PhD project is on 'moral progress'. While there are many examples of historical developments that one may want to call 'morally progressive', it remains contested what exactly progressiveness consists in.
I develop a novel conception of moral progress that aims to be illuminating and useful in understanding moral progress and regress on the societal level, while avoiding the pitfalls of existing accounts.
Supervisors:
Uppsala University
Max McLoughlin
I am interested in the relationship between ethical theory and practice. My thesis explores the occasions when this relationship breaks down. For example, some ethical theories may require too much information or cognitive power to be implemented in realistic human contexts. Ohers may be practically self-defeating, that is, they may posit goals which, if aimed at, cannot be achieved.
Moreover, according to some philosophers ethical theories could 'alienate' agents from friendship, love, and important projects. Such considerations generate the need for 'self-effacement'. Ethical theories end up recommending their own removal from practical consciousness.
This raises several interesting questions, not only about moral psychology, but also about the nature of ethical theory and its role in practical life.
Supervisors:
Uppsala Unversity
Åke Gafvelin
In my PhD Project, I examine the relation between expressivism and fundamentality. Firstly, I argue that expressivism (in particular, quasi-realism) can be made precise using the notion of fundamentality. In particular, expressivism can be understood as a 1. metaphysical thesis that P-facts are not fundamental, nor (appropriately) reducible to the fundamental and 2. a linguistic thesis, that P-sentences serve a practical, rather than representational role. This gives an easy solution to the problem of Creeping Minimalism and arguably bypasses the Frege-Geach problem.
Secondly, I develop and argue for a kind of meta-metaphysical expressivism, which I call Meta-Expressivism, according to which the language of fundamentality itself is expressive. In particular, I argue that facts of the form [P is fundamental] are not fundamental (contra Sider 2011), and not themselves reducible to the fundamental. I argue that that these locutions are best understood as serving a practical, as opposed to representational role, in serving to express the adoption of metaphysical theories. The result is a position close to Global Expressivism, as championed by Price (2011), but one which allows us to retains the thought that some languages (as opposed to others) correspond to reality.
Supervisors:
Stockholm University
Ellen Svensson
I started my PhD in practical philosophy in the fall of 2024, as part of the Research School Norms and Normativity (NoNo). My research project is called "In AI We Trust? An Ethical Inquiry into AI Paternalism in Public Healthcare” and it focuses on the risk of AI paternalism in medical decision-making.
This project places particular emphasis on bioethics and AI ethics with the aim of exploring how AI paternalism will impact the bioethical norms of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice. Both my bachelor's and master's degrees are from Umeå University, where I have written about bioethics and ethical issues related to CRISPR and gene-editing technologies, the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as AI questions regarding autonomy.
Supervisors:
Stockholm University
Ellen Davidsson
I started my PhD in September 2023, as a part of the Norms and Normativity Research School (NoNo). I work primarily with the concept of objectification. In my dissertation, I explore whether objectification can be defined as a lack of empathy, and seek to establish the relation between the concept and recent theories on social norms, social ontology, social power, as well as ethics and epistemology.
Supervisors:
Last updated: January 20, 2025
Source: Department of Philosophy