Abstract

Philosophers have written a lot about moral and epistemic  uncertainty, uncertainty about what is the right thing to do and what to believe is the case in situations  where we lack moral guidance or sufficient knowledge. However, there is  one type of uncertainty that has gone fully unnoticed to philosophers:  we are often also uncertain about how we should feel. Uncertainty about how to feel or affective uncertainty generates affective  dilemmas and affective conflicts,  situations where we don’t know how to  feel or disagree with others about  emotions.

In this paper I show how affective dilemmas and conflicts are  similar but non-reducible to moral or epistemic dilemmas and conflicts,  and thus how existing proposals on uncertainty about morality or empirical matters cannot explain what affective uncertainty is  neither help reduce it. Grasping affective uncertainty  contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of  uncertainty.