Abstract

In my presentation I plan to critically discuss an argument defended by Shamik Dasgupta (cf. esp. his 2018 and unpublished ms.) to the effect that, because reasons exist for thinking that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative, and since this (primitive) normativity must but cannot be explained, nothing is objective, and hence Realism must be given up.  

In my presentation, I plan to argue: 

(1)   …that Dasgupta’s argument—which I understand as an argument about explanation—rests on ideas about whatneeds explaining as well as what counts as an adequate explanation that can—I suspect ought to—be resisted.

(2)   …that the scope of Dasgupta’s argument may not be as wide as he wants it to be: that those who accept a ‘sparse’ conception of what there is most likely do not have to accept that objectivity—and so Realism—constitutively requires that some things that exist are (primitively) normative and so will not have to face the explanatory challenge in the first place.

This is very much work in progress, which means that I don’t have a paper polished enough to warrant circulating. Those of you who want to prepare for the seminar can (but in no way need to) check out Dasgupta’s papers, which can be accessed via his website: https://shamik.net/