Abstract

The goal of the talk (based on joint work with Olle Risberg) is to offer a novel account of the nature of good reasoning, both practical and theoretical, where reasoning is understood to be a transition between attitudinal mental states such as beliefs and intentions.

The basic idea is that good reasoning is a matter of “following the flow” of normative support between attitudes, whereas bad reasoning is a matter of failing to do so (in one way or another). Call this the support-based account of good reasoning.

After introducing and motivating my preferred account of good reasoning, I critically evaluate its main competitors: the reasons-based account and the fittingness-based account. In doing so, I explain how the support-based account captures their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses.

I conclude by explaining how the support-based account of good reasoning can explain both what's right and what's wrong with the view of reasons as premises of good reasoning.