Abstract

Forming the basis of his theory of human psychology, ethics, and political philosophy, Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, his view that all finite things strive to persevere in their being, is a cornerstone of his philosophy. Several issues have been raised concerning this doctrine. However, a feature that is generally regarded as relatively straightforward is Spinoza’s contention that the conatus is a causal power.

In this talk, I will argue that this contention is in fact deeply puzzling. For it appears to be directly at odds with another core commitment of Spinoza’s, namely the view that all finite things depend on God not only for coming into being (for being created or produced) but also for remaining in being from one moment to the next (for being conserved), a view that is regarded as beyond question in the eyes not only of Spinoza but also of most early modern Cartesians and medieval Aristotelians.

But if this is so, I will show, it appears by Spinoza’s lights that the conatus cannot be a causal power. There is thus a tension right at the heart of Spinoza’s philosophical project. The aim of this talk is to understand how Spinoza can resolve this tension and, with that, deepen our understanding of the conatus doctrine.