Income inequality typically measures dispersion across populations, while analyses of other welfare dimensions focus on group differences. This study applies population-wide dispersion analysis to non-income dimensions of the level of living, comparing their trends with income inequality patterns. Using Sweden’s Level-of-Living survey data from 1968-2010, we analyzed inequalities in health, education, social relationships, civic participation, victimization, and residential space using mean average difference (MAD), relative mean average difference (RMAD) and concentration measures. Our findings challenge the assumption that non-income inequalities mirror income inequality trends. Only social relationships and participation showed partial alignment, with absolute gaps smallest during periods of low income inequality. Our results suggest that income inequality trends should not be automatically considered indicative of broader societal inequalities.

This article documents a surprising reversal in the long-standing gender gap in academic achievement: between 2021 and 2024, Swedish girls’ school grades declined sharply, whereas boys’grades remained stable, narrowing the gender gap by over a third. Using full-population data on official school grades and national test scores, the analysis shows that the decline is broad based, affecting nearly all subjects and concentrated among previously high-performing girls. Changes ingrading policy or long-term mental health trends are unlikely to account for the sudden downturn. Instead, the evidence points to behavioral changes in girls’ school engagement, possibly triggered by external shocks. Among the most plausible shocks are the rise of TikTok, which increased in popularity among girls just before the grade decline, and Covid-19 disruptions, which may have acted as a catalyst. Although the causes remain uncertain, the pattern signals a sociologically significant disruption, challenging assumptions of stable female academic advantage and inviting international replication.

Children with foreign-born parents attend early childhood education and care (ECEC) to a lower extent than native-background children in most European countries. This enrolment gap persists even in countries with universal right to ECEC, suggesting that structural constraints alone cannot explain it. This article examines (1) whether lower ECEC enrolment in Sweden is particularly pronounced among immigrant-origin groups known to experience later educational disadvantages, and (2) whether immigrant-background children face disadvantages in ECEC quality. We use data from the Swedish pre-school register 2014–2023, linked to parents’ sociodemographic characteristics. Enrolment differences are examined using longitudinal competing risk models, considering emigration as a competing risk. ECEC quality indicators are assessed using descriptive statistics and OLS models. We find that the enrolment gap is primarily driven by lower enrolment among non-refugee migrant children who subsequently emigrate before compulsory school. The conclusion is that increasing ECEC enrolment in Sweden is unlikely to reduce later educational inequalities as those not enrolled will rarely attend Swedish schools. More generally, in contexts with high levels of temporary migration, lower ECEC participation should not automatically be seen as a risk factor for later inequality. Moreover, we find that structural indicators of ECEC quality—such as teacher density, qualifications, and turnover—are similar between immigrant- and native-background children. However, children of immigrant background attend ECEC centres with more immigrant-background peers and foreign-born teachers, which can potentially affect their language development and later outcomes.

Integration theories assume that ingroup partnering (endogamy) among individuals of immigrant background declines as their exposure to majority society increases. We examine this for Sweden, a country with a large and diverse immigrant population. We study cohorts born 1986–1998 who either immigrated as children or were born in Sweden, thereby excluding pre-migration partnerships. We analyse both temporal and spatial exposure using population register data (n>1,000,000) covering both marriages and consensual unions. Our findings show high levels of endogamy by origin group, particularly among those with parents from the Middle East and Africa, where endogamy rates at country level range from 40% to 60%. Partnering with someone of majority background is rare, especially among women. The time exposure hypothesis finds some support as endogamy is higher the older a person was upon immigration. Also, for the second generation, endogamy declines with the family’s time in Sweden, although it remains high even after many years for several groups. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that spatial segregation drives endogamy. Ingroup partnering persists even with few co-ethnics in the neighbourhood, perhaps due to online meeting opportunities. Cultural attraction and aversion mechanisms appear to be more decisive than the opportunity structure for partnering.

Swedes uphold progressive attitudes regarding family, sexuality, and gender norms. At the same time, Sweden has had generous immigration policies for decades. This leads to challenges for children of immigrants, who must navigate between expectations from their family and the surrounding society. Therefore, this study asks whether children of immigrants’ attitudes relating to family, sexuality and gender roles adapt and approach those of their Swedish-background peers, using the Swedish branch of the CILS4EU survey (n = 5434). We account for dynamics in three ways: We compare attitudes of first- and second-generation immigrants; compare attitudes of youth to those of their parents; and study change in youth’s attitudes over time. In favour of acculturation, we find that second-generation immigrants have more liberal attitudes than first-generation immigrants, that immigrant-background youth are closer to majority peers in attitudes than their parents are to majority parents, and that gender norms of immigrant-background youth move closer to those of Swedish-background youth over time. For attitudes relating to family and sexuality, however, we find a divergence in attitudes over time, but not because immigrant-background youth become less liberal: Their views do become more liberal, but majority youth see an even stronger change in the same direction.